

# Communist China as a World Power

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### WEST GERMANY AS A WORLD POWER

January, 1960

Our first issue for 1960 opens with a topic that has increasingly taken precedence in international affairs. Our January issue, on *West Germany as a World Power* continues our series on the tensions and effects of the cold war. Articles include:

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**GERMANY IN THE AFTERMATH OF TWO WORLD WARS** by *Felix Hirsch*, Trenton State College, New Jersey.

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# Current History

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*The emergence of Communist China as a world power is increasingly evident. Recently, Communist China has threatened the peace and security of South Asia. How significant is the Chinese Communist threat? Will Red China some day assume the role of the dominant world power? Our December issue opens with an historical review of Chinese foreign policy, divided by the author into three periods: first, "bare survival"; second, "equality among nations"; and third, "restoration of the empire." As this author sees it, it is the last stage that "the Communists are working on."*

## An Historical View of Chinese Foreign Policy

By WERNER LEVI

*Professor of Political Science, University of Minnesota*

CHINA'S modern international relations are only a little over 100 years old. In the middle of the nineteenth century the major Western powers decided that the time had come to force China out of her seclusion and into relations with the modern world. The rationale for this measure, often advanced at that time, was that no nation had the right to refuse sharing its wealth with the rest of the world! China's initial reaction to such arrogance was the refusal to have any diplomatic contacts on an equal basis. But she failed in her attempt to deal with the Westerners as she was used to dealing with other invading barbarians, to wit: to demand tokens of submission, to permit limited and controlled trade, and to avoid all other contacts. The caliber of the Western invaders and their determination to reach their goals differed from those of the tribes in the territories surrounding China. The Chinese needed several decades to realize that their country was not the center of the universe and many never have been able to reconcile themselves to this fact. In the meantime, their refusal and inability to cope

with the outside world threatened the very existence of the nation.

The Chinese opposed early diplomatic, economic, military and ideological pressure from the West with procrastination, delaying tactics, and an attempt to utilize the rivalry among the foreign powers for their own ends. Neither the Chinese government nor the people were in any way prepared to handle modern international relations when the Westerners came to stay. They were not organized administratively: there was no foreign office, no foreign service, no national army. They were not organized socially: only cultural bonds held them together, there was little political consensus, no solidarity, no loyalty to the state; or at least in the absence of any previous serious challenge, these were not conscious and there were no channels for expressing them. The ruling class feared the Westerners as a threat to its position: the social system and hierarchy depended upon China's superiority over the nations of the world and the literati's monopoly of knowledge and ideas. Moreover the admission of foreigners into China aggravated a situation



already dangerously explosive because of dissatisfaction and unrest among the people.

The foreign powers took advantage of these weaknesses. They engaged in war three times, 1839–1842, 1856–1858, and 1860, to open the country for the residence, trade and missionary activity of the Westerners. A set of treaties was imposed upon China granting foreigners privileges most hurtful to the sovereignty, dignity and well-being of the Chinese. Foreigners enjoyed the right of residence in specified ports and cities, of travel, and of extraterritoriality. Foreign goods now entered with a fixed low tariff of five per cent *ad valorem*, which could be changed only by unanimous consent of all treaty powers. Foreign troops and gunboats, stationed on Chinese soil, were freely used for further advantage. Settlements and concessions in many cities were areas leased to and administered by foreigners. Gradually, China was forced to establish an organization for diplomatic contacts. These and other privileges meant that in fact the government's control over the country's administration and economy was severely limited. Privileges not expressly granted in treaties were often obtained by threats and bribery. The insertion of the most-favored-nation clause guaranteed that a privilege enforced by any one nation by whatever means would automatically accrue to all others.

This behavior of the foreigners reinforced the impression, first formed by the Chinese in earlier contacts with the West, that the Westerners were indeed barbarians. Since the last and worst condition of these unequal treaties, extraterritoriality, was not abolished until World War II, this impression remains fresh in the minds of many Chinese unto this day.

While antagonism to the Westerners was universal, there was some disagreement on the government's policy of refusing official dealings with them. Some of the literati realized that in the long run such resistance to contacts would not only be inadvisable, but would be impossible, unless parts of Western material culture were accepted. These men were pioneers of the reform movement which arose toward the end of the nineteenth century and eventually led to the modernization of China. They also were the personification of the intellectual upheaval

produced by the arrival of Western ideas. Among their heirs can be counted the Communists of today.

On a less spiritual level, the intellectual disputes and disagreements were paralleled by peasant rebellions and the great T'ai-p'ing Rebellion (1850–1864), whose deeper roots lay in the decline of the Chinese polity, but in which foreigners were also involved, both in physical participation and in political direction.

These disturbances during the first two or three decades of China's intensive contacts with the Western world made it clear that the country would have to pass through a long and agonizing process of cultural change before completing its metamorphosis from a traditional, Confucian nation to a modern state.

In the development of China's foreign policy, this process was reflected in three main stages: securing the bare survival of the state; recuperation of status and equality among nations; and restoration of the empire to its former size and glory. All national governments and all national regimes were inspired by this last goal. But not all were able to reach or even work directly toward it. Internal dissension, civil war, and external aggression were obstacles. The labor had to be divided and each regime had to build upon the achievement of its predecessor. The Manchu Dynasty—almost in spite of its efforts—completed the first stage. The Nationalists, under Kuomintang guidance, and after an interval of revolutionary disturbances, civil war and warlordism, completed the second. The Communists are working on the third.

#### Survival: The Manchu Contribution

The Manchu Dynasty had to bear the brunt of the Western impact. The period of its own decline coincided with the period of worst Western imperialism (1860–1914). Internal disintegration facilitated the empire building of the foreign powers, and this, in turn, hastened the disintegration. The Western powers and Japan were nibbling at the edges of the empire. China lost some islands off the mainland; parts of Indochina, Burma, Sinkiang and its northern domain along the Pacific coast; Tibet, Nepal and Korea. Not all these areas were integral parts of China;

indeed most of them were not. But they paid tribute to Peking, recognizing thereby some tenuous dependency.

Within China proper, the Western powers did not deny the form of sovereignty but thinned its substance by using their privileged positions to expand their interests. They made deep inroads into China's territorial, administrative, political, and economic integrity and ideological tradition. By the turn of the century, the major Western powers and Japan had carved out their spheres of interest, which threatened to become colonial territories.

The Chinese government was faced with these calamities at a time when it was fighting for survival against rebellious peasants and reformist literati. It was almost helpless and could do no more than play one foreign power against another, usually forced finally to appease them all at great cost. That the Boxer Rebellion (1899-1900) did not lead to the disappearance of China as a political unit was due mostly to the unwillingness of the powers themselves to take this last risky step, their rivalries within China, and their growing preoccupation with affairs closer to home. The circular letter by United States Secretary of State John Hay in 1900, preceded by a very similar letter from Paris, in which the powers were asked to maintain China's territorial and administrative entity in a common policy with the United States, was therefore welcome to most nations concerned. The exceptions were the Russians, who proceeded with their penetration of Manchuria, and the Japanese, who intended to do the same.

The territory of China south of the Great Wall was safeguarded for the foreseeable future, although the more subtle but equally effective economic and financial penetration by foreigners continued with increased vigor until World War I and, in more modest manner, thereafter. The survival of China as a state, albeit a crippled one, provided at least the minimal basis for subsequent governments to recover the country's equality among the nations of the world.

Before this task could be undertaken, however, China had to overcome the worst consequences of her revolution of 1911-1912. The interval between the fall of the Manchu Dynasty and the rise of the Nationalist regime

in the middle 1920's was marked by the brief reign of strong-man Yuan Shi-k'ai, civil war and warlordism. The country soon fell into complete chaos and the conduct of a systematic foreign policy was practically impossible. The foreign powers had difficulty in finding anybody with whom they could deal in the absence of any center of power. Formally, they recognized as the government whatever faction happened to be in control of Peking. This induced the warlords of the south to set up their competing puppet government of the revolutionaries under Sun Yat-sen who had established themselves in Canton after their flight from the capital.

In fact, the Westerners dealt mostly regionally with the various warlords and handled China's international relations among themselves in their own interest. Settling the affairs of China without consulting China had been their long standing practice anyway. In this way, China was pushed into World War I as an "ally" when that suited certain powers. Japan used the war in Europe to advance her position by the infamous Twenty-One Demands, designed to make China a dependency. At the Paris Peace Conference, only the Americans showed any sympathy for China's plight. But Mr. Wilson was so cleverly maneuvered into a dilemma by the Japanese, that he could not prevent the treatment of China as a negligible quantity. The Chinese delegation, loosely held together by hopes of settling their country's grievances, hardly received a hearing and withdrew. Again, at the Washington Conference of 1921-1922, similar hopes were disappointed, although this time, minor concessions were made and promises for a better future were given.<sup>1</sup>

#### Russia and the Rise of the Kuomintang

These experiences with the Western "allies" (among whom Russia was of course no longer present) and Japan were largely responsible for the turning away from the West and toward the Soviet Union of those in China who had any concern left for the fate of their country. This was not immediately noticeable because the warlords held the spotlight in China. But under the

<sup>1</sup> At a parallel conference with the Japanese in Washington, Japan abandoned some of the advances made during the war in Shantung Province.

spectacular surface, a group of people were active: intellectuals; workers in the port cities, students, who were destined soon again to run the country and whose nationalism was greatly stimulated by the diplomatic defeats and the disintegration of the nation. These men had no political power. But they were scattered across the country and provided some unity, if only ideologically. They were no longer alone, they had a following.

Large sections of the population had been aroused by the dramatic events within and without the country. There was much fleeting effervescence in mass demonstrations against corrupt officials, warlords, Japanese, or foreigners in general at the time of the Revolution, China's entry into the War, the Paris Peace Conference, the Washington Conference. But the striking novelty was that such events, especially international events, could cause any mass action at all, and every demonstration widened the circle of those who remained interested. What they needed for effectiveness was organization, and they found the instrument for this—for want of something better—in the Kuomintang, vegetating by the grace of the warlords in Canton. Their agitation assumed sufficient strength so that neither the warlords nor the foreigners could ignore it. They were fortunate also in that the democratization and liberalization of the West, following the First World War, was favorable to their cause. Nevertheless, many governments, more interested in the security of their privileges in China than in that country's democratization, remained suspicious of the Westernized, nationalist leaders (Chiang K'ai-shek at that time was the "Red General") and supported, as they had always, reactionary forces, more amenable to Western persuasion of various kinds.

Without expectation of sympathy or cooperation from the West, many nationalist leaders turned to the Soviet Union where they found a feigned eagerness to provide material and spiritual aid in the settlement of China's grievances. A marriage of convenience was contracted in the early years of the 1920's during which Russia helped to make China's new national life productive in political action, often to the disadvantage of the West.

Communist Russia's attraction for the Chi-

nese Nationalists was understandable. In Russia, there was a movement that had successfully engineered a revolution, appeared dynamic, seemed modern and advanced, claimed to solve the most serious economic problems, and had eliminated internal and external oppression. Here was, in short, a movement which had apparently found the way to solve the very problems with which the Chinese revolutionaries were struggling rather unsuccessfully. The Chinese wanted to learn how.

For the Russians, cooperation with the Chinese also had attractions. They could harm the West in a "quasi-colonial" area; they might win China for communism; and, immediately, they could frustrate the many White Russians in Manchuria and play China against Japanese ambitions on the mainland. In joining for common effort, the Kuomintang and communism each hoped to use the other for its own end.

With the help of Russian advisers, experts, and materials, the Kuomintang was molded into a tightly knit organization, comprising Right reactionaries, Left reactionaries, Communists, liberals, nationalists and those with many other shades of political conviction. At the newly created Whampoa Military Academy, under the presidency of Chiang K'ai-shek, a political army was formed. The collaboration of these most heterogeneous elements in party and army was frequently marred by subdued or open outbreaks of hostility. Nevertheless, the efficiency of these two instruments was demonstrated during the Nationalist revolution. This began in 1926 with the march north from Canton, and ended in 1928 in Peking with the nominal unification of the country under the National government of Chiang K'ai-shek and the defeat of the Communists as part of the revolutionary forces. In the course of its revolutionary progress the Kuomintang had become a conservative party, retaining many of the totalitarian features it had been given by its Communist assistants. The Kuomintang had now, in the main, fulfilled the "anti-militarism" part of its program. It turned immediately to the completion of the "anti-imperialism" part.

In fact, the realization of this had begun when the Nationalists were still in Canton. A very radical position on the abolition of

foreign rights and privileges had been a feature of their campaign to win public favor. The Nationalists were particularly effective in pointing out that since the war ten states had signed equal treaties with China and that China was now justified in abolishing unilaterally the unequal treaties. The public temper clearly supported such a position and forced Peking to take a similar stand, though with the advocacy of milder methods.

Foreign reaction was surprisingly conciliatory. There were many reasons for this. But the most important ones were that the foreigners wanted to strengthen the Peking warlords against the Canton Nationalists and that they were afraid a rigid stand would play into the hands of the Communists. The Chinese, even those who did not like the Communists, began to recognize the value of their existence for China's policy and began to play them against the West whenever possible. Slowly at first, in 1925 and 1926, and more rapidly when the conservative nature of the Kuomintang became evident, foreigners began to surrender their special privileges. After 1931, only extraterritoriality remained until the Japanese occupation of the mainland during World War II made that illusory.

The Soviet Union was the one nation which did not participate in this process. Her relations with China had taken the opposite course. At the time of the Revolution, the Communists had announced with great fanfare that they would surrender all the ill-gotten gains of Tsarist imperialism and they did, indeed, end their extraterritoriality because this hurt the White Russians in China more than it benefited the Communists. It is surprising that the Soviet Union has reaped such great propaganda benefit ever since from these declarations, for when it came to negotiate the actual surrender of the substantial rights and privileges in Manchuria and some of the outlying Chinese territories, the Russians not only refused to do so but went about to recover what they had lost during the revolution and more. By the middle of the 1920's, the Soviet Union's position in Outer Mongolia, Sinkiang and Manchuria was equal to or better than that of Tsarist Russia.

The National government did not even wait for the completion of the country's uni-

fication and the full defeat of warlords and Communists before it began to work on the restoration of the empire. A Commission on Mongolian and Tibetan affairs was established in 1929 with the intention of reaffirming and fortifying the Chinese supremacy over these territories. There were indications that other territories, formerly under Chinese suzerainty, as parts of Nepal, Ladhak, Bhutan, would some day be reincorporated into the empire. Success in these enterprises was denied to the government first because of Russian opposition and then by the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931.

### Russian Help against Japan

This last event produced some unity among the rival groups in China, enhancing and strengthening her international position, but not enough to enable her to take a strong stand against Japan. Efforts to obtain international assistance through the League of Nations failed. China was thrown back once more on the device of buying the aid of one power to help against another. Most powers were not interested at any price. They had their own troubles at home and the truth had gradually been revealed that China did not offer the economic benefits whose supposed existence had once lured Westerners to her shores. The Soviet Union, apprehensive about Japan's future moves, was responsive to Chinese advances, and the many border incidents bedeviling the relations between the two states suddenly ceased and were replaced by the resumption of diplomatic relations in 1932.<sup>2</sup> This warning to Japan was so minor that the Japanese proceeded to expand their control and influence in Manchuria—now Manchukuo—and Northern China until they resumed full military action in China proper, in 1937, before Chiang K'ai-shek succeeded in building up

(Continued on page 338)

<sup>2</sup> Broken off in 1928.

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*In a study of Russian-Chinese relations, this author leaves us with the thought-provoking comment that "Moscow's greatest anxiety must still be the future impact of China on the U.S.S.R. itself, the more so since China's growth seems an inexorable and irreversible force in history. One need only recall that China's rate of growth, in population, continues to be five or six times greater than Russia's."*

# The Moscow-Peking Alliance: The First Decade

By CHARLES B. McLANE

*Chairman of the Department of Russian Civilization, Dartmouth College*

WHEN on October 1, 1959, Peking celebrated the completion of a decade of Communist rule over China, the Chinese Communists themselves were completing nearly four decades of alliance with Moscow. The first 30 years of this alliance, most concede, are the most important single factor determining the course of events in China since the Communists came to power. To students both of China and of the U.S.S.R. it is endlessly absorbing to inquire into the changes that have occurred in the relations between the two countries in the past decade and into the forces that may alter the relationship further.

It should be said at the outset that the pre-1949 relationship between Moscow and the Chinese Communists has never been clearly understood abroad and even now, despite numerous recent studies on the subject, is not susceptible of any precise interpretation. Thus whether one finds the Moscow-Peking axis strengthened or weakened as the result of events in the last decade depends in large measure on the view one holds of the

relationship before the Chinese Communists came to power. It would seem to be a minimum requirement for anyone attempting to evaluate the course of Soviet-Chinese Communist relations since 1949 to state his understanding of this relationship in earlier years. The present writer, basing his views in the main on a study covering the so-called "lean years" of Chinese communism,<sup>1</sup> views the pre-1949 relationship as follows.

In the first place, Mao's ascendancy in the Chinese Communist movement was the result of his own maneuvers within the Chinese party and was not the consequence of any stratagems devised in Moscow. He had been a founding member of the party in 1921 but it was not until the early 1930's, after the era of Moscow's most intense preoccupation with the revolution in China had ended and Comintern agents had been withdrawn, that Mao gained control of the party apparatus. At this time he was beyond Moscow's reach, embattled as he was in the mountains of South China fighting off Chiang Kai-shek's "bandit extermination" campaigns.

Mao's ascendancy in the party was a hollow victory as long as the Communists in China remained scattered and disorganized, but after the Long March to North China in 1934-1935, and especially during the era of the united front against Japan after 1937, Mao's undisputed leadership of a revitalized and consolidated Communist movement became an important factor in the relations be-

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<sup>1</sup> *Soviet Policy and the Chinese Communists, 1931-1946*, Columbia University Press, 1958.



tween this movement and Moscow. In a way that no other foreign Communist leader had until this time imagined possible, Mao had built for himself a position of relative independence with respect to the Soviet leadership.

Independence, however, does not necessarily mean rebellion, and Mao's should not be noted without adding that he never used it to embarrass the Soviet leadership or to reject Soviet policies which he may have found objectionable. For instance, Mao promptly applauded both the Nazi-Soviet pact of 1939 and the Soviet-Japanese pact of 1941 although both undermined the anti-fascist movement in China to which the Communists were then deeply committed. Similarly Mao supported Stalin's pact with Chiang Kai-shek in August, 1945, despite the fact that Stalin's action immediately reduced the likelihood of Soviet assistance to the Communists in their struggle against Chiang's government. Mao's ideological pronouncements respecting the Chinese revolution were virtually identical with Stalin's, despite the preponderance of peasants among his forces and the need to take this factor into account in shaping strategy.

Moscow in the meantime—and this is an equally important consideration in weighing the Soviet-Chinese Communist relationship—found no unorthodoxy in Mao's leadership that required public exposure. Stalin's attitude toward Mao may on occasion have been ambiguous (as when, during the war, for instance, he confided to American diplomats that Mao's brand of communism was *ersatz*), but it was never hostile. This absence of open hostility between the two leaderships, even if it disguised only meagerly an absence of cordiality, was nonetheless of some significance since it meant that there were no scars to be healed when Mao stood ready at the end of World War II to bid for control of all China.

What role Moscow played in encouraging Mao's final bid for power is a matter of dispute among students of Far Eastern politics. In the view of the present writer, Soviet encouragement of Chinese Communist ambitions was initially negligible. This is reflected in the repeated emphasis in the Soviet press after the war on a coalition government in

China; in at least one reported recommendation to the Chinese Communists by Stalin that they disband their armies in the interests of a peaceful resolution of the China problem;<sup>2</sup> and in the systematic stripping of Manchurian industries by Soviet occupation forces—a step that is hardly compatible with a strategy contemplating the use of Manchuria as a base from which Mao's forces might subdue the rest of the country. Mao, however, was evidently determined to force the issue in China and in due course Stalin relented and gave his blessing to this effort.

Perhaps he had no alternative. To have balked, now that the first genuinely self-propelled Socialist revolution since 1917 was at hand, might have compromised Soviet leadership of the world Communist movement, which Stalin had repeatedly said stood on the brink of success and upon which Moscow still relied for support of many of its varied international objectives. At any event, after mid-1946 the Chinese Communists enjoyed Moscow's full moral support at least and doubtless material support as well, though the extent of the latter has never been revealed. Mao appears to have been fully satisfied with Moscow's attitude and in July, 1949, responded with his famous "leaning to one side" pronouncement. "... The Chinese people," he said, "must either side with imperialism or with socialism. There can be no question of remaining between them, there is no third path. . . . Internationally, we belong to the anti-imperialist front headed by the Soviet Union, and for genuine friendly aid we must look to this front."

This was the situation on the eve of Mao's coming to power.

#### Liabilities in the Sino-Soviet Alliance

Before looking at the actual course of relations between Moscow and Peking since 1949, it is worth imagining for a moment what far-sighted individuals in each of the capitals may have anticipated as the liabilities of the alliance, now that the Communists had come to power in China. The gains were clear: for Russia—security in the Far East, a greater role for Moscow in Pacific affairs, an important new avenue for the

<sup>2</sup> Vladimir Dedijer, *Titto* (New York, 1953), p. 322.

spread of communism to South and Southeast Asia; for China—assurance of at least minimum Soviet protection while the new regime consolidated itself, economic and technical assistance to help close the vast gap between China's level of economy and that of other great powers, perhaps in due course enough diplomatic and military support to enable the new government to liquidate the remnants of Chiang's regime and recover Formosa. These were the more obvious advantages, of which much was made, either implicitly or explicitly, in pronouncements emanating from both capitals. But what of the liabilities? We do not necessarily exaggerate early sources of tension between Moscow and Peking in noting certain anxieties that must have been sensed even if never expressly articulated.

On the Soviet side, there were, in the present writer's view, at least three different reasons for uneasiness. The first was that the Chinese leadership might, through its excesses, bring discredit to socialism. This might occur in any one of several ways. Too ambitious a program, for instance, in stabilizing the Chinese economy and launching industrialization might lead to bankruptcy. Too vigorous a suppression of opposition elements before the regime was strong enough to protect itself might lead to wide-scale counter-revolution, and perhaps intervention by the United States. Too belligerent a foreign policy, with respect to Formosa, say, or the regimes in Southeast Asia, could antagonize many nations, like India and Indonesia, whose benevolent neutrality Moscow counted on in its war of nerves with the West. Any one of these circumstances or any combination of them would bring loss of face to communism. At the very worst, Moscow might have to intervene, at great cost, to set matters right. Until 1949, communism had been a commodity on the international market which had borne an exclusively Soviet stamp; the Russians must inevitably have questioned the qualifications of any but themselves to display the product to best advantage.

A second source of concern to the Russians was the role China would now play in the world Communist movement. Certainly China would be no satellite like Poland or Hungary. No matter how adroitly Moscow

handled its relations with Peking, the special claims of the Chinese Communists to independence based on their long and largely solitary struggle with Chiang Kai-shek would have to be respected. Would Mao use this independence, now he was in power, to claim leadership of an Asian approach to communism different from Moscow's?

And the third source of anxiety in Moscow—perhaps not so sharply sensed until after the census of 1953 which showed a population in mainland China of 582 million (by 1959 estimated at over 650 million)—was the impact an emergent and overpopulated China might have on the U.S.S.R. itself. Was Russia nurturing a Frankenstein?

As far as the Chinese were concerned, their anxieties over the association with Moscow were more immediate and more temporary. How exacting a master would Stalin be? Time was on their side. If they could maintain a dignified relationship with Moscow for several years, they could make good their independence. But if Stalin proved truculent, the Chinese leadership, in the wake of a great national revolution that had been directed as much against imperialism as against the preceding regime, could anticipate difficulties in justifying the alliance with Russia to an aroused citizenry.

The course of Sino-Soviet relations since 1949 should be considered against this partial catalogue of hypothetical liabilities as they may have been seen by thoughtful persons at the time of Mao's victory.

### Relations until Stalin's Death

While Stalin lived, relations between Moscow and Peking remained deceptively formal. In accordance with Mao's assertion that the new regime would "lean to one side," Peking dutifully followed Soviet leadership in international affairs. Yugoslavia's prompt invitation to exchange ambassadors, for instance, was rebuffed. Peking's attitude toward the United States remained as unyielding as Stalin could have wished it, despite initial efforts by the State Department to keep the door open for negotiations.

Moscow, meanwhile, acknowledged China's special position in the Communist bloc by showing greater deference to representatives from Peking than to those from

Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union supported China's bid for a seat in the United Nations, even boycotting the Security Council while the issue was in abeyance—a circumstance that denied Russia a crucial veto when the Security Council voted to send troops to Korea. Yet China was at no time during these years treated as an equal power, or anything like an equal power. If Mao had any pretensions of sharing power with Moscow in bloc relations or in cold war strategy, Stalin ignored them. Mao appeared willing to wait. In short, all was correct, yet the protestations of deep and lasting amity between Moscow and Peking were singularly unconvincing to most Western observers.

The formal terms of the alliance were spelled out in a series of agreements announced early in 1950 following many weeks of secret negotiation. Mao himself went to Moscow. The nine weeks he remained in the Soviet capital may not have been an inordinately long stay, on his maiden visit to the center of world communism after 30 years of association with the movement, but the terms of the agreement revealed that Moscow had driven a hard bargain. Russia remained in control of Port Arthur and was to share control of the Manchurian railway system, provisions that were virtually identical with the Sino-Soviet Pact of 1945 concluded with Chiang Kai-shek. In return, Moscow undertook to ally with Peking in the event of any attack by Japan "or any state allied with Japan." The financial terms of the agreement were meager indeed, measured against China's economic needs: Moscow offered a five-year credit of no more than \$60 million (U.S.) annually, at one per cent interest, to be used as payment for specified industrial equipment from the U.S.S.R. These agreements remained unchanged for nearly three years.

Peking's initiating role in the major international episode during Stalin's last years, the war in Korea, is obscure. Certainly the tone of China's propaganda at this time suggests Peking's sympathy with the North Korean effort, but whether Peking prodded Moscow into underwriting the venture, or *vice versa*, cannot be said with any degree of certainty. At a crucial juncture, in the fall

of 1950, China threw its "volunteers" into the breach to prevent the collapse of the North Korean regime and a suspected penetration of Manchuria by MacArthur's forces. During the long and uneasy truce in Korea following the June, 1951, armistice Moscow and Peking appeared to be coordinated in their policies, but with no more than a perfunctory display of common objectives.

At the end of 1952, Chou En-lai, in Moscow, negotiated certain revisions of the 1950 agreements. The Russians were permitted to remain in Port Arthur, at Peking's "request," but the Manchurian railways were to be returned exclusively to China without compensation. Provision was also made (but announced only two years later) for a closer linking of China to the U.S.S.R. through the joint construction of a railway through Outer Mongolia. During this same period Liu Shao-chi, then as now Mao's principal aide in China, spent three months in Moscow following his attendance at the Nineteenth Congress of the Russian Communist Party. The substance of his talks with Soviet leaders has never been detailed, but it is a good assumption that they concerned, among other things, greater economic aid to China in connection with the Soviet Five Year Plan scheduled to begin in 1953. The Chou and Liu visits were the first feeble indication to the outside world, before Stalin's death, that the Sino-Soviet alliance was at least open to re-negotiation and change.

#### Since Stalin's Death

Stalin's death in March, 1953, introduced an important new factor in Sino-Soviet relations by removing the major obstacle to China's emergence as an equal partner in the alliance. Until at least mid-1957, more than four years after Stalin's death, the leadership issue in Russia was not wholly resolved. Since during this same period Mao's leadership in China underwent no known challenge, inevitably his prestige rose. As a consequence Peking gained a greater voice in the councils of world communism. Among the first moves of the post-Stalinist leadership was a reassertion of the tie with China. Chou En-lai, for instance, marched alongside Soviet leaders at Stalin's funeral,

the only non-Soviet functionary accorded this honor. At the end of March, Moscow announced the conclusion of new economic agreements with Peking. Six months later these agreements were spelled out in more detail, showing Russia's commitment to assist the Chinese in the construction of 141 "large-scale" industrial projects. In the meantime the number of visits to China by delegations of Soviet experts rose sharply.

The climax to this first phase of reactivating the Sino-Soviet tie was the Khrushchev-Bulganin visit to Peking in the fall of 1954. On this occasion the alliance was ostentatiously reaffirmed and a series of declarations and communiqués spelled out in detail agreement on a wide range of subjects. Russia and China were henceforth to coordinate their foreign policies through regular consultation. Agreement was announced on overall objectives in Asia, including the so-called "five principles" which had previously formed the basis of an agreement between China and India. Port Arthur was to be evacuated. Jointly operated stock companies established in Stalin's time were to revert to exclusive Chinese control. Additional technical and scientific cooperation was promised. A new (third) railway linking China and Russia was to be constructed through Sinkiang. In short, the Moscow-Peking axis was entering a new era.

This new era opened not only because Moscow feared that unless more concessions were made to China Peking would become unmanageable, but also because the Peking regime had by this time registered certain undeniable successes on its own. At Geneva, for instance, in the summer of 1954, Chou En-lai had proved himself a capable and independent negotiator with non-Communist powers, a reputation he was to advance still further at Bandung the following year. And at home the new regime, with little help from Moscow, had entrenched itself firmly and solved the most glaring economic problems facing the country at the end of the war. Increasingly, therefore, Peking was able to negotiate with Moscow not merely as a black mailer, but from a position of independent strength.

De-Stalinization, more than any other single development since 1953, opened the way

for China's full debut as an independent force in the Communist world. For six months after Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin in March, 1956, and after his reported revelation in Warsaw that Stalin had greatly strained Sino-Soviet relations during his last years, Peking clearly seemed to identify itself with the Eastern European countries against Moscow. This was a period, especially, of a blossoming Sino-Polish honeymoon; Mao himself was reported to be planning a visit to Warsaw. But the honeymoon was short-lived. Following the Hungarian uprising of November the Chinese declared themselves abruptly and unequivocally opposed to any division of this sort within the Communist bloc. Mao elected, within the camp to which he already "leaned," to lean still further toward Moscow.

Why Peking switched its ground is still much debated among students of international relations. Some argue that it was a manifest indication of Peking's continued subservience to Moscow; others that Mao, if anything *plus royaliste que le roi*, would not condone unorthodoxy in the Communist camp. But these explanations are not entirely satisfactory. Mao was not in all things "subservient" to Moscow, as his "hundred flowers" campaign and admission of "contradictions" between classes under socialism were presently to indicate. Moreover, he had himself been too long independent in the Communist world not to sympathize with certain objectives of the Polish and Hungarian, and perhaps the Yugoslav, leaders. But by the end of 1956 Mao was a member of the Praetorian Guard. To have condoned independence on the scale that Poland, Hungary and Yugoslavia sought it would have been to jeopardize the integrity of the entire Socialist camp. China no less than Russia would have been the loser. In this writer's view, then, neither a sense of indebtedness or loyalty to Moscow nor ideological preferences but very practical considerations of bloc politics led Mao to a reassertion of orthodoxy in 1956.

During 1957 and 1958, Peking continued to reaffirm the Sino-Soviet alliance. There were during these years several developments in China which aroused little enthusiasm in Moscow—such as the short-lived "hundred flowers" campaign of 1957 and



the more ambitious launching of the commune system the following year. Yet these should be regarded as domestic innovations, permissible in the post-Stalinist era, and need not suggest serious disagreement over long-range goals and strategies. Most important, they did not deter the progress of outwardly cordial relations between Moscow and Peking in the international sphere. In November, 1952, Mao attended a conclave of Communist representatives in Moscow and behaved as though no words of discord had ever ruffled the surface of the Sino-Soviet alliance.

In the spring of 1958 he followed Soviet initiative in reading Tito out of the Communist fraternity for the second time. Khrushchev responded in kind. In August, 1958, he flew secretly to Peking to consult with the Chinese leaders in the midst of a crisis in the Near East; his altered approach to the pending "summit" conference on his return to Moscow was so marked that Peking's probable influence on him in this matter cannot be passed over (though it can perhaps never be proved). In September, during a new crisis over Quemoy, Khrushchev bluntly cautioned the West that "an attack on China is an attack on us." Only the most stubborn student of the Moscow-Peking axis could fail to acknowledge that Russian and Chinese strategies and destinies were now inextricably intertwined.

The events of 1959 are too much with us to sift through for valid new evidence on Sino-Soviet relations. But they surely reveal no marked change. Peking's suppression of the Tibetan uprising in March—an episode which in world opinion was reminiscent of Russia's suppression of the Hungarian uprising two and a half years earlier—was applauded in Moscow. Communist action in Laos, which possibly is inspired by Peking, has been similarly condoned. The Indian border incidents, to be sure, are treated more cautiously in the Soviet press, since there is some embarrassment here to Moscow's objectives in New Delhi. It should be noted too that this border issue is old and complex; not even Nehru has suggested that Chinese penetration into territories claimed as Indian constitutes Communist aggression comparable to that in North Korea or Laos.

China in the meantime hailed Khrush-

chev's visit to the United States in appropriate terms and greeted him, on his arrival in Peking following his American visit, with the show of warmth the occasion required. In short, if there are significant rifts in the Moscow-Peking axis arising from or revealed in the events of the past year, a greater perspective than we now have is needed to detect them.

### Perspective and Prospects

If one were to select a most important single observation on the Sino-Soviet alliance in the past decade, it would perhaps be that the evidence of unity greatly outweighs the evidence of disunity. And yet when predictions are made for the next decade, few are sanguine that this will continue.

What has happened to the anxieties we attempted to catalogue above? Peking's, it may be imagined, have been largely dispelled. Stalin is dead. The new Soviet leadership, whether willingly or not, has acknowledged China as an equal—or very nearly equal—partner in the direction of world Communist strategy. The significance of Khrushchev's three visits to Peking in the last five years and Mao's one to Moscow should be lost on no one. Nor should anyone overlook the fact that Russia has found it expedient to increase its annual outlay in China from \$60 million in the early years of the alliance to an estimated \$200 million today. Peking must feel increasingly confident that whatever developments the future may hold, Russia is not likely to intervene in Chinese domestic affairs and that China will continue to share leadership with Russia in determining Communist strategy in world affairs.

Moscow's anxieties too have been dispelled on certain points. China, for instance, is no longer likely to be an embarrassment to the Soviet leadership, at least in the sense that was perhaps once feared. The Peking government has surely blundered on occasion. Exaggerations of the 1958 grain harvest that, when finally corrected, reduced estimates of the 1959 yield by nearly half were hardly a good advertisement for socialism; nor were belated admissions that the entire product of an ambitious program in 1958 to make steel in home-made blast fur-

nances was unusable for industrial purposes. Yet these "blunders" are trivial in comparison with the undeniable gains the Mao leadership has made in Chinese economic development during the past decade. Moscow need not fear Chinese bankruptcy. Nor, in the area of international affairs, has Moscow yet had occasion to be profoundly disturbed by Peking's actions. A determination to recover Formosa is still, beyond doubt, as important an objective of Peking's foreign policy as it ever was, but for some years now the Chinese have seemed willing to pursue this objective in a way that would not hopelessly involve the Soviet Union.

As far as Chinese leadership of an indigenous Asian approach to communism is concerned, two things might be said. The mere existence of an Asian concept of communism does not appear to have caused Moscow great concern to date. There is such a concept beyond doubt, based more on the Chinese experience than the Russian, but it does not violate fundamental Marxian principles as Moscow enunciates them. Perhaps the present Soviet leadership is less particular on this point than Stalin was, or more appreciative of the different circumstances affecting Communist strategy today as compared with those affecting Bolshevik strategy half a century ago.

The question of Chinese leadership, however, is a different matter. The extent of this leadership, at Moscow's expense, in South and Southeast Asia has not yet been revealed but is suspected by virtually all students of this topic. Moscow cannot but be disturbed by this eclipse of its ancient prerogative to chart the course of Communist revolutions throughout the world. Nor can it view with equanimity, once the air has cleared, such episodes as Chou En-lai's playing the role of arbiter between Russia and Poland in 1956.

Moscow's greatest anxiety must still be the future impact of China on the U.S.S.R. itself, the more so since China's growth seems an inexorable and irreversible force in history. One need only recall that China's rate of growth, in population, continues to be five or six times greater than Russia's. Not a few foreigners traveling in recent years in parts of the Soviet Union bordering on China have heard Russians predict, unofficially of course,

that it is merely a matter of time before the Chinese will "overrun us all"—the "us" here referring, in one of those rare instances when a Russian forgets ideological differences in the face of a greater threat, to Russia and the West alike.

When all is said and done, the best advice to soothsayers where Sino-Soviet relations are concerned is caution. If Harrison Salisbury cares to speculate that Khrushchev's visit to the United States was calculated to hasten a *modus vivendi* with the West before China becomes "a full-fledged member in the world club of nuclear powers"<sup>3</sup>—thus implying inevitable future discord between Russia and China—he needs to make his speculation against the background of an extraordinarily firm Sino-Soviet alliance to date, as firm an alliance as has existed between any two great powers in the twentieth century. Certainly no one doubts the existence of different and sometimes conflicting objectives in Soviet and Chinese foreign policies, any more than one questions their existence in the policies of England and the United States. But one need not assume a monolith, in the post-Stalinist era, to imagine successful collaboration between Communist powers, whether or not they have nuclear arms.

Finally, as a caution to soothsayers, the variables in the Moscow-Peking axis can never be too scrupulously attended to. Let us consider one: to put it in Allen Whiting's words, "the relative stability of the two élites in terms of domestic opposition."<sup>4</sup> It is generally conceded today that an important factor in Mao's gaining a greater voice in Sino-Soviet councils was the instability of the Soviet leadership following Stalin's death. But Mao too must die and since orderly transfer of power is not generally assumed in dictatorships, instability in a succeeding Chinese leadership will affect Peking's relationship to Moscow. As time passes the number of these variables grows and their complexity increases. To analyze or predict the course of Sino-Soviet relations without due reference to variables becomes, for amateur and professional alike, an idle pastime.

<sup>3</sup> New York Times, September 11, 1959, p. 1.

<sup>4</sup> Allen S. Whiting, "Dynamics of the Moscow-Peking Axis," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, January, 1959, p. 103.

*Discussing Communist Chinese expansion in South Asia, this author points out that "Communist China already has its foot squarely in the gateway to Southeast Asia. By giving aid to the Communists in Vietnam it won a satellite which can be effectively used to penetrate further into the region." In addition, because of geographical factors, "aggression is almost impossible to prove."*

## Chinese Thrust in Southeast Asia

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**B**EFORE World War II, China was regarded as the most serious though latent threat to the security of Southeast Asia. Its teeming millions, its large, centrally located land-mass, and its ancient imperial attitude toward the region made the foreign rulers and native peoples apprehensive for the distant if not the immediate future. China had for a long time regarded the countries of Southeast Asia as vassals, demanding tribute of them. Siam paid this tribute until only a century ago. Moreover, the large Chinese communities in the region were looked upon as potential advance guards of China's thrust southward.

If these fears had any basis before the war, what now? Before the war China was divided and weak; today it is strong and a member of a powerful bloc, its population is exploding, and the Western powers have

withdrawn from the region, leaving a power vacuum which Seato is trying to fill with only limited support from the region. Moreover, the present masters of the enormous mass of Chinese are committed to an aggressive ideology.

If Peking did not try to make use of the 12 or more million Chinese in Southeast Asia for its own purposes it would be strange indeed, for these overseas Chinese communities are obviously potential instruments of its policy. Moreover, in taking a keen interest in the overseas Chinese and in seeking to enlist them in its cause the Communist regime is following a policy pursued by Chinese governments since about 1890.

The number of ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia, or the Nanyang as the region is known among Chinese, can only be roughly estimated for the reason that the Chinese migration to this region began a long time ago—long before the Westerners came—and until recent decades there was much intermarriage with native women. As a result of these mixed marriages there was some assimilation with the native population, but not so much as might be expected. Most of the families resulting from the mixed marriages remained Chinese in outlook and continued as members of the Chinese community. It is generally estimated that the Chinese constitute about five or six per cent of the total population of the region. However, this percentage varies greatly from country to country. In Singapore they constitute about 80 per cent of the population, in the Federation of Malaya nearly 40 per cent, but in the Philippines less than one per cent. Percentage estimates for the other

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countries are as follows: British Borneo, 25; Thailand, 16; South Vietnam, 8; Indonesia, 2.5; and Burma, 1.7.

The importance of the Chinese in the economy of all of the countries of Southeast Asia is much greater than their number would suggest. Nearly everywhere they constitute the bulk of the middle class, providing the skilled labor and professional services, and serving as middlemen while the native peasants till the land. In many areas they dominate the retail trade. Many of the rice mills and much of the rice trade are in their hands; they are also prominent in banking, tin mining and the rubber trade. Where they are industrial workers they have taken leading roles in the trade unions. It is evident that the overseas Chinese could be effective instruments of Peking's policy.

The prominence of the Chinese in the economic life of Southeast Asia is the more noticeable because there has been little assimilation with the native populations. The Chinese organized chambers of commerce, opened branches of Chinese banks, published Chinese language newspapers, established schools often with imported Chinese as teachers, and formed secret societies and social clubs. The Chinese communities developed into powerful, compact minorities with little likelihood of ever becoming assimilated voluntarily.

Until about 1890 the Chinese government's attitude towards Chinese emigrants was one of complete indifference. It then reversed its policy and instituted a number of measures with the object of binding the overseas Chinese more closely to the motherland. Government missions were sent out to the emigrant communities for the purpose of inspiring a renewed loyalty among them. The overseas Chinese responded to these advances. They gave Sun Yat-Sen and his movement much material aid, probably making the revolution possible. For this support they were rewarded. In 1911, the Chinese in the Dutch East Indies were invited to elect representatives to the provincial council at Canton and in 1912 the Chinese chambers of commerce abroad sent representatives to Peking to participate in the election of six "overseas" senators for which the new Republican Constitution provided.

Nationalist China became increasingly in-

terested in the Chinese in the Nanyang. Chinese consular officials in the countries of Southeast Asia were instructed to register all Chinese in their area. In 1932, an Overseas Affairs Commission was established, which was not unlike a colonial office. Acting through Chinese community organizations, it looked after the welfare of the overseas communities, fostering schools, hospitals and cultural activities. There was also an Overseas Education Board which investigated and registered Chinese schools abroad, granted them subsidies, awarded scholarships and supervised the training of teachers for the overseas schools. The interest of the Nationalist government was more than cultural; the Draft Constitution of the Chinese Republic, the organization of the Kuomintang Party and the Organic Law of the Peoples' Political Council all provided for the participation of overseas Chinese in the political life of China.

The Chinese in the Nanyang responded readily to this manifestation of solicitude on the part of the motherland. Many sent their children to China to be educated. The Chinese press closely followed events in China and reflected Kuomintang views on foreign policy and world affairs. The Nanyang Chinese organized and maintained well-disciplined branches of the Kuomintang. The boycott against Japan was widely observed and sometimes enforced by terrorism. The overseas Chinese contributed generously to patriotic funds and gave financial support to the Nationalist government. The effect of the Chinese policy with respect to its overseas nationals was to develop a group which was already economically powerful into a compact, unassimilable minority strongly oriented toward a foreign country.

#### Reaction in the Nanyang

The growth of an alien nationalism among the overseas Chinese naturally provoked a reaction on the part of both the governments and peoples of the countries of Southeast Asia. Among other things it stimulated the nationalist movements in these countries; the Indonesian nationalist movement had its inception in an anti-Chinese movement among the batik workers of Java.

In Siam, the only country in the region which never lost its political independence



and where the Chinese almost completely dominated the economic and commercial life, the reaction was sharp. The Siamese nationalists, who came into power by revolution in 1932, adopted a series of measures aimed at breaking the hold of the Chinese on the economic life of the country and at forcing a rapid assimilation. All political parties and societies were forbidden; the collection of money for war purposes was made illegal in 1937; nearly all Chinese newspapers were closed by government order in 1939; a number of Chinese private schools were closed for failure to comply with the law requiring all schools to conduct instruction in the Siamese language; Chinese banks were closed and a number of prominent Chinese were imprisoned or deported on the grounds of having engaged in the illegal transmission of funds to China. Later, Chinese were excluded from a number of professions and trades. Siam refused to enter into diplomatic relations with China because it did not wish to have Chinese diplomatic and consular representatives on its territory, as they undoubtedly would seek to exercise jurisdiction over the numerous Chinese in the country.

Colonial governments in the other countries found the Chinese useful in the economic development of the area and welcomed Chinese emigrants. The one exception was the United States government in the Philippines, which applied its Oriental exclusion laws to its Asian colony. This accounts for the small number of Chinese in that country today. The Netherlands welcomed Chinese immigrants; it even recruited laborers in China, but it also took measures to restrict the intervention of China on behalf of its subjects in the East Indies. Before it would agree to Chinese consular representation in its dependency, the Netherlands made China recognize as Dutch subjects all Indies-born Chinese.

### Postwar Developments

Even before the war there were organized Communist movements in the countries of Southeast Asia. Violent disorders in Indonesia in 1926 and 1927 were Communist-inspired. The Nationalist government could use the overseas Chinese for its purposes but

not the Communist parties. On the other hand, the Communist regime, since it is now in control of the mainland, may be able to use both, though this would seem to present some difficulty, in view of the fact that among the Chinese are many middle class and not a few wealthy people and that the native masses are generally anti-Chinese. After independence the pattern of anti-Chinese legislation, which was noted in Siam, spread to all of the countries of the region.

A brief survey of the situation in some of the countries of Southeast Asia may be helpful in attempting an assessment of the prospects for the extension of communism from China into the region.

### The Philippines

Of all the countries of Southeast Asia, the Philippines would seem to be most secure from Communist Chinese influence and expansion. The Filipinos are the most Westernized of Asian peoples. After the war there was a formidable peasant revolt, which had some Communist leaders and apparently some connection with the Chinese Communist party. The Philippine government succeeded in putting down the revolt by means of force and agrarian reforms. The Communist movement in the islands is weak.

However, the basic economic problems of the country have not been solved and the economic situation is critical. President Garcia and his party are advocating wresting control of trade and finance from the foreigners—chiefly Americans and Chinese—as an easy solution to their difficult economic and financial problems. The Chinese community, which has often been blackmailed by the politicians, is driven into a dilemma as in the other countries of the region. Neither Nationalist Formosa nor the Communist mainland holds much appeal for the Chinese in the Philippines, but if driven by desperation to choose between them they might elect Red China, which at least is strong and might be able to help them in their plight.

### Indonesia

A Communist rebellion against Indonesia's nationalist leadership while the Indonesians were engaged in a bitter struggle with the

Dutch was ruthlessly suppressed, but the political power of the Communist party in Indonesia has steadily increased. In the first parliamentary elections, held in 1955, the Communists emerged as the fourth largest party with 16.4 per cent of the votes cast. The Nationalist party, which received the highest number of votes, could boast of only 22.3 per cent of the total votes. Labor unions have been deeply penetrated by Communist influence and leadership. President Sukarno turned steadily away from Western political institutions, pressed hard for Communist representation in the Cabinet, and finally called for a "guided democracy."

A rebellion against the government for its extreme Leftist tendencies attracted a number of prominent political leaders but failed to draw much popular support and came to naught. Economic conditions have deteriorated badly and the government's financial plight has become desperate. In the early months of 1959, President Sukarno set aside the provisional Constitution of 1950 and proclaimed the reinstitution of the Constitution of 1945, which act practically made him dictator with the support of the Army. The Army is reputedly strongly anti-Communist, but it is not completely united. Whether and how far it has been infiltrated by the Communists time will reveal.

Since the Indonesian government recognized the Communist regime in China, the pro-Nationalist Chinese are very quiet. Pro-Nationalist Chinese have been threatened with deportation to Red China for activities hostile to a friendly government. Something of the ambiguity which characterizes overseas Chinese communities elsewhere is found here also. It is reported that the Indonesian Chinese gave considerable financial support to the Communist party in the 1955 election campaign.

#### Malaya

There are so many Chinese in Malaya that it is sometimes referred to as a province of China. The Communist insurrection, which began in 1948 and has not yet been completely suppressed, was almost wholly a Chinese affair, though its leadership seems to have had little direct connection with the Communist party of China. Singapore was excluded from the Federation because its

inclusion would give the Chinese a near majority of the population. The Federation received independence in 1957 and Singapore was granted self-government with grave misgivings on the part of the British in 1959. The United Kingdom retains control over defense and foreign affairs. The Federation government is conservative and pro-Western but an extreme Leftist group, the Peoples' Action Party, decisively won the general election in Singapore in May, 1959.

The Chinese schools have been hot-beds of radicalism; students have created disorders and organized Leftist demonstrations. The older, pro-Nationalist generation has been very nearly silenced by terrorism or threats of violence. A few wealthy Chinese seem to have gone very far in supporting pro-Communist groups and even in cooperating with Communist China's agencies. One explanation of this strange behavior may be that wealthy Chinese businessmen are buying protection for their interests.

The situation of the Chinese in Southeast Asia is difficult, even tragic. They feel themselves superior to the peoples among whom they live; pride in their race and in their mother country has been raised by the achievements of the Communist regime. For young people this appeal has been very strong and large numbers of students have been attracted to China by the special opportunities which the Communist government has offered them. The overseas Chinese are under strong pressure to become nationals of the countries in which they live because of discriminatory legislation, yet mere acceptance of this nationality is not going to remove popular hostility toward them. In countries which recognize the Communist government of China, retention of Chinese nationality practically means joining Peking, while adoption of another nationality offers little help. Overseas Chinese are caught in a cruel dilemma. "They are trapped," as a recent writer on the overseas Chinese has put it, "between native governments which would destroy them if they could, and aggressive, messianic Communism which uses them to destroy themselves."<sup>1</sup>

Communist China now has a population

<sup>1</sup> Robert S. Elegant, *The Dragon's Seeds*. New York, 1959, p. 72.

of approximately 650 million with an annual increase of 12 million or more. More efficient administration, sanitation and health measures will reduce the death rate. If the birth rate remains at approximately the same high level, a population explosion is inevitable. If the production of goods is not greatly increased, people must find a living elsewhere; if production is markedly increased China will need to import tremendous quantities of primary commodities as well as export large numbers of people. Though there are areas of high population pressure in Southeast Asia, there are also large areas which by Chinese standards are sparsely settled. In any case, the region has great natural resources of value to an expanding industrial economy—tin, rubber, rice, oil, iron ore, bauxite and so on. By contrast with Communist China the nations of the region are divided, their economies weak and their governments inefficient. A high pressure area adjoins a low pressure area.

#### Methods and Prospects of Expansion

As has already been indicated, Peking has sought to win the allegiance of the Chinese in the Nanyang through the Chinese schools, press and associations. The overseas Chinese have found it difficult not to take pride in the prestige and power of the new China. Peking's efforts seemed crowned with success, especially as against the Nationalists, but sober second thoughts may be setting in. During the past two years, remittances to China have dwindled sharply and the number of students lured to the homeland has decreased markedly. The overseas Chinese have come to learn something of the evils of Chinese communism and their ardor has been dampened.

Peking uses a number of devices to win the people of the region to communism, including cultural and educational activities, international Communist meetings, tours, infiltration of labor unions, free distribution of Chinese and Russian Communist publications, and a steady blast of radio broadcasts from China.

Communism would seem to have its best chance of taking over in Singapore. This small island of a million and a quarter people with practically no natural resources must

live largely on its entrepôt trade. Cut off from the Federation of Malaya and with Indonesia channeling its foreign trade directly to its customers, Singapore is experiencing a bit of an economic slump. An economic depression would aid the spread of communism but it is difficult to see how communism could be introduced or long maintained in isolation on a small island dependent on a non-Communist world for its livelihood. However, that may be, Singapore's strategic position makes it a strategic center for infiltration and subversion in neighboring countries.

Communist China has also resorted to the use of trade as a political weapon. By slashing export prices of textiles and other goods it disrupts the trade patterns in the region and impresses the overseas Chinese as well as the indigenous peoples with its industrial development. Through its branch banks it has offered the overseas Chinese credit subject to the condition of complying with Communist directives.

Red China has sought to allay the fears of aggression among its neighbors and to disarm them by its advocacy of the Five Principles of Coexistence,<sup>2</sup> but recent events in Tibet and on the Indian border and the disturbances in Laos have undone much of an initial success. It is significant that Burma, which in 1953 suspended American aid as incompatible with its policy of neutrality, reversed its policy in 1959 by requesting substantial economic aid. Indonesia after much effort obtained a much desired agreement with the Red regime on the problem of dual nationality, but when the Indonesians came to examine it carefully they found that it did not go nearly so far as the previous Dutch or their own more recent legislation on the subject.

In 1956, Communist China began to use economic and technical assistance agreements with the countries of the region as an economic weapon. Burma, Cambodia and Indonesia have entered into such agreements. The amounts involved are not large.

Undefined boundaries in wild country are an aid to Chinese aggression. Burma is confronted with this problem. Contiguity also

<sup>2</sup> Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, nonaggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.

facilitates infiltration. Communists from Burma have gone into Chinese territory, received military training there and returned to aid in the rebellion against the government of Burma. Apparently Burma did not dare to protest this flagrant intervention in its internal affairs on the part of a powerful neighbor.

Communist China already has its foot squarely in the gateway to Southeast Asia. By giving aid to the Communists in Vietnam it won a satellite which can be effectively used to penetrate further into the region. Adjoining Laos is ideal territory for such activity. The country is vast, mountainous, sparsely settled; the government is weak, the people backward and there is already on the North Vietnamese border a Communist group, the Pathet Lao, which is in open rebellion against the Laotian government. Under these circumstances aggression is almost impossible to prove, as the United Nations commission of inquiry is discovering.

*(Continued from page 325)*

his armies with the help of German and other advisers.

Again China sought help, collective or otherwise, again without success. Her traditional methods were not any more successful: neither warnings that Japanese advances in China would threaten Western interests nor promises of great benefits if Westerners would transfer their interests from the occupied coast to Free China could overcome Western reluctance to get involved in the Far East. The only responsive nation was the Soviet Union, for the same obvious reasons. There was no illusion in China about Russia's benevolence in sending material aid. "Russia realizes we are fighting her battle as well as ours and does not stint her support," said a high official. The Chinese government was no less opportunistic. China had to accept aid where she could get it and hoped that good relations with the Soviet Union, especially in the face of a common enemy, would make it easier to control the Communists in China. No doubt Chiang would have preferred to obtain help from the United States or Great Britain, but this was not possible until these nations were immediately and directly threatened by Japan too. Until that moment they were more

When a probing operation runs into trouble, it can be quickly halted.

If Communist China is bent on expansion into Southeast Asia, what is the relation of Russia to this plan? Is this a part of a global strategy agreed upon by the Communist partners, or is this purely a matter of Chinese aggrandizement which Russia may dislike and even fear, but which it cannot stop or openly disapprove? The interests of the two countries are certainly not in complete agreement, but the close alliance has yielded great benefits to the two partners and so long as this continues, conflicts of interest will not be allowed to break up the partnership. China would need the aid of Russia in any venture which brought it into military conflict with the United States. To that extent Russia has a veto on Chinese action in Southeast Asia. However, Southeast Asia lends itself to conquest by infiltration and subversion, which Seato and American military power cannot effectively combat.

interested in averting that threat than in actively giving China any kind of assistance.

The great misfortune of China during the first 100 years of her modern contacts with the West was that her introduction into world politics coincided with an era of extreme imperialism. The cultural strength of China, sufficient in the past to absorb attacks from the outside, was inadequate to withstand the modern onslaught. The weakness of China was a lack of the type of community which is necessary in the modern age for survival as a nation and is indispensable for the realization of the imperial ambitions inspiring all Chinese national leaders. Gradually, when these leaders became aware of this, they began to create such a community on the basis of nationalism. This process required a modification in traditional outlook and attitude which led to an ideological void because, for a number of reasons, Western concepts of politics and economics found little acceptance. Moreover, the nations of the West made no particular effort to help the Chinese in their search for a new system of values and beliefs suitable to Chinese conditions. This failure was a part of their general arrogant approach to China and the Chinese which changed too late to benefit the Western world.



*Discussing United States-Chinese relations, this author declares that "To incur the hostility of one quarter of mankind is not an easy matter and the United States has no vital reason to do so. . . . Red China is separated by 6000 miles of ocean from the United States and has no navy to speak of. Obviously China can become dangerous to the United States only as an instrument of Soviet policy."*

# The Chinese-United States Stalemate

By HELMUT G. CALLIS

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**F**EW foreign policy issues in American history have been more hotly debated than the question of diplomatic recognition or non-recognition of Communist China. It would serve no useful purpose here to repeat the practically endless arguments pro and con on a most complex subject matter which can be looked at from very different yet tenable points of views: legal, political, moral, and matter of fact.<sup>1</sup>

The administrations of Presidents Truman and Eisenhower chose to refuse recognition to Communist China on preponderantly moral grounds and that policy firmly stands. Having taken this position and staked America's prestige on that issue, a sudden revision of this policy would be unwise except for very good reasons.

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Unfortunately, the United States is confronted with much more important problems than the recognition question. For whether America chooses to recognize the Red China regime will not make an iota's difference in Red China's importance as a crucial factor in world politics. The point is that Red China *exists*, its government ruling 650 million people firmly controlled by militant Communists, its frontiers sprawling from Siberia to India. No nation can ignore the implications of these facts except at that nation's own peril.

If Communist China were the only major opponent of the free world, the evaluation of Red China's role in world politics would be relatively easy. However the matter is vastly complicated by the fact that the West must take into account the policies of a much mightier opponent in the cold war, namely those of the Soviet Union. On one hand, this tricky "twosomeness" of the Communist opposition allows the United States to benefit from any discoverable fissures in their supposedly solid front; on the other hand, it gives Peking and Moscow most welcome opportunities to squeeze the United States in different parts of the world simultaneously.

In a complex triangular situation like this, the protection of America's national interest requires not only thorough and continuous examination of the intentions and power

<sup>1</sup> Thomas Jefferson and Daniel Webster took a matter of fact view of recognition; Woodrow Wilson, Harry Truman, and John Foster Dulles inclined to a moral interpretation of the recognition question.

potentials of each of the two allied opponents separately, but it also demands a clear understanding of the modes, methods and degree of their collusion in constantly changing situations of the cold war.

The question naturally arises here whether or not the Communist world is really as monolithic as the Communists try to make us believe. In an effort to answer that question, this writer in a recently published book entitled *China, Confucian and Communist*<sup>2</sup> probed into the mainsprings and motives of Chinese and Soviet foreign policies and, finding them different in historical origin and also in intent, came to certain conclusions which if substantiated may deserve attention. In a nutshell these findings may be stated as follows:

1. The historical key to Red China's modern imperialism is found in her now revived but verbally unexpressed claims for restoration of her ancient empire once girded by a ring of tributary, satellite states, but broken up by the assault of colonial powers in the nineteenth century.<sup>3</sup>

2. Refusal by the United States to recognize Red China's imperialist claims is bound to draw the United States into a prolonged conflict with Asia's most powerful nation (the Russians are not Asiatics)—a conflict which would give world politics its basic tenor for decades.

3. If the United States as a leader of the free world is not cautious in handling the China problem, the resulting conflict is likely to work to the advantage of the Soviet Union and to help Russia in gaining world supremacy.

### Mainsprings of Chinese Policies

Let us look for a moment more closely at the ramifications and probable consequences of the United States' conflict with China, a conflict which ought not to be confused, as it often is, with American opposition to communism in general.

Communism *per se* is an ideological and institutional system which aims at the overthrow of opposing ideas and social institu-

tions held in contempt by Communists and earmarked by them for destruction.

By contrast, the American dispute with China, with its partly territorial aspects, is an international and political issue having on the Chinese side age-old historical foundations which all governments of imperial as well as republican China (including Chiang Kai-shek) strenuously tried to preserve a long time before China ever became Communist. The only thing which is new about China's imperialist claims is that these claims for the first time in more than a century are being pressed by a well organized and aggressive Chinese government which skillfully uses Communist ideas and methods for the promotion of Chinese national interests.

To be more specific, Red China's actions in Korea, Vietnam, Tibet, Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, Ladhak and Laos are not mere incidents but form well-ordered links in a chain of events which aim at the step by step restoration of the old Chinese Empire in modern form. Thus understood, invasions, infiltrations and clashes along China's borders lose the character of the accidental, sporadic and conspiratorial and assume the character of a long-term political plan. Seen in this light, recent happenings in Chinese border areas are only beginnings, reminders for the world of Chinese claims that will be pressed with much greater force and persistency later as China grows stronger.

United States policy to stop Communist China in Asian countries situated historically and geographically in the orbit of Chinese power will require a tremendous effort unlimited in years and incalculable in costs. The Russians knew exactly what they were doing when they left this complex area to their Chinese comrades as a sort of paid up insurance for Chinese cooperation against the West in Asia. But it is for Americans to ponder whether the continuation of the present policy toward Red China is a wise policy or, put differently, whether this policy is really in the national interest.

Nothing would suit the Soviet Union better than a long drawn-out conflict of the United States with the Chinese. For it would allow the Russians to smuggle the Chinese population time bomb, which nature and geography have placed at Russia's back door, into Uncle Sam's boots. Noth-

<sup>2</sup> Henry Holt Co., New York, 1959.

<sup>3</sup> Communist and Pre-Communist maps still show these states in the same color as China, *nota bene* Korea, the states of Indochina, Burma, Bhutan, Nepal, and Ladhak; the latter was part of Tibet until 1834.

ing could be more pleasing to them and help them more on the road to world supremacy than to see from a safe distance America's blood and resources wasted on Asian battlefields for an indefinite period of time. If the United States were at war with China, spending uncounted billions for military adventures in Asia, there would be less trained technical personnel and less money available in the West to give effective economic aid to underdeveloped countries, whose growing needs now go unsatisfied and to help whom would be in the tradition as well as power of the United States at peace. But if the United States should ultimately lose the global battle for the defeat of human misery by default, Russia would be put into a position to promote her own economic designs among the world's destitute peoples in underdeveloped countries and thus to win another round in the contest for world hegemony. In particular, if the Soviet Union were able to stay out of armed conflict while the United States were involved in it, the Russians would have a freer hand to force the West into acceptance of their clearly stated demands in Europe: compromise in Berlin, recognition of East Germany, liquidation of Nato, and some kind of guarantee against any "roll-back" of communism in satellite countries.

Deeper United States involvement in Asia would also translate itself into greater disunity of the free West, already sharply and tragically divided on various issues including that of policy toward Red China. Over the long haul, trade with China and Eastern Asia will be increasingly important for Europe, and for some European countries, e.g., England and Germany, it is not unimportant even now. The same is true for Japan. None of these countries, allied with the United States, would like to see normal trade channels clogged by throwing Eastern and Southern Asia into the inevitable turmoil of a long drawn-out Chinese conflict with the United States. Nor would such conflict help much to improve United States relations with Canada and South America which have felt overlooked or neglected by the United States for a considerable time, although for different reasons.

In brief, quixotic military excursions into remote areas of normally small concern for the American people would evoke the dan-

ger of undermining the American position in the West itself at a time when the realization of greater unity and closer cooperation among the world's free peoples should be recognized as the most urgent task of American statesmanship.

### Balancing West with East

By contrast, the disruption of Western unity and the cementing of Asian solidarity with the Kremlin has always been the fundamental strategy of the Soviet Union in the cold war. "In the last analysis," said Lenin, "the issue [between capitalism and communism] will be determined by the cold fact that Russia, China, and India represent a crushing majority of the people of the world." On the other hand, the Soviets with one-third China's population and more than twice China's territory hear the ticking of the Chinese population time bomb fearfully close. They undoubtedly hope that when the bomb is about to blow up Uncle Sam will be good enough to catch it.

### Red China and U.S. Policy

In the West, cold war tactics have required the political, economic and cultural boycott of Red China. But in the long run, it seems just as impossible in the social realm as it is in the physical world to "contain" an already overheated steam boiler without provoking the danger of an explosion with disastrous consequences. The time may come when Chinese economic pressures will rise to the point where the need for food and for exports to pay bills for industrialization may force a desperate government to resort to external solutions, thus precipitating an international catastrophe.

Political and military means cannot solve economic problems. Instead of weakening China's Communist dictatorship, outward pressures make regimentation even more of an economic necessity, for hungry mobs can be disciplined only by slave drivers.

Containment, however, has also been criticized on other grounds. It has been said, not without justification, that the political boycott of Red China sharpens disagreements among Western nations, alienates the uncommitted peoples, makes China more dependent on the Soviet Union, cements to

that extent the Communist bloc, and stands in the way of an urgently needed, general settlement in the Far East.

Without further elaborating on these comments, we may draw attention here briefly to certain *strategic* dangers of the present American position in the Orient. Whereas in case of a conflict United States military forces will have to operate from their *littoral* fringes of the Eurasian continent, the Communist powers will be able to command the *internal* lines of communications from the heartlands of Asia.

If they so desire, the Communists will be able to launch attacks or start "pinpricking" at a dozen places of their own choosing simultaneously. Whether atomic bombs will be used in such a case as a deterrent is doubtful. For in view of the exorbitant price of a full-blown atomic war—estimated by the Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy at 50 million Americans dead and 20 million others seriously injured—it is likely that atomic power will be employed only sparingly or not at all to suppress sporadic outbreaks somewhere in Asia.

#### Is Seato Useful?

The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (Seato), on the other hand, has been described as a totally ineffective "paper alliance," barring direct American intervention. Besides, the treaty is known to have inherent constitutional weaknesses. The basic trouble with Seato is that it is weakest in the very area which it is created to protect, namely in Southern Asia; for the majority and the strongest of its signatories are not Asian, and the strongest of the Asian countries are not signatories. Besides, Seato Council decisions are subject to unanimity rule and the carrying out of treaty provisions is governed by the constitutional processes of each individual state. Consequently, collective action is easily paralyzed by indecision or political lukewarmness of treaty partners.<sup>4</sup>

Moreover, most of the small states that the United States is treaty-bound to defend in Asia are weak, unstable regimes, readily swept away by political tides. In some special cases, notably South Korea, South Vietnam and Formosa, politically fractured econ-

omies without economic hinterland impose on the supporting power an unduly heavy burden for an unpredictably long time. The last named three states, which were partitioned by either war or agreements, received a major share of American non-military assistance, although they represent only four per cent of the peoples of the underdeveloped world. United States military support to South Korea, which bears a defense load of 60 per cent of total budgetary expenditures, is reportedly more than that of the total for the Near East, Africa, Europe and Latin America combined. On Formosa, high birthrates and expanding military establishments have caused a serious drain on the island's limited resources.

#### China's Rising Power

But perhaps the most alarming cause for American concern is Red China's gradual rise to the status of a great power in Eastern Asia. In 1962 at the latest, China's steel output will be about 50 per cent larger than that of Japan when it attacked the United States at Pearl Harbor. Even if it were not allied with the Soviet Union, China, we should realize, is one of the four political structures in today's world that is large and self-sufficient enough to make economic containment highly problematical. Under fanatically determined leadership (such as the Chinese Communist dictatorship now provides), China's military power must be expected to grow with every passing day. If the 650 million Chinese have their share of modern machines, there will be a colossus in the Far East which will make any *status quo* established without its consent totally obsolete. The day when this is going to happen may be closer than we are inclined to think.

For several scores of years American policy in the Far East was predicated on a peaceful China with an open door for all and friendly to America. This China is no longer in existence for reasons too complex to investigate here. But there is no sense crying over spilled milk. It would be highly unrealistic, for example, to let our disappointment trick us into the wishful belief that China's Communist regime will soon disappear. The "new" China is here and we must "deal" with it. "Dealing" with Red China does not

<sup>4</sup> United States, United Kingdom, France, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines.



require us suddenly to recognize it, vote it into the United Nations, or "betray" our Asian friends and allies. It does require of us, however, to take it into all our political calculations, not to be heedless of dangers, and not to blind ourselves to our own vital interests.

We may pause here for a moment and wonder whether we would be as deeply and morally aroused if Mao Tse-tung, like Tito, were neutral or even hostile to the Kremlin. Perhaps what really troubles us is not so much the morals of China's present-day regime as its collusion with the Soviet Union. What really disturbs us is our continuing dilemma: to face a combination of forces we are helpless to repress or destroy, except by risking our own annihilation.

At this point the splitting of the Sino-Soviet aggressive combination emerges as the top security problem of American policy. If it proves impossible to counterbalance single-handedly the combined strength of Eurasia's two mightiest nations, China and Russia, across the world's largest ocean, we must try to develop step by step a policy of helping Asia's major powers *balance each other*.<sup>5</sup> This policy was precisely Britain's policy earlier in this century, when Downing Street built up Japan by an alliance and other means as a counterweight to Russia in the Far East; it was highly successful, as long as it was consistently pursued.

As far as Red China and Soviet Russia are concerned, the objective of making them check each other seems difficult at the present time. Nevertheless, the first step would be increased awareness on our part that although the Chinese and the Russians are now both ruled by Communists, they continue to be Russians and Chinese with sharply different traditions and political aspirations. Our present policy of containment and military pressure against them discourages the growth and expression of any differences which may exist between Moscow and Peking. If our conclusion is correct that current United States policy toward China instead of serving American security rather imperils it (and also for other reasons aids the Soviet Union), it would follow that a change of policy is indicated.

<sup>5</sup> This balance would naturally include India and Pakistan as well as Japan.

In the light of the foregoing analysis, a policy of caution, flexibility, and gradual disentanglement is suggested here. To incur the hostility of one quarter of mankind is not an easy matter and the United States has no vital reason to do so. China as such is no security problem. Red China is separated by 6000 miles of ocean from the United States and has no navy to speak of. Obviously China can become dangerous to the United States only as an instrument of Soviet policy.

To relax tensions in the Far East, we need not make abrupt turn-about such as sudden recognition of China. We can limit ourselves to bringing about a more relaxed atmosphere by keeping discussions going and by concentrating on possibilities of agreement rather than on the evils and wrongs of the past. We can make it clear to China's Communist leaders that, though we disagree with their social philosophy, we are not trying to destroy them as incorrigible devils, and that, in consideration of the vast problems the Chinese people are still facing, we do not wish to stand in their way of solving them if they can do so without jeopardizing the peace of other nations. As our contribution to a peaceful solution of China's difficulties we can promise removal of discriminatory trade restrictions except for imports specially designed for war.

In order to avoid deeper involvement, we may recognize Peking's claim to the controversial offshore islands in exchange for Communist Chinese acquiescence in the undisturbed evacuation of their garrisons. We may search for an interim solution in Formosa which would neutralize the island and guarantee respect for the will of its population under United Nations' auspices. We could explore possibilities of finding grounds on the basis of which the United States may feel inclined to withdraw its objection to Red China's admission to the world peace organization. We may also cautiously open a door for the exchange of cultural visitors on a reciprocal basis, a device which will help us to gather on-the-spot information. All these means combined, though they will hardly improve relations miraculously overnight, will keep them at least from worsening.

Later, if radicalism and anti-American

hostility in Red China are somewhat modified, we may reconsider the whole China problem with a view toward its diplomatic recognition and admission to the United Nations. Admission, to be sure, need not be granted without some substantial *quid pro quo*; in fact it may be preceded by an understanding of all nations concerned in the Far East as to what this *quid pro quo* should entail. The path toward such an understanding is already prepared by a resolution of the General Assembly adopted on February 1, 1952, that in regard to admission to membership it is not possible "to deny candidates the right to present *proof*" of their willingness to accept and honor the obligations of the United Nations Charter. The nations vitally interested in the Far East might well agree among themselves beforehand what kind of concrete proof they wish to have submitted by Communist China.

Aside from political assurances such as the renunciation of military force as an instrument of policy, agreement to a Formosan settlement, and the reopening of the door in China to all friendly nations, admission may also be made conditional on the *bona fide* granting by the Peking regime of reciprocal diplomatic rights and personal safeguards which are the bases of relations between civilized nations.

Since Formosa has become the object of an international dispute, endangering the peace, the United Nations seems to be the only proper agency to deal with the controversy and to find ultimately a practical solution. To deprive Peking of the argument that Formosa is a security threat to mainland China, Formosa might be placed, at an opportune moment, under a U.N. trusteeship. If later in the future, conceivably after Chiang Kai-shek's death, a majority of the Chinese on Formosa should seek a compromise with the Chinese of the mainland, such a new relationship could be worked out also under the auspices of the international organization.<sup>6</sup> Meanwhile, admission of Red China might well be made dependent on the latter's acceptance of an interim solution regarding Formosa and American *de facto* recognition of the regime may follow in due course.

To bring real and permanent peace to Eastern Asia without the cooperation of the government which rules more than half of the population of this region is an impossibility, and politics has always been the art of the possible.

<sup>6</sup> Authorities familiar with the situation on Formosa believe it probable that the majority of the Chinese and other groups living on the island would vote for independence. *Sic.* Stanley K. Hornbeck, former chief, Far Eastern Division, Dept. of State in an article in *Foreign Affairs*, fall, 1955.

"... The Far East has also seen continued progress during the past year in promoting domestic welfare and in strengthening security. War-torn economies have been, for the most part, rebuilt and the foundations laid for further progress. . . .

"The member countries of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization have carried forward their programs for economic, social and cultural advancement. Seato also plays a vital role in the collective defense of the area and is now carefully watching events in Laos.

"Side by side with these encouraging developments, which augur well for peaceful and constructive change, events in the past year have underlined the continuing danger posed by attempts to mold the international situation through the threat or use of force.

"Most recently, the freedom and independence of LAOS have been threatened by forces from outside its borders. The Security Council subcommittee is now in Laos. We hope that it will not only succeed in collecting the facts, but also by its presence contribute to easing a potentially dangerous situation.

"In these circumstances, there is no need for a Conference as proposed by the U.S.S.R. Such a conference would be disruptive and would ignore the authority of the United Nations. . . ."

—Christian A. Herter, United States Secretary of State, *Peaceful Change*, an address before the United Nations General Assembly, New York City, September 17, 1959.

*As this specialist analyzes the problem, "... the maintenance of the commune system . . . must have as a prerequisite the continuation of high emotional tension." Hence, "A complete or significant relaxation of the cold war atmosphere would hardly be conducive to this condition."*

# The Communes in a Changing China

By YUAN-LI WU

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THE COMMUNE has been officially described by the Communist Chinese as a basic unit of the country's Socialist social structure, integrating in itself the functions of the worker, the peasant, the trader, the student and the soldier. Inasmuch as its administrative committee is at the same time the People's Council of the *hsiang*, an intermediate level of local government divisions between the village and the county,<sup>1</sup> the commune is also said to be the basic building block of a Socialist political structure. The institution of the commune has been hailed by Communist China as a major step forward in the progression of Chinese society toward communism. Amidst the enthusiasm which was generated during the initial period of the commune movement, it was also offered as incontrovertible evidence of China's status as an *avant-garde* in Communist ideology.

As a result of these Communist claims and the world-wide consternation and disbelief and, in some countries, aversion which greeted the commune movement, the outside observer has more frequently than not emphasized the social and political impact of the commune on the Chinese population and,

through the latter's reaction and response, on the fate of the Communist dominion itself. This has led to the relative neglect of the economic significance of the commune. Yet economic understanding is essential to a valid appraisal of this unquestionably revolutionary social innovation.

## On the Eve of the Commune Movement

In order to appreciate the role played by the commune in the economy of mainland China, it is necessary, first of all, to recall briefly the economic situation that prevailed immediately before the onset of the movement in the early summer of 1958. As the author pointed out in an earlier issue of this journal,<sup>2</sup> the Chinese economy exhibited at the time certain serious deficiencies and bottlenecks in spite of the relative success of the first five year plan, and perhaps even because of it. Agricultural production had lagged behind over-all industrial output and had in some cases clearly impeded the expansion of light manufacturing industries producing consumer goods. Even within the sector of production industries, there were some notable short-comings and deficiencies, including such items as specialized steels, machinery and chemical fertilizers. The transportation system was also seriously strained.

Above all, the most critical problem was the lack of unused industrial capacity, the need to make new investments that required increasing initial outlay and a longer average

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<sup>1</sup> See for instance the article by the Communist minister of agriculture, Liao Lu-yen, on the nature of the communes, in *Hsin-hua pan-yueh-k'an* (New China Semi-Monthly), No. 2, p. 6, Peking, 1959.

<sup>2</sup> Yuan-li Wu, "China's Industry in Peace and War," *Current History*, December, 1958.

construction period, and the increasing demand for considerable overhead capital as the industrialization process spread to outlying territories. The clamor for more consumer goods and the continued growth of the population, which already numbered about 650 million, threatened to encroach on the investment fund in spite of the Communists' reluctance to admit that a Socialist society might have a serious demographic problem.

Obviously, the best solution would be to find some way of increasing the total national output, i.e., the gross national product, without any prior net increase in investment. If this happened, it might be possible to raise the level of both investment and consumption simultaneously. Such a development would be possible if, in utilizing existing capital stock, capital-saving methods of production were adopted widely; if the amount of new capital investment per unit of output, or what is known as the incremental capital-output ratio, were reduced; and if resources hitherto not fully employed were brought into the production process. Furthermore, it would seem that this development should be directed to relieve specific bottlenecks and shortages and also to enhance the momentum of technological innovation on a broad base.

Specifically, this meant that *inter alia* attention should be given to agricultural production, to the production of fertilizers and improved farm implements, and to such other items indispensable to the basic metallurgical and machinery industries. It would appear that greater local initiative should be brought to bear and new activities be dispersed over a wide area, which would in turn alleviate the transportation shortage. Finally, it would be prudent if measures adopted for these various purposes were of such a nature that the planners could be given more rigorous control over the rate of consumption, which could then be regulated in accordance with the performance of the program.

If the above analysis is correct, the commune movement and the simultaneous development of local small-scale industries using native methods of production, along with the continued expansion of newly established

modern industrial complexes, seemed to be the Communists' answers to their problems. For the commune is essentially an organizational form designed for the most intensive mobilization of the rural labor force, the only readily available resource in mainland China which could be exploited without prior investment.

### The Nature of the Communes

There were in the spring of 1958 some 740,000 agricultural cooperatives of the advanced type, each averaging 170 farm households, 2,000 *mou*<sup>3</sup> of land, and approximately 350 effective workers.<sup>4</sup> By the fall of 1958 these had been merged into some 26,500 communes each averaging nearly 5,000 farm households, 60,000 *mou* of land, and 10,000 effective workers. Between the end of 1958 and late summer 1959 these communes were further consolidated into 24,000 units each averaging over 5,000 households.

The commune is organized by combining a number of cooperative farms. To some extent the larger size of the commune may conceivably result in somewhat better land utilization although the individual unit of farm operation within the commune today still corresponds in size to the former cooperative farm. What is more important, a sufficiently large labor force is placed under the direction of a unified management or command, which may direct it to agricultural and non-agricultural pursuits, both within and outside of the individual commune. The mobility of labor both on a geographical plan and across occupational lines is increased through the organization of the commune in military formations, subjecting all members of the commune to strict discipline.

Increased mobility and discipline of labor mean that a larger number of man-hours can be extracted from the same labor force. At the same time, the labor force itself is augmented by the fuller exploitation of the female members of the population. This is facilitated by the establishment of communal kitchens and dining halls and of institutional care for the aged, the infirm and the young so that, as the Communists have euphemistically proclaimed, women are "liberated" from their household duties in order to par-

<sup>3</sup> A *mou* equals one-fifteenth of a hectare. A hectare is 2.471 acres.

<sup>4</sup> *Hsin-hua pan-yueh-k'an* (New China Semi-Monthly), No. 2, p. 24, Peking, 1959. *China Daily News*, New York, Sept. 21, 1959.



ticipate further in industrial and agricultural production. In some cases, communal living quarters have been set up and the population forcibly transferred from their original individual homes. The establishment of communal feeding and of a ration system, moreover, provides the commune administration with an opportunity to regulate closely the rate of both individual and aggregate consumption. All members of the commune are paid in rations supplemented by a nominal money wage that is barely sufficient for the purchase of such sundry items as soap, cigarettes and so forth.

In short, the commune has become a basic unit in the organization of production. All members of the commune are first of all labor units. The rate of their consumption is, in the first instance, determined by the level of their physical subsistence while the rate of their output is determined by the ability of the commune administration to extract labor from them and to provide necessary complementary factors of production. Since the life of the commune members evolves entirely around their assignments in the production process, the commune is also the basic unit in the political and social structure of the rural society. Commune members are not only under military discipline, but also drill daily. Children of school age are cared for by the commune instead of by their families. Hence the commune is an organization that combines the functions of the industrial worker, the peasant, the trader, the student and the soldier, as the Communists have claimed.

The availability of a larger labor force and an even larger number of man-hours in the commune has led to the adoption of highly intensive methods of production. In agriculture, for instance, according to a report on the Hungkuang People's Commune,<sup>5</sup> some 90 man-days were spent per hectare of cultivated land on irrigation in 1958 while the corresponding number was nil in 1957. Similarly, some 30-45 man-days were spent per hectare in deep plowing in 1958, a ten-fold increase over the corresponding figure in 1957. Ninety man-days were spent in the application of fertilizer per hectare in 1958 as compared to twenty-two and one-half man-days in the preceding year. The in-

crease in total labor input per hectare of crop land has been matched by a corresponding increase in the use of labor to collect and transport ores, to tend the mushrooming backyard furnaces for iron production, to manufacture fertilizers and to produce farm implements by simple processes.

### Effects of the Communes

Whether or not the commune movement and the related development of small-scale industrial plants has been a success should be judged in the first place on the basis of their immediate economic effects. The latter can be further examined from the point of view of the volume of production, the division between consumption and investment and the removal of specific shortages. The appraisal, however, would not be complete unless a secondary test were applied to determine the indirect effects especially from the point of view of economic organization and planning, the provision of adequate incentive for the continuous expansion of production, and lastly, the socio-political impact of the commune in the reorganization of the Chinese way of life.

#### A. Expansion of Production

According to some recently revised official statistics, which represented sharp reductions from earlier claims, the value of mainland China's gross agricultural output registered a 25 per cent increase in 1958 over and above the corresponding figure in 1957. The increase in the physical volume of food-grain production during the year was 35 per cent while that of cotton was 28 per cent, exceeding respectively the 20 per cent increase for food grains and the 26 per cent increase for cotton for the entire period of the first five year plan.<sup>6</sup> In the case of industrial production the output of coal in 1958 was reported to be 217 million tons as against 124 million tons in 1957. Twenty-seven and one-half billion kilowatt-hours of electricity were generated in 1958 as compared with 19 billion in the preceding year.

Crude steel output in 1958 from the modern plants reached 8 million tons as against a little over 5 million tons in 1957. To the

<sup>5</sup> *Jen-min jih-pao* (People's Daily), Peking, April 18, 1959.

<sup>6</sup> *China Daily News*, New York, October 2, 1959.

last figure one might add another three million tons of steel produced by native methods<sup>7</sup> although there is some doubt as to whether this output qualifies as steel in view of its poor quality. In virtually all these cases the preliminary targets that had previously been published for 1962 were attained in 1958, the only exception being steel from the modern plants.

### B. Bottlenecks in Industry

Throughout the second half of 1958 the Chinese Communists repeatedly issued glowing claims to a "great leap forward" in both industrial and agricultural production. These claims were radically revised during August, 1959, when the figures of actual grain and cotton production were sharply lowered,<sup>8</sup> while it was admitted that the three million tons of "native" steel were of questionable quality. According to one report, the low quality of the steel produced by native methods was attributable to the poor pig iron of the small backyard furnaces while the low-grade pig iron was in turn the result of high sulphur content and the inadequacy of coke production and technological deficiencies in coal concentration, ore sintering, and so forth.<sup>9</sup>

The production of chemical fertilizers apparently also failed to register the progress expected, and the large-scale application of fertilizer on the farms was primarily depend-

ent upon the use of night soil, compost, and green manure. Thus while agricultural production registered a substantial increase in spite of the reduced claims, the industrial segment of the "forward leap" fell considerably short.

### C. The Savings-Income Ratio

As far as the division of increased agricultural output between consumption and investment is concerned, one recent detailed survey of a commune<sup>10</sup> shows that the savings-income ratio in this case reached a phenomenal height of 65 per cent in 1958. Out of a total net income of 8.7 million *yuan* in 1958 for the entire commune only 2.7 million *yuan* represented personal income distributed to the members of the commune. The latter amounted to a *per capita* personal income of 77 *yuan*. While this was nominally somewhat higher than the corresponding figure in some cooperative farms in 1956, about two-thirds of it was in the form of food rations, thus leaving only 26 *yuan* a year as the regular and bonus monetary wage receipts per head.

If the figures reported in this survey approximate at all the general state of affairs, it would seem that the commune has achieved a high rate of savings as well as a far more rigorous control over consumption. Since the bulk of the savings is directly invested by the commune, the corresponding rate of investment has also risen.

### D. Weakening of the Drive for Economy

But the extremely high savings-income ratio mentioned above may not have been typical even though the ratio for the entire country was probably higher in 1958. In fact, one of the major complaints that the Communist party set out to investigate at the end of 1958 was the attitude said to prevail in certain communes that since members of the commune no longer had to worry about their own food and maintenance, they could consume much more freely without the urge of economy and austerity. This points to one serious weakness born of the initial Communist claim that communization means the complete abolition of private property. Not a few members of the communes, including apparently some of the Communist administrators, were of the opinion that the elimina-

<sup>7</sup> As of September 1959, official Communist reports indicate that a 65 per cent increase was achieved in the gross value of industrial output during the first half of 1959 in comparison with the corresponding period of the preceding year. The increase for pig iron (excluding the output of native process), coal and metal-cutting lathes was reported to be 50 per cent in all cases on the same basis of comparison. The production of crude steel for the first 7 months of 1959 was reported at 67 per cent greater than that of the corresponding period of 1958. *China Daily News*, September 29, 1959.

<sup>8</sup> The earlier claims indicated a food-grain output of 375 million metric tons for 1958 and a cotton output of 3.25 million metric tons, both being about twice the corresponding outputs of 1957. See for instance, *T'ung-chi kung-tso* (Statistical Work), No. 19, pp. 4-5, Peking, October, 1958. The revision was announced by Chou En-lai to the National People's Congress in August, 1959. See, for instance, *The Wall Street Journal*, August 27, 1959.

<sup>9</sup> *Hsin-hua pan-yueh-k'an* (New China Semi-Monthly), No. 7, p. 54, Peking, 1959.

<sup>10</sup> The commune in question is located at Ch'ang-ko hsien and has 7,382 households, 35,577 persons, and 4,843 hectares of cultivated land. Ninety-five per cent of the land is irrigated which probably accounts for the higher output. *T'ung-chi kung-tso* (Statistical Work), No. 21, p. 67 ff. For a more detailed discussion see Yuan-li Wu, "Effects of Land Reform," Agricultural Collectivization and the Commune System in Communist China, A Preliminary Study," paper submitted to the Marquette Conference on "Land Tenure, Industrialization, and Social Stability: Experience and Prospects in Asia," Milwaukee, September, 1959.

tion of individual property meant also the abolition of individual responsibility.

Since the growth of small-scale industries operated by the communes has inevitably brought with it a certain degree of decentralization in decision-making, the weakening of the pressure for economy as a result of communization poses a serious problem both in the maintenance of efficiency and cost control and in the integration of the production of the individual communes with the over-all economic plan. The restoration of the "production responsibility system" and of "business accountability" which was at least partially enforced in the cooperative farms, has, according to recent reports, again been made a task of first priority.<sup>11</sup>

#### E. Wages and Incentive

The intensive labor methods now employed in agriculture are economical only because of the extremely low wage level. But the question of incentive has become serious and the communes are devising a system of piece rates and bonus wages temporarily abandoned when they first came into existence. However, in order to regulate the volume of aggregate consumption at a more or less pre-determined level the wage system now being developed aims principally at allocating a given total wage bill among the workers in proportion to the relative magnitudes of their output. Thus it is possible that while a person may obtain a relatively larger personal income by working harder than other members on his team, the absolute level of his income does not necessarily rise in any definite proportion to the amount of work he does if they *all* work equally hard. The real solution of the incentive problem lies, of course, in a rise in consumption. While this possibility should not be ruled out, there is little indication that the Communists have decided to allow consumption to rise substantially.

#### F. Disruption of the Family Institution

But perhaps the most important obstacle to the continued success of the commune—for a partial success would seem to have been scored during 1958—lies in popular resist-

ance to the disruption of family life. A recent report dealing with the revision of regulations in communes inhabited by families of overseas Chinese<sup>12</sup> has made some mention of a revised rule under which participation in communal feeding has become voluntary. If the report is accurate, members of such communes are now permitted to take their food rations home for individual preparation. The same regulation has also stipulated that houses and furniture taken over by the communes are to be restored to their original owners. The tenor of the official line is that there has never been any real intention to disrupt family life or the maintenance of individual households. As of now it is not known whether this relatively lenient treatment of the families of overseas Chinese is meant to be of general application.

It would appear, however, that mobilization of the labor force through the commune would be seriously handicapped if the social order of the pre-commune period were restored at the present time. It cannot be doubted that such increase in production as was attained in 1958 was primarily attributable to the intensive application of labor in all productive endeavors. Already the phenomenon of labor shortage has emerged in certain areas and has been cited as an important reason for mechanizing agriculture. If the state of full labor mobilization were relaxed prior to the attainment of a large and sustainable increase in the total national output and in the rate of investment, the commune movement would fail. Thus the partial success of the communes during 1958 has led to the emergence of a new dilemma; namely, whether the continuation of economic development at a rapid rate should be tempered by political expediency. For after all, the Communist party wants to stay in power and cannot risk large-scale open resistance.

There are certain political and social implications of this appraisal. In the first place, it would seem that the maintenance of the commune system even with slight modifications must have as a prerequisite the continuation of a state of high emotional tension. A complete or significant relaxation of the cold war atmosphere would hardly be con-

(Continued on page 364)

<sup>11</sup> *China Daily News*, September 21, 1959.

<sup>12</sup> *China Daily News*, September 22, 1959.

*According to this author, "By the summer of 1959, Peking's policy toward Japan was wholly bankrupt. The pro-Peking elements in Japan were scattered and discredited for the time being. The Kishi policy of alliance with the West was vindicated as never before."*

# China's Failure in Japan

By PAUL M. A. LINEBARGER

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CHINA and Japan have often understood one another too well to be friendly. More precisely, one can say that for the last eight decades—the time of their common entry into the world of Western nations—leaders in each country have harbored lively and justified suspicion of the other. This is one of many instances in which international understanding promotes tension, even though the rule more commonly runs the other way.

Chinese and Japanese like each other well in the private sphere. Politically, China and Japan get along best when one of them has been abjectly defeated. The cultures have enough in common to make each nationality an authority on the other. If the two nations were utter strangers they might have more tolerance and kindness toward one another. Their joint use of the ideographs, their sharing of Buddhism, Confucianism and subordinate philosophical schools, and their many other similarities lead to frustration and exasperation. Japan, of all nations on the

periphery of the old world empire of the Chinese, held out against absorption, dependency or conquest; Japan, alone among China's neighbors, has had the effrontery to try to make herself the "China" of the Far Eastern world.

Only against Japan's background of conquest and failure can the relations of the two countries be understood. The Japanese attempted, in the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere, to re-create a Chinese family of nations with China as a spoke, not a pivot. They ruined Nationalist China, promoted a Soviet triumph which they had dreaded and damaged their own nation in the process. Israeli-German friendship is no more startling than the reconciliation of these recent and sanguine enemies.

The Japanese appreciated China when they had conquered one-third of it, but they did not trust their Chinese ally (President Wang Ch'ing-wei of the Nanking puppet regime) enough to let him reestablish a single hegemony over all those portions of China which they held. They kept "Manchukuo," a superficially Chinese satellite state, in the northeast as an insurance against a China too big for them to manage. Even at the height of their power, they preferred two Chinas.

Now they face two Chinas, and it is none of their doing. Their attitude is predicated on the sophisticated premise, too simple for many statesmen in Washington or London to understand, that "one country—two governments" is not an unusual state of affairs for the Chinese. The Japanese have come as close to recognizing both Chinese govern-

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ments as have any people. The Japanese flag flies over a Japanese embassy in Taipei, Formosa, while semi-official Japanese delegations are being officially received by the Chinese Communists in Peking. Lacking firepower, the Japanese are using their brains; pleasantly enough, they are achieving more with their imaginations than they ever managed with machine guns. The Japanese used to be the most inflexible of people in dealing with the Chinese; now they are the wildest and least obtrusive.

Into this attractive picture of Sino-Japanese reconciliation, two ungoverned forces have obtruded themselves. One of these is the China issue in Japanese domestic politics; the other is the Japanese goals of Peking foreign policy. It takes a very quick politician to operate Japan's grand diplomatic strategy when the Socialists at home or the Communists in Peking are ready to detonate crises at any moment.

Furthermore, it must be realized that the People's China is now more heavily militarized than Japan ever was; mainland China has paid for this militarization with an increased truculence in international behavior. The war lords of Communist China operate as a team; it will be a while yet before the rest of the world recognizes them for what they are—true successors of the Japanese militarists of 1931–1945. While China has become militarist, Japan has become civilian. Relations between the two almost resemble a photo-negative of the years 1915–1945, when the roles were directly reversed.

A civilian Japan wants trade, employment, markets and profits, and is willing to deal smartly to get them. A military People's China wants glory and power, and is willing to sacrifice mere economics. A Nationalist China, more relaxed than the mainland, sits on the sideline and insists on every jot and tittle of its prerogatives. The position of the Japanese cabinet has been difficult indeed.

In 1956, the Japanese were tempted by the prospects of peace and trade to recognize Peking, even though they would imperil their rich Formosan trade. The *Asahi Shimbun*, one of Japan's most respected newspapers, reported that Prime Minister Hatoyama would soon meet Premier Chou En-lai. They never did meet, but the flirtation

dragged on throughout the year. Hatoyama himself told the Diet that Japan would normalize relations with the U.S.S.R. and China as soon as possible. Chou went so far as to make the invitation to Hatoyama official in October, 1956, but nothing came of it. The Japanese were feeling their way toward a formula which would save their bird in the hand, the lucrative and secure trade with Nationalist China on Formosa, while plucking many additional birds off the Communist bush by recognizing Peking as well as Taipei. Tiptoeing in broad daylight, they sought to contrive an innocent deception which would make it possible for Japan to be friends with everybody.

They failed.

In 1957, Nobusuke Kishi became prime minister. He had the caution of a politician who knew his people well. He had moral courage of a very unusual sort, and was willing to travel in thoroughly unfriendly countries in order to promote good-will and trade for Japan. The personal embarrassment he endured would be excruciating for any Japanese; for the lay head of the Japanese state, it is almost unimaginable. He was willing to go nevertheless. He travelled everywhere.

Except China. China never reached the proportions of a reasonable gamble. Kishi had taken office on the basis of putting national life first and national luxuries second. He was man of the world enough to know that Japan survived behind the massive shield of the Free World's economic and military power. He refused to risk the safety or basic well-being of Japan in the American and Western alliance in order to satisfy the enthusiasm of businessmen or the sentiments of labor leaders.

China he visited—as far as Taiwan—where he had a pleasant meeting with President Chiang Kai-shek in June of 1957. Weeks earlier, he had sent a heavily official “unofficial” delegation to Peking to discuss economic relations between Japan and mainland China. With infinite indirection and much finesse, the Japanese tried to keep economic prospects apart from political commitments; with brutal monotony, the Chinese Communists re-entangled the two issues whenever possible.

For more than a year—from the summer of 1957 to the summer of 1958—these talks went on. The Kishi cabinet had behind it a formidable set of pressures, not without parallel in other parts of the Free World, to do business with the “New China.” Ironically enough, but beyond the notice of most American observers, “New China” was also the sobriquet of that other mainland government, under the traitor-genius Wang Ch’ing-wei, which the Japanese themselves had put in power during World War II. A man Kishi’s age has seen so many new “new Chinas” that he can be pardoned for becoming blasé. Even the lowliest Japanese can take pride in the fact that his realm and his emperor have survived death itself, in the form of atom bombs and total surrender, and have remained faithful to a Japanese Japan. The Japanese knew that China was “new” and that countries under new regimes offered political opportunities as well as economic ones.

The political opportunities were so tempting as to lead the Japanese Socialist party down the road to suicide between 1956 and 1959. The temptation lay in a reconciliation between the two major Far Eastern states that would breach the cold war, give Japan the benign approval of the Communist bloc, relieve Russo-Japanese tensions, turn Japanese progressives once more toward liberal middle-of-the-road Marxist thinking, and show a way to the future for a neutral and Socialist Japan. Teachers, journalists, intellectuals, labor leaders and politicians were all of them tugged by the desire to outsmart the West, to risk a bold reconciliation which would make Japanese life really independent of American protection or support. The attraction of the formula lay not in its soundness but in its novelty. The Socialists followed it to the bitter end. Their defeat in 1959 was of suicidal proportions; two parties, one moderate and one Marxist, have already risen from the corpse of the old; and the “China policy” issue has been clearly stamped minoritarian for the broad-range present.

The other, conservative group seeking reconciliation with Peking had nothing to do with progress or socialism. Conservative forward vision often reached many hours

ahead, and conservative horizons were marked in all directions by account books. The Chinese market would be Japan’s largest market if: If China were not Communist. If China were not autarchic to a marked degree. If China were not already mortgaged to the U.S.S.R. through intra-bloc trade commitments. If China were not nationalist in all fields.

Disregarding these obstacles, Japanese manufacturers and traders put intense pressure on the Kishi government to “normalize” relations with the People’s Government on the mainland, even at the risk of the rich little market offered by the Nationalist Government on the islands. The Kishi cabinet responded, but did not panic.

Chinese Communist diplomacy undertook an elaborate seduction of Japan. This reached its climax in the summer of 1958.

The immediate occasion was trivial. Premier Kishi had never said *no*. He had often said *maybe*. In the spring of 1958 he had authorized an officially unofficial Japanese delegation to Red China to sign the Fourth Sino-Japanese Private Trade Agreement. Nationalist China had cancelled its trade agreements in reprisal, but the pro-Peking groups in Japan stood firm until they were betrayed by Peking itself.

The Chinese Communist authorities seized upon the so-called “flag incident” at Nagasaki earlier that spring. The Japanese police had requested that the red-field, five-star flag of the Chinese Communists be taken down from a pole on which it was flying in an “official” manner; later the Japanese government expressed its willingness to fly the Peking version of the red flag “unofficially” as often as the Chinese Communists wished.

Peking over-reacted in a savage and frantic manner. The Chinese Communist radio commanded the Japanese people to repudiate the Kishi government in domestic elections. To any nation, such foreign interference would have been intolerable. To Japanese—and from *Chinese*, of all people—the affront was unbearable. The Japanese nation reacted with a vigorous support of the Liberal-Democratic party of Prime Minister Kishi in the cabinet of June, 1958. Both the business groups and the Leftists who had supported Tokyo-Peking rapprochement

were dismayed and scattered by the international vulgarity committed by Peking.

The Chinese Communist government not only cut off its nose to spite its face; it then buried the nose—by cancelling the trade agreements which the Japanese and their Peking “friends” had worked out.

It can be argued that the United States has never committed a diplomatic blunder so startling as this, or so self-defeating. The Peking regime undid the result of years of promising, hinting, glozing and dealing. Pyramids of conspiracy toppled in a week.

Following the great mistake of 1958, the Chinese Communists made no attempt to retrieve their position. Rather, they dared the Japanese to be pro-Peking.

Nationalist China and Prime Minister Kishi reaped the harvest. The Nationalists enjoyed a better year of Taiwan-Japanese relations than they ever had before. Kishi, proven correct in his estimate of the reaction of the Japanese, was returned and supported by larger parliamentary majorities than ever. In August, 1958, Kishi was able to speak from strength to Peking and to say that it was the Chinese, not the Japanese, who would have to change if Japanese-Mainland relations were to improve. He warned the Chinese not to meddle in Japanese domestic matters in January, 1959, and in the spring of 1959 he let the Japanese Socialists send a solemnly official “unofficial” delegation to Peking to talk to Chou En-lai. Chou played the Chinese one-string fiddle of linking recognition to trade; even the stupidest Japanese had only to look at the British to see that recognition had not poured the wealth of China into British ships at Shanghai.

By the summer of 1959, Peking's policy toward Japan was wholly bankrupt. The pro-Peking elements in Japan were scattered and discredited for the time being. The Kishi policy of alliance with the West was vindicated as never before. In part, the pressures which put the Japanese liberals in power were the same as those that reelected Macmillan in Britain, but in Japan the memory of Red China's great and insulting blunder of 1958 lingered on.

Why had the Chinese Communists, who so often have been smooth and crafty, destroyed their position in Japanese politics?

Part of the explanation lies in the fact that the top leaders are growing old. They have had hard lives, followed by the softening comforts of the Peking palaces and wine-shops. The new grade of Communist leader is often a fighting man. The appearance of Communist marshals in the foreign office is as freakish as would have been the appointment of the late General Patton as Secretary of State. The new president, handpicked to cause no trouble to the aging Stalinist leader, Mao Tse-tung, is a man named Liu Shao-chi who is famous for extreme orthodoxy, incredible talkativeness, and a strong mistrust of foreigners of all descriptions. Chinese Communist diplomacy was clever when it had to be clever. Now it has more than 150 million male Chinese of military age, and no longer needs to be clever.

It would be astonishing, and a paradox of history, if China becomes Stalinist as it becomes strong. Chou En-lai himself is one of the senior diplomats of the world, but Chou is being crowded by the new war-lords of the Chinese Communist period on the mainland—generals and marshals who won glory during the anti-Chiang and anti-American wars in China and Korea.

No one needs to tell a middle-aged Japanese that militarists can make fearful fools of themselves or can make ruins of their native lands. The Japanese are intrigued by China. With a mature government of long continuity, the Japanese can watch the antics of newly-civilian Chinese Red generals with great patience. They can continue to recognize one Chinese government (Chiang in Taipei) officially officially and the other Chinese government (Liu in Peking) officially unofficially, while protesting an admiration for the indivisibility of China. They can remember the opening sentences of the most famous of all Chinese novels, the *San Kuo chih Yen-i*: “Empires wax and wane. States fall asunder and coalesce.”

Japanese policy toward mainland China has succeeded, at least in part: maximum trade with minimum commitment. Chinese Communist policy toward Japan has failed: the neutralization of Japan from the West. Nationalist Chinese policy has profited from both: remain armed, wait and see, and meanwhile, trade.

*After discussing Indian-Chinese relations with "Prime Minister Nehru, in an exclusive interview graciously granted to this writer. . .," Professor Chao reports that Nehru did not expect "... any danger of military invasion by China, although there was 'tension.'"*

# The Chinese-Indian Controversy

By CHAO KUO-CHÜN

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**W**HEN the Central People's government was formed at Peking on October 1, 1949, most Indians were sympathetic toward the new regime because they too had suffered from foreign domination in the past and knew the unpopular nature of the Kuomintang rule. India became an independent Republic on January 26, 1950, and established diplomatic relations with Peking on April 1 of the same year.

In October, 1950, Peking, after announcing its intention to "liberate Tibet by peaceful or other means" on January 7 and June 24, ordered the People's Liberation Army (P.L.A.) to advance toward Tibet in October. On October 19, Chinese forces defeated the Tibetan troops at Chamdo in Sikang. On October 21, a memorandum was delivered by the Indian Ambassador to Peking,

stating, *inter alia*, that "a military action at the present time against Tibet will give those countries in the world which are unfriendly to China a handle for anti-Chinese propaganda at a crucial and delicate juncture in international affairs." Another note was despatched from New Delhi to Peking on October 26, reiterating that "the decision to order the advance of China's troops into Tibet appears to us most surprising and regrettable." The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on October 30 replied that "Tibet is an integral part of Chinese territory and the problem of Tibet is entirely a domestic problem of China. . . . The Central People's Government (C.P.G.) is exercising its sovereign rights. . . . The regional autonomy granted by the Chinese Government to the national minorities inside the country is an autonomy within the confines of Chinese sovereignty."<sup>1</sup>

Thus at the beginning of Peking-Delhi relations, divergent views existed between the two governments concerning the question of Tibet. However, with the signing of the Sino-Tibetan agreements on May 23, 1951, the situation regarding Tibet eased—at least temporarily. The major provisions of this agreement include the following:

(1) "The Tibetan people shall return to the big family of the motherland—the People's Republic of China."

(2) "The Tibetan people have the right to exercise regional autonomy under the unified leadership of the C.P.G."

(3) "The central authorities will not alter

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<sup>1</sup> English texts of these three documents appear in the appendices of *Indian Views of Sino-Indian Relations* by Margaret W. Fisher and Joan V. Bondurant, University of California Press, 1956.



the existing political system in Tibet."

(4) "The policy of freedom of religious belief laid down in the Common Programme shall be carried out."

(5) "Tibetan troops shall be reorganized step by step into the P.L.A. and become a part of the national defense forces."

(6) "The C.P.G. shall have the centralized handling of all external affairs of the area of Tibet."<sup>2</sup>

At least two significant aspects of the above documents may be noted. First, China regarded her measures concerning Tibet since 1950 as an exercise of sovereign rights within Chinese territory while India emphasized the autonomous nature of Tibet. The word "suzerainty" has often been used by Indians in describing the relationship between Peking and Lhasa, but the Prime Minister of India also made the following statement in the Lok Sabha (Lower House of India) on May 15, 1954:

... All during this period whether China was weak or strong and whatever the Government of China was, China always maintained this claim to the sovereignty over Tibet. It is true that occasionally when China was weak, this sovereignty was not exercised in any large measure. When China was strong, it was exercised. . . . Even then, when it was British policy to have some measure of influence over Tibet, even then they never denied the fact of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet, although in practice it was hardly exercised and they laid stress on Tibetan autonomy. Recent events made some other changes, factual changes because a strong Chinese State gave practical evidence of exercising that sovereignty. . . ."<sup>3</sup>

The second significant point is that the Agreement of 1951 gave Lhasa substantial autonomous rights and until the Tibetan local government took up armed insurrection in March, 1959, China had adopted a go-slow policy in making changes in Tibet. Thus the presence of Peking's strength was not too keenly felt along the Sino-Indian

frontier and Tibet still served the function (though diminishingly) of a buffer zone.

After 1950, there were frequent and close contacts between China and India. Beginning with an unofficial goodwill mission from India in September, 1951, a number of friendly intercourses took place. These included the first Chinese cultural delegation to India in October, 1951, the rice agreement in May, 1952, the Indian government's role in mediating the Korean war, rectification of the Sino-Indian agreement on Tibet on June 3, 1954, Premier Chou En-lai's visit to India that same month, Prime Minister Nehru's visit to China in October of the same year, and the Bandung Conference in April, 1955, in which Chou and Nehru played leading roles.

The Bandung Conference was a high water mark in Sino-Indian relations. The role enacted by Chou En-lai was praised highly by practically all circles and journals in India.<sup>4</sup> After that and up to March, 1959, when the Tibet rebellion occurred, cordial relations were maintained between New Delhi and Peking. Cases of a controversial nature developed but were not made known to the public. As early as July 17, 1954, the Counsellor of China in New Delhi delivered a note to the Indian Ministry of External Affairs on the "intrusion of 30 Indian troops into Wu-je (called by India Bara Hoti)" and requested "prompt investigation and immediate withdrawal of the Indian troops." (Text of this document is included as the first item in the *White Paper* published by the Indian government in September, 1959, on Indo-Chinese relations between 1954 and 1959. This volume shows that from July, 1954, to January, 1959, 25 documents were exchanged between China and India concerning half a dozen places of dispute along the frontier.)<sup>5</sup>

At the same time, friendly intercourse continued. Although, before March, 1959, there were some undercurrents of controversy, the general atmosphere was represented by the popular phrase "Hindi Chinni Bhai Bhai" (Indians and Chinese are brothers). A turning point came when open revolt broke out in Lhasa in March, 1959, and the subsequent overt border dispute further aggravated the situation. These two devel-

<sup>2</sup> Official English text is available in *Documents on International Affairs*, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1951, pp. 577-579.

<sup>3</sup> *Lok Sabha Debates*, Part II, Vol. V, No. 70, May 15, 1954, column 7495; also *Hindustan Times*, May 16, 1954, p. 1.

<sup>4</sup> For Indian comments on China's activities at Bandung, see Fisher and Bondurant, *op. cit.*, pp. 121-142.

<sup>5</sup> See *White Paper* (Ministry of External Affairs), September, 1959, pp. 1-32.

opments will be discussed in the following sections.

### The Tibet Rebellion

The Sino-Tibetan Agreement of May, 1951, and the Sino-Indian Agreement on Tibet signed April 29, 1954,<sup>6</sup> settled certain specific matters such as the entry of P.L.A. into Lhasa, freedom of religious belief by Tibetans, the control of external affairs of Tibet by the Chinese Central Government, Indian trading in Tibet, pilgrimages from Hindustan to Tibet, and the relinquishing of some special rights of India in Tibet. But a number of major questions like the magnitude or tempo of reform programmes to be implemented in Tibet, definition of "autonomy" for Tibet, and the delimitation of the Sino-Indian border line were left untouched. Furthermore, many basic (albeit often covert) issues were not satisfactorily resolved—such as antagonism toward reform by the Tibetan ruling group, suspicion of Han cadres by some Tibetans under the influence of several leading Lamas, and the conflict between what Nehru described as "a dynamic, rapidly moving society on one hand and a static, unchanging society fearful of what might be done to it in the name of reform on the other."<sup>7</sup>

The touch-off explosion came on March 9, 1959, when demonstrations broke out in Lhasa based on the apprehension that the Dalai Lama would be kidnapped during his scheduled attendance (on March 10) at a theatrical performance in the auditorium of the Tibetan Military Area Command of the P.L.A. On the same day, Manchung Sao-namchitso, a Tibetan official serving on the Preparatory Committee for the Tibet Autonomous Region, was killed by the mob. On March 10, armed insurrection began in Lhasa, and on the following day "a meeting

of (Tibetan) Government officials is called at the (Potala) palace and a proclamation is issued in the name of the Cabinet (sic.) declaring that Tibet is independent."<sup>8</sup> The Sino-Tibetan Agreement of May, 1950, was also declared null and void by the ruling Tibetan body (The Kasha). However, between March 12 and 18, the Dalai Lama wrote three letters to General Tan Kuan-san, saying that "unlawful activities of the reactionary clique cause me endless worry and sorrow. . . . In a few days from now when there are enough forces that I can trust, I shall make my way in secret to the Military Area Command. . . ."<sup>9</sup>

Either these letters were a ruse to mislead the Chinese authorities or the Dalai Lama was later persuaded by his nobles, because on the night of March 17, Dalai Lama, his family, and a party of about 80 including four out of six members (called Kaloons) of the Kasha left the Potala secretly for the Indian border. On March 20 (at 10 A.M.), the P.L.A. forces in Lhasa counterattacked and the rebellion was put down within three days. On March 28, the State Council ordered the dissolution of the Tibet Local Government, and the Preparatory Committee for the Tibet Autonomous Region was reorganized with the Panchen Lama appointed its acting chairman. On April 1, the Dalai Lama and his entourage arrived in India and were greeted by an Indian government representative from New Delhi.

It is neither feasible nor desirable in this short article to go into details regarding the accusations and countercharges made in India and China following the Tibet affair. The strong reaction among many Indians derives partly from their concern about Tibetan affairs, partly from their preference for Tibet as a buffer area, and partly from some peoples' desire to use Tibet as an anti-Communist tool.

Under the traditional influence of Gandhiji's emphasis on non-violence, many well-intentioned Indians were not against reform in Tibet but were critical of the use of force by the Chinese Central Government. But when one examines the turn of events described above, it is difficult to see what alternative to military action was left to the Peking representatives in Lhasa when the Tibetan

<sup>6</sup> English text appears in *White Paper of India*, *op. cit.*, pp. 98-104.

<sup>7</sup> The Prime Minister's speech in the Lok Sabha, April 27, 1959. In the same speech, Nehru also said that "to say that a number of 'upper strata reactionaries' in Tibet were solely responsible for this (rebellion) appears to be an extraordinary simplification of a complicated situation."

<sup>8</sup> This is a direct and very significant quotation from the "Chronology of Events," in *The Question of Tibet and the Rule of Law*, issued by the International Commission of Jurists in the fall of 1959, an anti-Communist publication.

<sup>9</sup> Photo copies of these letters, later admitted to be genuine by the Dalai Lama in India, appeared in *Concerning the Tibet Question*, *op. cit.*, pp. 36-40.

ruling group (1) supported armed revolt; (2) abrogated the 1951 Sino-Indian Agreement; and (3) declared independence. The fact that the P.L.A. waited for some ten days to take action against the armed rebellion indicates that military moves were not taken lightly. China is not the only country which has had to suppress by military force ambitious elements in a minority group, who declared "independence" and took up arms. It would be too much to expect the manorial lords of a feudal society like Tibet to cooperate voluntarily with reform measures without hostility.

Conciliatory gestures on the part of Peking such as the postponement of land reform from 1956 to 1962 were regarded by certain Tibetan rulers as a proof of the "invincible power of the God-King." Even after the outbreak of disturbances in Lhasa, no attempt was made by the Chinese authorities to capture or detain the Dalai Lama. When the Tibetan high priests were on their way to India they were spotted by Chinese planes on many occasions, according to one Indian newspaper,<sup>10</sup> but paratroops were not dropped to stop them nor were any mountain passes or roads bombed to block their way. As one American writer observed:

The Dalai's flight to India was apparently based upon the assumption that he was indispensable for Chinese rule in Tibet. That assumption was grossly mistaken. The Tibetan leader's withdrawal from the scene of action has brought Tibetan resistance the quicker to its end and fostered the implementation of Peking's programme in Tibet—to the disadvantage of India.<sup>11</sup>

Incidentally, the decision by the General Assembly on October 13 to debate the question of Tibet<sup>12</sup> is not helpful to Indo-Chinese relations nor to the easing of cold war tension. The government of India, the party

in the world organization most concerned and most familiar with the problem, opposed the debate. Five reasons for opposing the debate were given by the Indian Chief Delegate to the United Nations during a television interview on October 12.<sup>13</sup> A number of events in the past indicate that outside pressure will only stiffen the attitude of Peking.

One result of the Tibetan rebellion in March, 1959, was the extension of effective control of the areas adjacent to the Northeast Frontier Area of India by the Chinese authorities. According to a New China News Agency bulletin dated April 23, "in 10 days, the P.L.A. troops swept across hundreds of kilometres and wiped out the rebel nests at one stroke. The P.L.A. is now in control of the vast area south of the Tsangpo River and north of the Himalaya Mountains (called the Loka Area) . . . killed, wounded or took prisoner nearly 2,000 rebels."<sup>14</sup> The consolidation of the Loka Area by Chinese forces, together with the Tibetan unrest, made the Indian government more border conscious.

Some Indian leaders may also have deemed the events in Tibet an opportune moment to get explicit recognition from Peking on the frontiers as marked in the current Indian map. Thus the extending of civil and military administration to the N.E.F.A., picking up tempo after the entrance of the Chinese army into Tibet in 1950, was further accelerated, and new check posts were set up along the so-called MacMahon Line. For the first time in history, the Indian and Chinese administrations are face to face without the buttressing Tibetans—over a 2,500-kilometre-long frontier which has never been demarcated on the ground. This constitutes an immediate cause of the current border controversy.

### The Sino-Indian Border Questions

As mentioned previously, a score of border issues developed between July, 1954, and early 1959, but these were not made public by either India or China. The controversy came into the open when on August 28, 1959, the Prime Minister of India told the Lok Sabha that "a detachment of Chinese troops, 200 to 300 strong, crossed into the Subansiri Frontier Division in the N.E.F.A.

<sup>10</sup> *Times of India*, April 9, 1959, p. 1 and p. 7.

<sup>11</sup> O. Edmund Clubb, "The Old Order Passes in Tibet," *Eastern World*, London, August, 1959, p. 15.

<sup>12</sup> It is significant to note that out of 82 members of the U.N., only 43 supported the move to debate the Tibet question. Among these 43 members, only 7 are Asian countries, while 20 are from South and North Americas.

<sup>13</sup> For details, see *Times of India*, Oct. 13, 1959, p. 10.

<sup>14</sup> Many of the rebels in the Loka Area came from the nomadic group called the Khampas. One Western writer who was in Tibet between 1943 and 1950 wrote: "You never heard the name (Khampa) mentioned without an undertone of fear and warning. At last we realized that the word was synonymous with 'robber.'" Heinrich Harrer, *Seven Years in Tibet*, London, pp. 93-94.

and fired on the Indian picket post of Longju on August 25, and on the following day outflanked and overwhelmed it."<sup>15</sup> Although it was not publicized at that time, on August 27, 1959, a note was delivered by the Foreign Office of China to the Counsellor of India, lodging a "serious protest" against "the intrusion of a group of Indian armed troops into Migyitun [who] discharged dozens of rounds of machine-gun and rifle shots around 0600 hours on August 25, 1959."<sup>16</sup> After these open recriminations, there were charges and counter-charges of "aggression."

Under the strong emotions of nationalism, the intensity of which may not have been adequately gauged by far-away Peking, many Indians are understandably concerned or excited about the border events. Tension was enhanced by sensational front-page headlines in some newspapers such as a "Leap Forward into India Has Deeper Design," or a "Reported Massing of Chinese Forces on N.E.F.A. Border."<sup>17</sup> More sober remarks often did not get prominent display in the Indian press—such as the Prime Minister's statement that "the impression seems to have grown that there are masses of Chinese armies perched on the frontier or pouring into the frontier. This is not a correct impression."<sup>18</sup> Or factual reports like "Assam Rifles patrol parties who are now (September 4, 1959) moving northward in the Subansiri Frontier Division of the N.E.F.A. have not so far sighted a single Chinese, it is learned from informed sources."<sup>19</sup>

In addition to the Northeast frontier region, India and China also have different views regarding the territorial rights of Bara Hoti (Wu-je in Chinese), a small pass along the U.P. border, and the Ladakh region in Kashmir where the Chinese had built a road between Tibet and Sinkiang.

With the remote, undemarcated nature of the Indo-Chinese frontier, made more complicated by nationalistic emotions and politicking, it is difficult to present the numerous arguments on both sides. Summarily, the basic viewpoints of the Government of India include the following:

1. The "so-called MacMahon Line was drawn at a Tripartite Conference at Simla in 1913–1914 between China, Tibet and (British) India. . . . There was no mention of Chinese reservation in respect of the India-Tibet frontier either during the discussion or at the time of their initialling the Convention."

2. The "MacMahon Line has the incidental advantage of running along the crest of the High Himalayan Range which forms the natural dividing line. . . ." "Up to 1958, the Chinese Government had given the impression that they had accepted, at least tacitly, the Indian version of the Northeast frontier, as Peking did not raise formally any objection to it."

3. The Ladakh Region in Kashmir was "defined by a treaty of 1842 between Kashmir and Lama Guru of Lhasa and the Emperor of China." The area "now claimed by China has always been depicted as part of India on official maps, has been surveyed by Indian officials and even a Chinese map of 1893 shows it as Indian territory."

4. Regarding Bara Hoti (Wu-je), "its rightful ownership should be settled by negotiation."<sup>20</sup>

5. In reply to a letter from Premier Chou En-lai of September 8, 1959, Prime Minister Nehru wrote on September 27 that "Shatze and Khinzemane are on Indian territory, Yasher is a place not known to the Indian Government, and Tamadem, which has been ascertained as situated somewhat north of the MacMahon Line, has been vacated by Indian forces."<sup>21</sup>

6. The Government of India "recognizes that the India-China frontier which extends over more than 2,500-kilometres has not been demarcated on the ground and disputes may therefore arise at some places along the traditional frontier as to whether these places lie on the Indian or Tibetan side of this traditional frontier. We agree therefore that the border disputes which have already arisen should be amicably and peacefully settled. We also agree that until a settlement has been reached the 'status quo' should be maintained. In the meantime both sides should respect the traditional frontier and neither party should seek to alter the 'status quo' in any manner. Further, if any party has trespassed into the other's territory across the traditional frontier, it should immediately withdraw to its side of the frontier."<sup>22</sup>

<sup>15</sup> *The Statesman*, August 29, 1959, p. 7.

<sup>16</sup> *White Paper*, Government of India, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

<sup>17</sup> *Times of India*, August 30, 1959; and *The Statesman*, September 1, 1959.

<sup>18</sup> Speech in Lok Sabha, *Times of India*, September 13, 1959, p. 13.

<sup>19</sup> *Times of India*, September 5, 1959, p. 7.

<sup>20</sup> Letter from Nehru to Chou En-lai, March 22, 1959; text in *White Paper*, Government of India, *op. cit.*, pp. 55–57, and Nehru's remarks in Lok Sabha.

<sup>21</sup> *Times of India*, October 5, 1959, pp. 8–9.

<sup>22</sup> Nehru's letter to Chou, September 27, 1959, *op. cit.*, *Times of India*, October 5, 1959, p. 9.



The salient aspects of the presentation made by the Chinese government include the following:

1. The "so-called MacMahon Line was never discussed at the Simla Conference (1913-1914), but was determined by the British representative and the representative of the Tibet local authorities behind the back of the representative of the Chinese Central Government. . . . As to the Simla treaty, it was not formally signed by the representative of the then Chinese central government, and this is explicitly noted in the treaty."

2. "It was only in the period around the peaceful liberation of China's Tibet region in 1951 that Indian troops advanced on a large scale into the area south of the so-called MacMahon line. Therefore, the assertion that this section of the boundary has long been clearly delimited is obviously untenable."

3. "Indian troops, after the Tibetan rebellion, not only overstepped the so-called MacMahon line as indicated in the map attached to the secret notes exchanged between Britain and the Tibet local authorities, but also exceeded the boundary drawn on current Indian maps which is alleged to represent the so-called MacMahon line, but which in many places actually cuts even deeper into Chinese territory than the MacMahon line. Indian troops invaded and occupied Longju, intruded into Yasher, and are still in occupation of Shatze, Khinzemane, and Tamaden (as of September 8, 1959)."

4. "Concerning Ladakh, the then Chinese central government did not send anybody to participate in the conclusion of this treaty (of 1842), nor did it rectify the treaty afterwards. Moreover, this treaty only mentioned in general terms that Ladakh and Tibet would each abide by its borders, and did not make any specific provisions or explanations regarding the location of this section of the boundary. . . . Between China and Ladakh, there does exist a customary line derived from historical traditions, and Chinese maps have always drawn the boundary between China and Ladakh in accordance with this line."

5. "An over-all settlement of the boundary question should be sought by both sides taking into account the historical background and existing actualities and adhering to the Five Principles (panch shila), through friendly negotiations conducted in a well-prepared way step by step. Pending this, as a provisional measure, the two sides should maintain the long-existing status quo of the border, and not seek to change

it by unilateral action, even less by force."

6. "As to some of the disputes, provisional agreements concerning isolated places could be reached through negotiations to ensure the tranquility of the border areas and uphold the friendship of the two countries."<sup>23</sup>

The above official pronouncements on both sides show that there exist different interpretations regarding a number of issues, but there also is a readiness to undertake peaceful negotiations, to maintain the status quo, and to uphold age-old mutual friendship between India and China.

### Evaluation and Observations

This article will focus on three questions: One, what are the major factors that contribute to the present tension between New Delhi and Peking? Two, what are the "cohesive" and "disruptive" elements in Sino-Indian relations today? Three, what possible steps may be taken to mitigate if not resolve the current controversy?

Regarding the question why, there suddenly erupted open disputes between India and China after March, 1959, even though certain points of disagreement had existed between them for several years, one must look for possible explanations in both the international and domestic arenas of these two countries.

One reason is of course that now Tibet has ceased to be a buffer zone and Chinese forces have come right up to the Sino-Indian frontier. But few people in India really believe that China would "invade India." Prime Minister Nehru, in an exclusive interview on the subject of Indo-Chinese relations, graciously granted to this writer on October 7, 1959, did not expect any danger of military invasion by China, although there was "tension." The Prime Minister of India was reportedly upset because until 1959 he had thought that China had given consent to the MacMahon line. But the boundary question was not included in the Sino-Indian Agreement of October, 1954. Silence on the part of the Chinese government was taken as "consent" by India, but was regarded as "postponing to bring up the issue at a later stage so as not to disrupt Indo-Chinese amicable relations" by Peking.

The question of the "MacMahon Line" was officially brought up on December 14,

<sup>23</sup> Statements quoted from Chou En-lai's letter to Nehru, dated September 8, 1959. English text in *China Today*, New Delhi, vol. 4, No. 39, September 16, 1959, pp. 3-7.

1958, in Nehru's letter to Chou En-lai, and the latter's reply came in January, 1959, denying the legality of the MacMahon line and proposing surveys to determine the demarcation. Another letter was despatched by Nehru on March 22, reiterating Indian views about the MacMahon line and also bringing up the boundary questions of Ladakh and Sikkim. However, these notes were not made public by the Government of India until September when the "White Paper" was issued. China so far (mid-October, 1959) has not published any documentary volume on the border question, but a collection of translated items on Tibet was issued by the Foreign Languages Press in May, 1959.

To examine the recent flare-up of the Sino-Indian controversy, particularly since September, one cannot ignore certain internal developments in India and China. The "demonstration effect" of economic advances in China<sup>24</sup> may have intensified the urge of the conservative elements in India to seek ways to counterbalance Peking's impact. By propagating the "threat to national security from China" line, conservative factions are also striving to deal a blow to the Communist party of India, especially when an election is now scheduled to be held in the State of Kerala in February, 1960. The same stratagem is employed by a number of sources in the West, who would like to see a deterioration of Indo-Chinese relations.

Certain writers maintain that the current Sino-Indian controversy represents an attempt on the part of China to divert attention from "large-scale dislocation and immense popular discontent" at home. But available information does not reveal any unrest on the Chinese mainland, and both 1958 and 1959 showed substantial achievements on China's domestic front. Even if one assumes that Peking wished to create some international issue further to stimulate the national effort, it is difficult to envisage why other more convenient questions (such

as the off-shore islands, Hongkong, and Macao) were not utilized.

After deliberating on the possible causal factors in the decline of Sino-Indian relations, it is also desirable to examine the forces that tend to affect their cordial relationship. A number of factors contribute to the differences or tensions between China and India. Some are obvious, such as nationalistic sentiment, differences in ideologies between the two ruling parties (e.g., between "Gandhian socialism" and "Marxism-Maoism"), conflicting border claims, divergent views regarding Tibet, and the class nature of the dominant power in the respective countries. But there are also less obvious factors. These may include the competitive role of these two countries regarding the Asian-African region, "traditionalism" as a major trait in Indian society versus the "dynamism" of the new Chinese society, economic competition both in domestic and international (e.g., foreign market) fields, the role of Western aid in India's economic planning, and population growth on both sides which tends to make open frontier areas a "Lebensraum."

On the other hand, fortunately, there are other major factors which are conducive to the development of friendly cooperation between Peking and New Delhi. First, both countries suffered foreign exploitation in the past, and share the sentiments of anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism. Second, India and China are both striving for industrialization and modernization, in the face of many similar problems. Thus each can learn a great deal from the other. A concrete expression of this mutual aid may be seen in the exchange of numerous delegations and visits described previously. The latest examples are the studying of Indian statistical methods by the Chinese, and the experimenting in India with Chinese techniques of crop cultivation and local industries.<sup>25</sup> Third, the top leaders of China and India are all in favour of peaceful negotiations and long-term friendship. Fourth, Peking and New Delhi are endeavouring to develop ever closer relationships with the Asian-African peoples, and any open break between the two largest nations of the world will be a disservice to Asian-African solidarity. Fifth, China has been supported by

<sup>24</sup> Prof. Wilfred Malenbaum, for example, wrote in the *American Economic Review* of June, 1959, (pp. 284-309) that "India achieved an annual rate of growth of real income of almost 3.5 per cent in the period from April 1, 1950, through March 31, 1959. Over essentially the same period, the Chinese growth rate was at least three times as great."

<sup>25</sup> See "India Will Try Out Chinese Methods (in Agricultural Production)," *Times of India*, November 3, 1958, p. 1; "Cultivation of Rice, Chinese Way to be Tried," *Times of India*, February 24, 1959, p. 10; and "Study of Chinese Methods of Steel Production," *Times of India*, March 4, 1959, p. 6.

India in several world issues like the argument between Peking and Washington regarding Taiwan (Formosa), and the question of a United Nations seat for Peking.

At the same time, the international prestige of India is enhanced by the fact that New Delhi enjoys amiable relations with both the Western and Soviet blocs—sometimes in the rewarding role of “an honest broker.” If antagonism, not to say hostility, develops between India and China, then New Delhi will have to rely more and more on the American bloc, because China’s allies may be forced to choose sides. This would not only result in India’s losing one of her diplomatic trump cards, but would also be detrimental to the easing of world tension. Sixth, and perhaps most importantly, China and India are both much occupied in national construction, and need to devote all their available resources as well as national effort to fulfill these herculean tasks. Neither can afford to squander its energy on non-productive adventures.

In view of the above, it is very unlikely that present Sino-Indian tension will develop into an open conflict. Although it may take some time for pent-up emotions on both sides to cool off, a turning point may have already been reached and Indo-Chinese relations will change for the better, because neither party can afford to make them worse.

### Hopeful Signs

Hopeful signs have occurred recently (early October, 1959). For instance, Premier Chou En-lai, in a reply to Prime Minister Nehru’s good wishes on the occasion of the Tenth Anniversary of the People’s Republic of China, emphasized the “profound friendship handed down from generation to generation between the peoples of China and India,” and noted that the current “difficulties should be viewed as merely an episode in the age-old friendship.”<sup>26</sup> The next day, October 8, Prime Minister Nehru welcomed the friendly tenor of Chou’s message. The external policy of a country on any specific issue is a considered choice after balancing the merits and demerits (or advantages against disadvantages). In this case, the fundamental need for friendship between

New Delhi and Peking far outweighs the elements of contradiction between them.

As to the more positive query: “What practical measures may be taken by both sides to improve the prevailing situation?” both Chou and Nehru have reiterated many times that the *status quo* should be preserved. The Indian Prime Minister’s advice during his talk with this writer on this question, that “both sides should avoid doing anything which may worsen the situation,” represents a conservative approach.

### Minor Differences

However, at the moment there exist some minor differences regarding the interpretation of the term “status quo.” For example, New Delhi has stated that Longju is south of the MacMahon line, while Peking maintains it is not on the Indian side of the line. Since there are only a few such points of contention (all small posts along a border that has not been delimited), both governments might well send ground survey teams to ascertain the exact location of these places. Also to facilitate factual understanding of this so-called MacMahon line, complete records of the Simla Conference (1913–1914) should be made public by both sides. To manifest a friendly spirit, it would be a welcome (and diplomatically prudent) gesture if the Chinese could make Longju a neutralized area.

### Conclusion

After a “right atmosphere,” emphasized by Mr. Nehru during the afore-mentioned interview, is established, the two sides can then sit down and present facts and arguments to each other for a reasonable, realistic settlement. The Indian Prime Minister remarked to the writer that it would not be necessary for a third party to participate when and if negotiations take place. If either side feels that certain questions are not subject to discussion, then matters can be left as they are or as they stood prior to the Tibetan rebellion in March, 1959. After all, the prevailing frontier existed for nearly a decade, since October, 1959, and there are no urgent reasons for settling all pending issues overnight.

<sup>26</sup> *The Statesman*, October 8, 1959, p. 1.

## Received at our Desk

**THE SECOND SOVIET-YUGOSLAV DISPUTE:** Full Text of Main Documents, April-June 1958. Edited by VACLAV L. BENES, ROBERT F. BYRNES, and NICOLAS SPULBER. (Bloomington: Indiana University Publications, 1959. 272 pages, \$3.50.)

Soviet-Yugoslav relations have had a checkered history since the rapprochement of May 1955. Within three years the Kremlin was again attacking "Yugoslav revisionism," though this time formal relations have not been broken off. A group of scholars at the University of Indiana have compiled the principal documents containing the charges and counter-charges of this second dispute.

"The documents have been grouped into four sections: the first section, "The Preliminaries," refers to the period from the reconciliation of May, 1955, to the end of 1957. The second section consists of the first three chapters of the draft program of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, which are the main targets of the Soviet critique. The third section includes the attacks launched by the various Communist parties against the League of Communists of Yugoslavia from April to June, 1958, as well as Khrushchev's speech of July 11. The fourth and last section contains the Yugoslav rejoinders."

The editors have performed a valuable service for students and scholars. Their introductory notes to each section are also of great benefit.

Alvin Z. Rubinstein  
University of Pennsylvania

**THE SOVIET AIR AND ROCKET FORCES.** Edited by ASHER LEE. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959. 311 pages and index, \$7.50.)

Concern over the military capabilities of the Soviet Union, particularly in the crucial areas of jets and missiles, has grown considerably since the launching of Sput-

nik in October, 1957. A number of informative, valuable studies have been published recently which add to our knowledge of this aspect of Soviet strength. Asher Lee, an internationally known British expert on military aviation, has compiled and edited another such book. In a series of timely essays, Western experts present a comprehensive evaluation of Soviet air power.

Every aspect of Soviet air and rocket forces is examined. The development of the Soviet Air Force from 1917 to 1941 is described by George Schatunowski, a former Soviet officer. The performance of the Soviet Air Force during the second World War is discussed by Hanson Baldwin and General Walter Schwabedissen. The problems of air defense and the future of Soviet air power are treated by the editor, Asher Lee. Other noted experts analyze the organization of the Soviet Air Force, the training of personnel, the state of production and missile development.

The various essays bear the imprint of solid research and careful analysis. Each contributes to a greater understanding of this vital subject. Above all, they leave this civilian with the realization that there is no real defense against the tragedy of a nuclear war except an intensified effort to channel the East-West conflict into economic and political areas. This reviewer agrees with Mr. Lee when he states that "the time has come when military action is no longer a major instrument of political strategy either Soviet or Western."

A.Z.R.

**THE RUSSIAN PUSH TOWARD JAPAN.** Russo-Japanese Relations, 1697-1875. By GEORGE ALEXANDER LENSEN. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959. 553 pages, bibliography and index, \$10.00.)

Among the many problems confronting American policy-makers in the Far East, the future of relations with Japan looms



large. For the present, at least, Japan, our former enemy, seems committed to the Western camp and is a key bastion in the Northeast Pacific. But there are innumerable unresolved difficulties of potentially critical proportions which periodically strain, and may eventually disrupt, the present pattern.

Dr. George A. Lensen's account of the origin and evolution of Russo-Japanese relations during the 1697-1875 period is a fascinating study. It combines scholarship with style, insight with information. Unlike many serious works, it is well written and commands the reader's interest throughout. The author has probed diligently and long among seldom studied Japanese and Russian materials. The result is extraordinarily compelling diplomatic history. The inter-relation between Russian policy in Europe and in Asia is ably considered.

"In terms of decades Russian policy appears erratic and to lack a definite course. On the other hand, "Japanese interest in Russia was total, constant, occasionally verging on hysteria, and shaped by an overestimation of actual Russian interest in Japan." Further: "It is a characteristic of Russo-Japanese relations that even at moments of extreme irritation with Russia, there were spokesmen in or near the Japanese government, who sought to deflect Russian pressure on their country by alliance with Russia rather than by direct opposition." This phenomenon is not without contemporary significance.

It is to be hoped that the author's intention to treat Japanese-Russian relations from 1875 to the present in a second volume will be encouraged, and that such a study will not be long in coming. A.Z.R.

**POPULATION AND PROGRESS IN THE FAR EAST.** BY WARREN S. THOMPSON. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1959. 443 pages, bibliography and index, \$7.50.)

Warren Thompson, for many years the Director of the Scripps Foundation for Research in Population Problems, has substantially revised his *Population and Peace in the Pacific* (1946) in order to take into

consideration the major changes in the area since the end of World War II. These are "the increasingly heavy burden of a rapidly growing population on the economies of most of these countries" as a consequence of more effective health measures, the impetus toward the welfare state which has accompanied political independence, the emergence of China as a totalitarian Communist nation, and "the recognition by the leaders of Japan, China and India that population control should become an operating policy if their peoples are to make rapid economic progress, or even maintain their present economic status."

His approach is to analyze the relationship between population growth and economic development (i.e., food supply, natural resources and industrial and agricultural production) in the various Asian countries. He presents the economic difficulties, and their political implications, clearly and cogently. One comes away from this book with a greater appreciation of the efforts being made by Asian countries to cope with the burgeoning pressure of population, and of the discouragingly inadequate measures thus far taken.

A.Z.R.

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**HUMAN RESOURCES FOR EGYPTIAN ENTERPRISE.** By Frederick Harbison and Ibrahim Abdelkader Ibrahim. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1959. 221 pages and index, \$5.50.)

This "analysis of labor problems in the industrialization of Egypt" is a case study, one of a series of country manpower studies under the auspices of the Inter-University Study of Labor Problems in Economic Development.

**THE ADMINISTRATION OF INTER-STATE COMPACTS.** BY RICHARD H. LEACH AND REDDING S. SUGG, JR. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1959. 256 pages, index, \$4.50.)

This is a highly technical account of the relationships between interstate compact agencies and state and federal governments, and the powers and functions of the agencies. Selected case studies enliven the text.

**THE SCHUMAN PLAN.** By WILLIAM DIEBOLD, JR. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1959. 750 pages, bibliography and index, \$6.50.)

The Director of Economic Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations writes a detailed analysis of the work of the European Coal and Steel Community from 1950 to 1959. Tables and bibliography are helpful.

**ESSAYS ON JAPANESE ECONOMY.** By SHIGETO TSURU. (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1959. 241 pages, index, \$4.50.)

A scholarly collection of essays written in the past 17 years by a Harvard-trained Japanese economist, this small volume deals with problems such as stability, employment and business trends in Japan.

#### Other New Studies

**THE EVOLUTION OF A CONSERVATIVE.** By WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1959. 295 pages, index, \$4.50.)

**TRADING STAMP PRACTICE AND PRICING POLICY.** By ALBERT HARRING. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1959. 390 pages, appendix and index, \$6.00.)

**THE AMERICANS: THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE.** By DANIEL J. BOORSTIN. (New York: Random House, 1958. 434 pages, bibliographical notes and index, \$6.00.)

**THE STRUCTURE OF NATIONS AND EMPIRES.** By REINHOLD NIEBUHR. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1959. 306 pages, index, \$5.00.)

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**MY HEART HAS SEVENTEEN ROOMS.** By CAROL BARTHOLOMEW. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1959. 177 pages, \$3.50.)

**THE WEST IN CRISIS.** By JAMES P. WARBURG. (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1959. 192 pages, \$3.50.)

**THE STUARTS.** By F. P. KENYON. (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1959. 240 pages, index, \$5.00.)

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(Continued from page 349)

ductive to this condition. In other words, the existence of a real or imaginary external enemy continues to be necessary for the Communist program. Secondly, if we assume that the commune system is maintained for any length of time, the effect of the social

reorganization it has wrought could hardly be erased at one stroke. One cannot as yet fully realize how the new Chinese society may take shape in the dynamics of social change, but the traditional social and moral values that are closely bound to the family can hardly be expected to survive.

# Current Documents

## KHRUSHCHEV AT COMMUNIST CHINA'S ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATION

After his United States visit, Russian Premier Nikita Khrushchev went to Peking for the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China. Excerpts of the official English text of his speech of September 30, 1959, in Peking follow:

Dear Comrade Mao Tse-tung, dear Comrade Liu Shao-chi, dear Comrade Chu Teh, dear Comrade Chou En-lai, esteemed comrades, friends:

Allow me, first of all, to thank Comrade Chou En-lai for his kind words about the Soviet Union and our Communist party, to thank you, dear comrades, for your hospitality.

Permit me to congratulate you, the entire fraternal Chinese people, with all my heart on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the Chinese People's Republic. It is a great and happy day not only for you, but for all the friends of your great country.

The current year, 1959, is rich in significant, or as we say, round, dates. This year the Polish, Rumanian, Bulgarian and Albanian peoples mark the fifteenth anniversary of the establishment of people's democracy in their countries, while our German friends will celebrate the tenth anniversary of the proclamation of the German Democratic Republic in a week's time.

We are happy that we are celebrating here with you, in festive Peking, the glorious victory of the Chinese people which has opened up a new era in the history of China. Each such momentous date is a historic landmark on the road of the swift development of socialism and communism.

Ten years ago, when the Chinese people took power into their own hands, the whole world said that the Chinese revolution was an event of tremendous historical importance.

Both the friends of the Chinese people and their enemies understood that the victory of the people's revolution in a country with a population exceeding half a billion would

seriously change the balance of forces in the world arena in favor of socialism. It will still further strengthen the forces of the national liberation movement throughout the world.

The victory of the Chinese revolution was another triumph of the revolutionary, transformative and life-giving force of Marxist-Leninist ideas.

Routed in open battle, the enemies of People's China cherished the hope that the Chinese people would be unable to cope with the numerous difficulties and obstacles that had arisen in their way.

As for us, true friends of People's China, we realized full well of course from personal experience that the building of socialism in such a vast and formerly backward country presented considerable difficulties. We saw at the same time what a mighty upsurge of revolutionary enthusiasm the victory of the people's revolution had produced, how the inexhaustible forces of the Chinese people were coming into play. All upright people sincerely believed that having taken its destiny into its own hands, the Chinese people was capable of defending its native land and establishing a Socialist scheme of things. . . .

We know from the experience of our country that when the working people take power into their own hands and when they are firmly guided by a Marxist-Leninist party which knows how to unite the people and where to lead them, then no force can halt the advance of the people.

The heroic and industrious people of China, led by their glorious Communist party, have shown what can be achieved by the people when they take power into their own hands. In our time many countries

have rid themselves from colonial dependence. Having inherited a backward economy, the people of these countries are looking for ways and means to bring their countries from backwardness to the broad road of independent development, of economic and cultural progress. They have two ways to choose from: The way of capitalist and the way of Socialist development.

In an effort to breathe new life into the senile capitalist system, the enemies of communism like to say that . . . so-called private enterprise provides a better possibility for self-expression and yields better results.

However, even a simple comparison of the rates of development of the countries following the capitalist road with the rates of development of the Socialist countries shows patently where the people are better able to display their creative abilities—under the Socialist system or under the capitalist.

No profound study is necessary here: Life itself shows the great advantages of socialism. There is no stopping the swift development of the Socialist countries and this is giving the creeps to the capitalist chieftains.

They acknowledge that the swift development of industry, agriculture and culture in the great People's China is having a great impact on the countries of Asia and Africa. This example can cause the other nations to emulate it in order to achieve the same great progress, while the enemies of socialism watch it with fear and apprehension for the fate of capitalism.

\* \* \*

When I talked with President Eisenhower, and I have just returned from the United States, my impression was that the President of the United States—and he has the support of many people—is aware of the need for relaxing international tension. . . .

The recognition of this fact keynoted all the talks. This was repeatedly pointed out by the President and other leaders. Therefore we, on our part, must do everything possible to preclude war as a means for settling outstanding questions. These questions must be solved through negotiations.

The statesmen in the capitalist countries cannot but reckon with such a decisive factor of our time as the existence of the powerful world camp of socialism. There is only one

way to maintain peace. This is the way of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems. The question is: Either peaceful coexistence or war with its disastrous consequences.

Now, with the present balance of forces between socialism and capitalism favorable for the former, those who would like to carry on the cold war policy are heading toward their own destruction. The advocates of the cold war are pushing the world towards another world war whose flames will devour in the first place those who will unleash it.

The leaders of many capitalist states find themselves compelled increasingly to reckon with the real state of affairs—to build international relations on a new basis because in our age it is impossible successfully to solve the problems of relations between the two systems in any other way but on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence. There is no other way.

Comrades, the Socialist countries have made great progress in the development of their economy and, as a result, have created a mighty potential enabling them to continue to advance successfully. They have the means of defense against the imperialist aggressors should the latter attempt to make them leave the Socialist road by interference in their affairs and to restore capitalism in them. This time has gone forever.

But we must reason realistically and correctly understand the present situation, and this certainly does not mean that since we are so strong we should test the stability of the capitalist system by force. This would be wrong. The peoples would never understand and would never support those who took into their heads to act in this way. We have always been against predatory wars.

Even such a noble and progressive system as socialism cannot be imposed by force of arms against the will of the people. This is why the Socialist countries pursuing their consistent peace policy concentrate on peaceful construction and by their example of Socialist construction inflame the hearts of the peoples and make them follow their lead.

The question when this or that country will embark on the Socialist road is to be decided by the people themselves. This principle is the holy of holies for us. \* \* \*



## The Month in Review

### INTERNATIONAL

#### Berlin Crisis

Oct. 6—U.S. Secretary of State Christian A. Herter affirms the Allied intention to keep its forces in Berlin until Germany is reunited. (For discussion of the summit talks, see *U.S.S.R.*, October 21 and October 23, and *U.S. Foreign Policy*, October 28.)

Oct. 25—West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer suggests that a summit conference be held sometime between December and June and that the question of Berlin and German reunification be excluded from the conference. He says that conference agenda should be restricted to discussion of a beginning disarmament program.

Oct. 29—Britain, France and the U.S. protest to East Berlin against any contemplated display of the new East German flag in West Berlin. The controversy over displays of the East German flag has snowballed since East Germany first tried to display it in early October over the West Berlin elevated railway stations which it operates.

#### Central Treaty Organization

Oct. 8—The Secretary General of Cento, M. O. A. Baig, reports that the Cento allies have agreed in a closed session meeting not to "let down" their guard.

#### Colombo Plan

Oct. 26—The eleventh Colombo Plan conference opens in Jogjakarta.

#### Disarmament

Oct. 9—The U.S.S.R. asks the U.N. to accept Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's disarmament plan in principle; details of inspection and control "would not be difficult."

Oct. 14—The U.S. suggests that the U.N. continue to try for progress on prohibiting nuclear test explosions and preventing sur-

prise attack, rejecting the Russian "all or nothing" approach.

Oct. 15—In Washington, representatives of 12 nations active in the Antarctic region pledge the demilitarization of Antarctica: the freezing of the continent's political status without accepting or rejecting any nation's claims is also accepted. The 12 nations include the U.S., the U.S.S.R., Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Great Britain, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the Union of South Africa.

Oct. 22—U.N. French representative Jules Moch suggests the elimination of nuclear weapons carriers as a method of disarmament.

Oct. 27—The Geneva conference on a treaty to ban nuclear weapons testing reopens.

The U.S.S.R. agrees with the U.S. and other Western powers to transfer all disarmament suggestions to a 10-nation group that will meet in Geneva early in 1960.

#### General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

Oct. 20—It is reported to members of Gatt that Japan and Australia intend to liberalize trade restrictions.

Oct. 27—U.S. Under Secretary of State Douglas Dillon asks other nations to drop their trade barriers.

#### International Bank for Reconstruction and Development

Oct. 1—68 members of the World Bank vote support for an International Development Association, an institution that will make loans for development on "softer" and easier terms than the World Bank.

#### United Nations

Oct. 5—U.A.R. Foreign Minister Mahmoud Fawzi tells the General Assembly that Israel is creating a crisis by insisting on using the Suez; the U.A.R. will lift the anti-Israel blockade when the Palestinian refugee question is settled.

Oct. 6—The U.S.S.R. says it will ask for a

United Nations international conference on "the exchange of experience in exploring outer space."

Oct. 16—The General Assembly approves a Trusteeship Committee recommendation for a plebiscite in the Southern Cameroons.

Oct. 19—The General Assembly suspends for 2 weeks the vote for the Security Council seat in contest between Turkey and Poland after 29 unsuccessful ballots.

Oct. 21—The General Assembly votes to "deplore" recent events in Tibet.

Oct. 28—The General Assembly votes unanimously to refer Khrushchev's disarmament suggestion to the 10-nation body meeting in Geneva in early 1960.

Oct. 29—The Trusteeship Committee asks the General Assembly to "invite" South Africa to negotiate on the question of the status of South-West Africa.

Oct. 30—A Special Political Committee debate on *apartheid* results in a walk-out by the South Africa delegation.

#### West Europe

Oct. 22—Headquarters of the Western European Union reveals that the Council has agreed to allow certain types of anti-aircraft missile manufacture in West Germany.

Oct. 23—Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco and San Marino admit Luxembourg and the Vatican to the group of states known as Little Europe.

#### ARGENTINA

Oct. 8—President Arturo Frondizi is reported to have refused to grant legal status to the Peronist Justicialist party. Consequently, Peronists will be excluded from the March 27, 1960, election.

Oct. 19—An International Monetary Fund group arrives in Argentina to discuss the economic plan for which Argentina needs \$200 million in credits.

Oct. 25—It is announced that the Left-wing University Student Federation's demands to drop U.S. assistance to Argentine national universities has caused a halt in the U.S. program. A study committee has been established to examine the problem.

#### AUSTRIA

Oct. 15—President Adolf Schaerf returns to Vienna after a 10-day trip to the U.S.S.R.

#### BELGIUM

##### Belgian Congo

Oct. 16—Belgium's Minister for the Congo August de Schryver announces that elections to a Congolese legislature, based on universal suffrage, will be held in December.

Oct. 31—Africans and government troops clash in a battle leading to the death of 24 persons at the least. The fighting was sparked when the government interrupted a prohibited meeting of the Congo National Movement.

#### BRAZIL

Oct. 10—It is announced that last night the Federal Commission of Supply and Prices ordered cattlemen to supply beef at set prices to the Brazilian government.

Oct. 31—An order is signed placing the control and operation of meatpacking plants under the government. General Ururahy Magalhaes, head of the Supply and Price Control Agency of the Brazilian government, resigns.

#### BRITISH COMMONWEALTH

##### Canada

Oct. 6—Two agreements with Euratom are reached by Canada for a peaceful atomic energy exchange program.

Prime Minister John Diefenbaker and Mexican President Adolfo Lopez Mateos confer in Ottawa and discuss trade expansion.

##### Ceylon

Oct. 6—Strict press censorship is enforced on reports of investigations of the assassination of the late Prime Minister S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike.

##### Great Britain

Oct. 3—The government reveals that the gross national product reached a peak of £20,130,000,000 (\$56,364,000,000) in 1958.

Oct. 8—The Conservatives win a sweeping victory in the general election; incomplete returns show a probable Conservative majority of some 100 in Parliament.

Oct. 14—Prime Minister Harold Macmillan names Duncan Sandys as the new Minister of Aviation; Harold Watkinson as Minister of Defense; Viscount Hailsham as Lord Privy Seal (in charge of atomic energy,

space and other scientific programs); Iain Macleod as Colonial Secretary; and Edward Heath as Minister of Labor.

Oct. 19—The Government reveals that after November 1 British travelers abroad will not be subjected to limitations on the amount of foreign currency they can buy yearly.

Oct. 21—The Foreign Office expresses the hope that a summit conference can be held "rather earlier" than next spring.

Oct. 22—With his third list of appointments, Macmillan completes his cabinet.

Oct. 23—The Parliamentary Labour party names Hugh Gaitskell again as leader; Aneurin Bevan is named deputy leader without dissent.

Oct. 27—The new Parliament opens.

Oct. 28—Macmillan warns of peril in delaying a summit meeting.

#### India

Oct. 4—Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru makes public a letter to Communist China's Premier Chou En-lai declaring that China must withdraw troops from Indian territory before border talks begin.

Oct. 6—V. K. Krishna Menon tells the U.N. General Assembly that India will negotiate peacefully but not submissively with Communist China.

Oct. 8—Nehru says India will "fully resist" Chinese aggression.

Oct. 23—India and Pakistan reach agreement about border disputes on their eastern frontier.

Oct. 24—Nehru says India will not "bow down" to Chinese threats.

Oct. 27—The Ministry of External Affairs reveals that India will accept the release of ten border policemen from Communist China.

Oct. 31—The Indian Army takes direct authority at the Indian-Chinese border.

#### Pakistan

Oct. 20—Pakistan government employees begin to move from Karachi to the new temporary capital at Rawalpindi.

Oct. 21—Legislation enacted by decree provides for setting up industrial courts to end industrial disputes with speed.

Oct. 26—President Mohammed Ayub Khan promulgates legislation providing for the election of two-thirds of the members of

local councils; a system he terms "basic democracies" limits direct popular election to the local level. All citizens 21 years and older of good character may vote.

#### BRITISH EMPIRE

##### Cyprus

Oct. 9—Issuing a joint request for "undisturbed peace and unity," Lieut. General George Grivas and Archbishop Makarios end their conference.

Oct. 13—It is announced that Cypriote elections will take place Dec. 13 for President and Vice-President. Elections for members of the House of Representatives and the Greek and Turkish communal chambers will be held later.

Oct. 18—A British naval craft intercepts a Turkish vessel and seizes ammunition.

Oct. 21—Protesting alleged Turkish arms smuggling, Makarios halts the discussions of a new constitution.

Oct. 23—The Turkish government denies encouraging arms smuggling into Cyprus.

Oct. 27—The Turkish Cypriote leader asks the Turkish community to turn in all arms and ammunition.

Oct. 29—Archbishop Makarios says discussions of the new constitution will begin again next week.

##### Kenya

Oct. 23—Sir Patrick Renison is sworn in as Governor, succeeding Sir Evelyn Baring.

##### Nigeria

Oct. 31—It is announced in Lagos that Parliament will be dissolved tomorrow; federal elections are scheduled for December 12. The new House of Representatives is to be enlarged from 184 seats plus a speaker to 320 seats, according to constitutional amendment. A Senate is also to be formed.

##### Singapore

Oct. 14—The Legislative Assembly adopts Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew's bill extending by 5 years emergency legislation that permits detention of suspects without trial if they threaten security or essential services.

#### BURMA

Oct. 25—It is announced that Soviet aid for costly projects in Burma has been cancelled

because of the expense to the Burmese government.

### CAMBODIA

Oct. 4—Britain denies that it desires to liquidate the International Supervisory Commission for Cambodia, whose adjournment because of lack of work it has suggested.

### CHINA, NATIONALIST

Oct. 10—President Chiang heads the celebration of the 1911 Chinese revolution.

### CHINA (The People's Republic)

Oct. 1—With Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev and Chinese Communist leaders in attendance, the tenth anniversary of Chinese Communist rule is celebrated.

Oct. 2—Chairman of the Chinese Communist party Mao Tse-tung meets with Soviet Premier Khrushchev.

Oct. 3—On Premier Khrushchev's last day in Peking (he is scheduled to depart tomorrow morning), Foreign Minister Chen Yi's article expressing anti-American sentiment is published in *Jenmin Jihpao* (People's Daily).

Chinese Communists shell the Nationalist offshore islands.

Oct. 7—Premier Chou En-lai, replying to Indian Prime Minister Nehru's greeting on Red China's tenth anniversary, declares that recent border difficulties between Red China and India are "merely an episode in our age-old friendship."

Oct. 9—Marshal Li Chi-shen's death yesterday is reported. He was Vice-Chairman of the National People's Congress Standing Committee and Chairman of the Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang.

Oct. 12—It is reported that Khrushchev kept his promise to U.S. President Eisenhower to discuss the release of 5 U.S. citizens imprisoned by the Red Chinese.

Oct. 14—It is reported from London that Red China will not release 5 U.S. prisoners.

Oct. 23—It is reported that Indians and Communist Chinese clashed 2 days ago in southern Ladakh, in a border area between India and Chinese Communist-held Tibet. India has protested the incident and has asked Peking to withdraw its forces from

Ladakh (see also *British Commonwealth, India*).

Oct. 25—A note sent to India by Communist China declares that Red China is holding 7 policemen and 3 other Indians.

Oct. 26—Communist China announces it is willing to release the Indians captured in Ladakh last week.

Oct. 30—It is announced that Indian officials are considering a Red Chinese statement laying claim to a considerably larger portion of Ladakh, an Indian northern province, than hitherto advanced.

### COSTA RICA

Oct. 27—Opposition leader Daniel Oduber broadcasts over the radio his demand for the resignation of President Mario Echandi.

Oct. 29—President Echandi announces that two members of the National Liberation party have come over to his side to give him a majority in Congress.

### CUBA

Oct. 13—It is reported that rebel activity against the regime of Premier Fidel Castro continues.

Oct. 16—The U.S. voices opposition to British plans to supply jets to Cuba.

Oct. 17—Castro abolishes the Ministry of National Defense and gives his brother Major Raul Castro full command of all Cuban forces in an attempt to quell counter-revolutionary elements.

Oct. 20—Former brother-in-law of Premier Castro, Attorney Rafael Diaz-Balart reveals he is head of the White Rose counter-revolutionary Cuban movement aimed at ousting Castro.

Oct. 21—Following his resignation after protesting against Communist penetration and the failure of Castro's movement, Major Hubert Matos is arrested. Matos was military ruler of Camaguey Province and played a prominent role in Castro's rebel movement.

Oct. 22—Havana workers stage a one-hour protest strike against terrorism, counter-revolutionary activity and the U.S. following an alleged bombing and other armed attacks in which 2 were killed and 45 wounded.

Oct. 23—Castro lashes out against the U.S., charging it with responsibility for the rebel



air attack on Havana on Wednesday (October 21).

The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation discloses that Major Diaz Lanz, ex-head of the Cuban air force under Castro, admits he led the anti-Castro "leaflet-bombing" over Havana.

Oct. 24—The U.S. informs the Inter-American Peace Committee, an agency of the O.A.S., that it would welcome an investigation of Cuban charges that the U.S. is a base for rebel plots against Cuba.

Oct. 27—The U.S. expresses concern over the recent rift in U.S.-Cuban relations.

Military tribunals are re-established in Cuba to hear counter-revolutionary cases.

Oct. 28—U.S. President Eisenhower declares that the U.S. is taking additional measures to guard against illegal flights from the U.S. to Cuba.

It is announced that Cuba has enacted a new mineral and petroleum claim law, providing that all claims must begin to be developed within 60 days and levying a 25 per cent tax of gross receipts on exports of petroleum or minerals. Most of the mining industry is held by U.S. companies.

Oct. 29—The Cuban government revokes the right of habeas corpus.

Oct. 30—Cuban agents enter foreign oil companies' offices and seal the files. It is reported that the government will take these files into its possession.

#### DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Oct. 27—It is reported that "business and diplomatic observers" view the current economic crisis in the Dominican Republic as a serious problem for Generalissimo Rafael Trujillo's regime, whose 29-year rule has been marked by economic prosperity. The deficit is largely due to increased military effort to meet the threat of possible invasion from Cuba.

Oct. 30—The Vice-President of the Dominican Republic reports that his government has spent some \$50 million on military arms during the year because of the threat of invasion from Cuba.

#### FRANCE

Oct. 9—France and Tunisia agree to exchange prisoners.

Oct. 10—Restrictions on imports from West

Europe, the U.S. and Canada are eased by the French Community.

Oct. 20—The National Assembly receives the government's financial reform bill for a single income tax and a cut in inheritance taxes.

Oct. 22—Premier Michel Debré announces that two Leftist weekly papers, whose latest editions were seized yesterday, are to be prosecuted for articles criticizing the French army in Algeria.

Oct. 23—De Gaulle's official residence, the Elysée Palace, announces that Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev has accepted an invitation to visit France. The date of the visit has not been fixed. It is rumored that de Gaulle would like the visit to precede a summit conference.

Oct. 27—Debré declares that a summit conference should be scheduled for the spring. He declares that Khrushchev's French visit is a prerequisite to creating conditions favorable to summit talks.

Oct. 28—President de Gaulle asks the co-operation of the army and civil officials in Algeria in promoting an Algerian settlement.

De Gaulle appoints Jean-Marc Boegner as Ambassador to Tunisia.

Oct. 29—It is reported that last week Marshal Alphonse-Pierre Juin was asked not to interfere in politics after an article of his, attacking de Gaulle's Algerian proposals, was published.

#### FRENCH OVERSEAS COMMUNITY, THE Algeria

Oct. 1—Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba urges France and Algeria to pursue a peace settlement.

Libya and the Sudan, before the U.N. General Assembly, urge French President de Gaulle to open talks with Algerian leaders.

Oct. 2—France boycotts a General Assembly speech by Guinea criticizing French excesses in Algeria.

Oct. 13—France again offers leaders of the Algerian Provisional Government a safe conduct guarantee to Paris to discuss a cease-fire.

Premier Michel Debré opens a National Assembly debate on France's three-way proposal for Algeria.

Oct. 16—A promoter of a liberal Algerian policy, Senator Francois Mitterrand, survives an attack on his life.

The National Assembly, 441 to 23, approves France's proposals for Algerian self-determination.

Oct. 24—French Senators in the French upper house urge a cease-fire settlement between Algerian nationalists and French troops.

Oct. 25—At a meeting of 200 representatives of the Gaullist Union for the New Republic in Algeria, de Gaulle's proposal for secession, integration or autonomy for Algeria is accepted. It is also reported that on October 22 some 300 mayors and other local officials resolved to accept the de Gaulle proposal.

Oct. 30—Delegate General Paul Delouvrier declares that either through a negotiated cease-fire or a military campaign, France will still be the victor in Algeria.

#### Cameroon

Oct. 29—Premier Ahmadou Ahidjo's government is empowered to rule by decree for 6 months.

#### GERMANY, EAST

Oct. 29—It is announced that Bishop Otto Debelius, Bishop of Berlin and Brandenburg in East Germany, will be forced to cease activities unless he issues a loyalty statement.

#### GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF WEST

Oct. 3—Minister of the Economy Ludwig Erhard arrives in West Germany after attending meetings of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Monetary Fund in Washington. He says that Germany must aid the underdeveloped countries.

Oct. 6—The West German Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee debates whether or not West Germany should recognize the governments of East Europe.

Oct. 10—It is announced that West Germany and Canada have agreed on a joint procurement program for basic parts for Starfighter aircraft.

Oct. 13—West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer rejects recognition for East European countries.

Oct. 14—The West German Cabinet approves a measure prohibiting the production or distribution of military arms in West Germany without government consent.

Oct. 17—Adenauer receives personal letters from Khrushchev and Eisenhower. Their contents are not disclosed.

Oct. 20—Adenauer announces he will go to London November 17 to discuss British-German tensions.

Oct. 26—It is reported that Adenauer has obtained stronger authority over his Christian Democratic Union party.

#### GUINEA

Oct. 4—The Peking radio broadcasts that Red China and Guinea have agreed to establish diplomatic relations.

Oct. 26—Guinea's President, Sekou Touré, arrives in the U.S.

Oct. 27—Touré meets for talks with President Dwight D. Eisenhower.

#### HAITI

Oct. 10—It is reported that 6 of Haiti's 21 Senators have been accused of an anti-government conspiracy. A National Assembly meeting will be called to choose 6 new Senators.

Oct. 23—President Francois Duvalier announces that Congress will convene next week to hear his new economic austerity program.

#### ICELAND

Oct. 25—Elections are held for the Althing (lower house of Parliament). The elections will continue through tomorrow.

Oct. 28—Results of the elections reveal that no party has received a majority of the 60 seats. The Independence party won 24 seats, the largest single bloc.

#### INDONESIA

Oct. 8—Finance Minister Djuanda Karawidjaja rebuts former Vice-President Mohammed Hatta's criticism of Indonesia's recent monetary reforms—the devaluation of large rupiah notes and freezing of large bank accounts.

#### IRAN

Oct. 9—U.S. President Eisenhower meets with Iranian Premier Manouchehr Eghbal, who is in the U.S. for a meeting of

the Council of Ministers of Cento. A White House statement on the talks reveals that Eisenhower commended the Premier for his country's firm withstanding of Communist propaganda.

## IRAQ

Oct. 7—Premier Abdul Karim Kassim receives a slight shoulder wound in an attack upon his life.

Oct. 8—Kassim's condition is reported as "good."

Oct. 15—A high-ranking Iraqi military leader reveals that a second plot on the life of Premier Kassim has been unearthed.

Oct. 16—Syrian troop movements on the Iraqi border are rumored following an Iraqi charge to this effect.

The U.A.R. denies Iraqi charges of Syrian troop massing on Iraq's border.

## ISRAEL

Oct. 6—The Israeli-Egyptian Mixed Armistice Commission condemns Israel for an attack on Bedouin tribesmen in the Negev.

Oct. 7—Israel's boycott of the Mixed Armistice Commission, initiated in 1956, is continued.

Oct. 18—It is announced that the French Renault auto company has cancelled a contract to deliver parts to Israel because it was blacklisted by the Arab League.

## ITALY

Oct. 1—Premier Antonio Segni tells the National Press Club, during his U.S. visit, that the West should not disarm until appropriate guarantees have been established.

Oct. 3—Segni arrives in New York, soliciting increased U.S. investments for his country.

Oct. 21—Segni receives a vote of confidence from the Chamber of Deputies before they adjourn until November 5.

Oct. 29—It is reported, following the close of the Christian Democratic party's seventh congress, that Antonio Segni and his government received overwhelming support.

## JAPAN

Oct. 26—A special session of the Japanese Diet opens to discuss budget problems.

## KOREA, NORTH

Oct. 25—The Peking radio broadcasts that North Korean Foreign Minister General

Nam Il has been replaced by Pak Sung Chul.

## LAOS

Oct. 9—Laos announces that its presentation of evidence to support charges of North Vietnamese aggression against Laos to the U.N. fact-finding committee has been completed.

Oct. 11—It is reported that the U.N. fact-finding mission will leave for New York where a report will be drafted. A "watch-dog" team will be left in Laos.

Oct. 21—Terrorists attack Pakse, the largest town in southern Laos. A Laotian army patrol is routed.

Oct. 30—King Sisavang Vong of Laos dies.

Oct. 31—Letters from Red China to Britain and the U.S.S.R., asking them to intervene in the forthcoming trial of the Leftist Neo Lao Haksat party leader, Prince Souphanouvong, by the Laotian government, are published.

## LEBANON

Oct. 8—Premier Rashid Karame doubles his Cabinet by adding 4 new posts.

## MEXICO

Oct. 10—President Adolfo Lopez, visiting the U.S., talks with President Eisenhower at Camp David.

## MOROCCO

Oct. 1—Morocco announces a trade agreement with Red China totaling \$11,600,000.

Oct. 15—Following talks with U.S. President Eisenhower in Washington, Premier Abdallah Ibrahim reveals that the question of U.S. bases in Morocco was discussed.

Oct. 16—The dirham, equivalent to 100 Moroccan francs, is announced as a new monetary unit.

Oct. 17—Announcement is made that the Moroccan franc will be devalued 20 per cent, increasing the rate of exchange from 420 to 506 francs to the dollar (effective October 19).

Oct. 19—It is reported that the U.S. will grant a \$40 million loan to Morocco in 1960.

Oct. 30—The U.S. announces it will evacuate its Moroccan bases.

Oct. 31—King Mohammed opens the dis-

tribution program of state lands to Moroccan peasants.

#### PHILIPPINES, THE

Oct. 12—The U.S. and the Philippines sign a "memorandum of agreement" revising the arrangements for U.S. bases on these islands. Four major bases out of 23 will remain.

#### POLAND

Oct. 2—Poland advises the U.N. to recognize two Germanies.

Oct. 19—Price increases (25 per cent) on meat are established because of the continuing shortage.

Oct. 27—Edward Ochab is removed as Minister of Agriculture because of the recent economic crisis. He is replaced by Mieczyslaw Jagielski.

Oct. 28—It is reported that Polish Communist party Secretary Wladyslaw Gomulka's attempts to tighten economic planning have caused a rift in the United Workers (Communist) party.

#### RUMANIA

Oct. 25—It is announced that Soviet Premier Khrushchev has ended a 6-day secret visit to Rumania, supposedly on a holiday.

#### SWEDEN

Oct. 26—The Academy of Science announces that the Nobel Prize in science has been awarded to two Americans and a Czech: Owen Chamberlain and Emilio Segre share the honors in physics; Jaroslav Heyrovsky receives the chemistry award.

#### SWITZERLAND

Oct. 24—Elections to a new National Council and Council of States (lower and upper houses of parliament respectively) are held. They will continue tomorrow.

Oct. 26—Results of the national elections reveal that the 196-member National Council keeps almost its same divisions. The Socialists drop 2 seats, which gives them and the Radicals 51 seats apiece. The Communists lose one seat, leaving them with 3. The Council of State also retains its old balance.

#### TIBET

Oct. 14—In an address in Peking, Tibet's new spiritual leader, the Panchen Lama,

declares that his people are in the throes of a "peaceful revolution."

#### TUNISIA (See *French Overseas Community, Algeria*)

#### TURKEY

Oct. 9—Premier Adnan Menderes confers with U.S. President Eisenhower. Menderes is in Washington for a meeting of the Council of Ministers of Cento (see also *International, Cento*).

#### U.S.S.R. THE (See also *Rumania*)

Oct. 4—Soviet scientists announce the launching of Lunik III, a lunar rocket that reportedly will photograph the far side of the moon. The latest moon shot was ejected as the last stage of a multi-stage rocket. It is a 613 pound capsule carrying radio and other equipment.

Oct. 6—U.S. Secretary of State Chistian A. Herter declares that Russia's claim to Communist world leadership makes her responsible for the Communist bloc to "a degree."

Oct. 6—It is reported that a Communist party official last week gave figures which reveal a general increase of 11 per cent in industrial production as compared to the 7.7 per cent increase predicted.

Oct. 7—The Soviet "round the moon" satellite continues in its track.

Oct. 8—Premier Khrushchev anticipates a summit conference this fall or winter, according to a speech (made in Vladivostok last week) just broadcast by the Moscow radio.

An official Moscow report declares that Lunik III has passed the far side of the moon, and will now go into orbit around the earth.

Oct. 10—Khrushchev arrives in Moscow for the first time (except for a 31-hour stop-over between his trip from the U.S. to Red China) since September 14. He has spent the last week touring and speaking in eastern Russia.

Oct. 14—Paul Yudin, Soviet Ambassador to Red China since 1953, is replaced by Stepan V. Chervonenko.

Konstantin F. Lunev, deputy chairman of the Soviet State Security Committee, is named chairman of the Kazakhstan State



Security Committee, according to a report reaching Moscow.

It is also reported that a strike of several days' duration was staged at a steel mill in Kazakhstan.

Oct. 16—A government announcement promises increased production of consumer goods in 1961 (a 42 per cent increase is ordered).

Oct. 17—The U.S. State Department discloses that Russell A. Langelie, chief security officer of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, has been ordered to leave Moscow. He is accused of espionage. The State Department also reveals that prior to the Soviet demand for his ouster, Langelie had been kidnapped and threatened by Russians who offered him money to betray the U.S.

Oct. 18—The Soviet Union reports that its "automatic interplanetary station," Lunik III, has photographed the far side of the moon.

Oct. 19—The Soviet Union lists specific charges against Russell Langelie.

Oct. 21—It is reported that Britain and the U.S. favor an early summit meeting as news of the forthcoming talks between Khrushchev and French President Charles de Gaulle are made known. France states that summit talks should not be held until spring.

In a letter to the U.S., it is reported that Premier Khrushchev voices his support of the Red Chinese claim to the Nationalist islands, which he terms an "internal" Chinese problem. Khrushchev also is reported to have rejected in his letter the doctrine of "limited responsibility" for the Soviet bloc, as recently promulgated by U.S. officers.

Oct. 23—The Soviet Union declares that it advocates summit talks as soon as possible.

Oct. 27—The first photograph of the far side of the moon is released by the Soviet Union.

The Supreme Soviet (the legislature) receives the 1960 budget with outlays for expenses totalling 744 billion rubles and a national revenue of 772 billion rubles.

Oct. 31—Soviet Premier Khrushchev addresses the closing session of the 6-day meeting of the Supreme Soviet. He tells the delegates that there must be East-West

compromise if differences are to be settled and "peaceful co-existence" is to be pursued. Upholding compromise, he rejects any betrayal of basic principles.

## UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

Oct. 8—In an interview with U.A.R. President Gamal Abdel Nasser, it is reported that Nasser has expressed a willingness to abide by the 1951 Security Council resolution on free shipping through the Suez provided Israel complies with U.N. resolutions on the Palestine refugees and other points.

Oct. 24—It is reported that last week the Commander-in-Chief of U.A.R. forces, Abdul Hakim, was put in control of all activities in the Syrian region of the U.A.R.

Oct. 25—The U.A.R. accepts Peking's apology for a speech, attacking the U.A.R., made at Red China's tenth anniversary celebration by a Syrian Communist party leader.

## UNITED STATES

### Agriculture

Oct. 6—The Agriculture Department reveals overwhelming support from sheep raisers for a program of lamb and wool promotion financed by deductions from the direct government subsidies paid to sheep raisers.

Oct. 22—Secretary of Agriculture Ezra Taft Benson says that a 7-year campaign has eliminated the hog disease called vesicular exanthema.

### Economy

Oct. 9—The Treasury reports that some 100,000 buyers put up over \$800 million in cash for the "magic fives"—the 5 per cent bonds due in 1964 offered by the Treasury on October 6.

Oct. 23—The Consumer Price Index is reported to have reached a record in mid-September; the peak is reported at 125.2, 25.2 per cent above the 1947-1949 average.

### Foreign Policy

Oct. 2—Speaking in Bonn, Germany, former Secretary of State Dean Acheson criticizes President Eisenhower's effort to negotiate with the U.S.S.R. on Berlin.

Oct. 4—The temporary White House says

that Eisenhower is not committed to attend a Big Four summit conference.

National Aeronautics and Space Administration head T. Keith Glennan congratulates the Russians on their launching of an around-the-moon rocket.

Oct. 7—Under Secretary of State Douglas Dillon says that if the Chinese Communists attack Taiwan and the offshore islands they will risk "total" world war.

Oct. 9—Mexican President Adolfo Lopez Mateos arrives in Washington on a state visit.

Oct. 10—It is reported in Washington that the U.S. and Turkey have agreed on the establishment of an intermediate range ballistic missile base in Turkey.

Oct. 12—Atomic Energy Commission Chairman John McCone, in Moscow, says that Russian-American collaboration in the field of non-military development of nuclear energy will be profitable to both countries.

Oct. 16—An attaché of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow is temporarily detained by Soviet authorities who charge him with espionage. (See also U.S.S.R.)

Oct. 17—The State Department protests the temporary detention of an American attaché in Moscow.

Oct. 19—The Development Loan Fund reveals that loans to underdeveloped nations from now on must be spent on American-made goods.

Oct. 26—The International Development Advisory Board resigns; Congress has refused funds for this agency.

Oct. 27—Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee J. W. Fulbright criticizes the new "Buy American" restriction on loans to underdeveloped nations.

Oct. 28—Eisenhower says that Britain, France and West Germany have sent "expressions of readiness" for a December pre-summit meeting.

The President says the government is studying foreign aid and the new "buy American" policy of the Development Loan Fund.

Oct. 29—The President reveals he has accepted French President de Gaulle's suggestion for a Paris pre-summit meeting December 19.

The President approves New York city as the site of the 1964 world's fair.

Oct. 30—The U.S. confirms its plans to withdraw from five Moroccan military bases.

#### Government

October 1—The Internal Revenue Service publishes a simplified tax form, 1040W, the first new tax form in five years.

President Eisenhower starts an 8-day California vacation.

A federal court says E. I. du Pont de Nemours can retain its 23 per cent stock interest in General Motors but cannot retain voting rights.

Oct. 8—Secretary of Commerce Frederick H. Mueller notifies the states that federal payments to states for highway building in the 1960 fiscal year will be limited to \$2.7 billion.

Oct. 10—Federal Communications Commission Chairman John C. Doerfer tells Congress the F.C.C. cannot take action against "fixed" television quiz shows.

Vice-President Richard Nixon dedicates a \$250 million Columbia River dam.

Oct. 13—John D. Hickerson is named Ambassador to the Philippines, succeeding Charles E. Bohlen.

Oct. 14—President Eisenhower celebrates his sixty-ninth birthday.

Oct. 20—President Eisenhower reveals plans to fly to Georgia tomorrow for a five day rest.

Oct. 22—The President reveals that he has chronic bronchitis.

The President says he has asked William P. Rogers, the Attorney General, to look into television quiz programs.

Oct. 25—The Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy orders a reappraisal of the "atoms for peace" program.

Oct. 27—Postmaster General Arthur E. Summerfield reveals that facsimile mail service is being considered for future fast mail delivery.

Oct. 28—The President accepts the resignation of Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy.

The Justice Department institutes a presidential inquiry into television quiz show procedures.

Oct. 31—His annual checkup reveals that

the President is in excellent health, except for a mild bronchitis.

The President names Livingston T. Merchant to replace Robert Murphy as Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs.

### Labor

Oct. 1—Teamsters Brotherhood chief James Hoffa says two-thirds of his locals have been checked and have no officers in violation of the new labor reform bill.

East and Gulf Coast ports are tied up by dock workers who defy their leaders.

Oct. 2—Monitors of the Teamsters Union say that Hoffa has refused to follow their suggested reforms.

Oct. 5—Steel negotiations collapse.

Eisenhower asks for a steel strike agreement.

Oct. 6—Eisenhower invokes the Taft-Hartley Act to end the dock strike, finding that the strike would "imperil the national health and safety" if it continued.

Oct. 8—A Federal court order ends the 8-day East and Gulf coast longshoremen strike.

Oct. 9—Invoking Taft-Hartley Act provisions, the President sets up a board of inquiry to investigate the steel controversy.

Oct. 13—The President's board of inquiry reports that a steel strike settlement is not in sight.

Oct. 15—The Steelworkers Union offers a reduced money demand in an effort to settle the steel strike.

Oct. 17—The steel companies reveal that they have refused to meet the new reduced demands of the steel union.

Oct. 18—Edgar F. Kaiser, of the Kaiser Steel Corporation, agrees to stop separate negotiations with steel union leaders.

Steel contract negotiations halt.

Oct. 19—The President orders Attorney General William P. Rogers to seek a court order enjoining the steel strike.

Oct. 20—President of the Carpenters Union Maurice A. Hutcheson is indicted for contempt of Congress.

Oct. 21—Federal District Court Judge Herbert P. Sorg orders the steel strike ended; Appeals Court Judge Austin L. Staley stays the enforcement of the court order overnight to allow the U.S. Court of Ap-

peals a chance to rule on the union challenge of the injunction.

Oct. 22—Three judges of the Court of Appeals grant a stay of the federal injunction order in the steel strike until October 26 or October 27.

Eisenhower criticizes both sides in the continuing steel strike.

Oct. 23—Steel strike negotiations are resumed.

Oct. 26—The Kaiser Steel Corporation signs a contract adding 22.5¢ an hour to steel workers' wages over the next 20 months.

Oct. 27—Some 1,300 workers return to work at the Kaiser Steel Corporation.

The Court of Appeals upholds the President's request for an injunction ending the steel strike but delays its issuance to allow the union to ask for a Supreme Court review. (See also *Supreme Court*.)

The U.S. Steel Corporation reveals a loss of over \$31 million in the third quarter of 1959.

Oct. 28—Union sources reveal that the strike truce with the Aluminum Company of America has been indefinitely extended.

Arrangements are completed for a resumption of steel negotiations by labor and management; both sides are summoned to a conference with the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service on November 2 if negotiations are not successful.

Oct. 29—The Granite City Steel Company signs a contract with the United Steelworkers, following the lead of Kaiser and the Detroit Steel Corporation.

Direct negotiations between steel union and industry representatives are abandoned.

### Military Policy

Oct. 13—A B-47 bomber fires a ballistic missile in the vicinity of the paddle wheel Explorer VI, successfully testing a new long-range attack and defense weapon.

A scientific satellite, Explorer VII, is launched from Cape Canaveral by an Army Juno rocket.

Oct. 16—General of the Army George Catlett Marshall dies at 78 after a long illness.

Oct. 17—It is revealed in Washington that Advanced Research Projects Agency head Roy W. Johnson plans to resign as soon as a successor for his job can be found.

Oct. 18—Atomic Energy Commission Chair-

man John A. McCone, visiting in Moscow, says that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. will have to declassify equivalent amounts of nuclear information.

Oct. 19—Major General John B. Medaris announces that he will retire as of January 31 as commander of the Army Ordnance Missile Command.

Oct. 20—The Navy reveals apparent sabotage at Portsmouth, where damage to the electrical cables of the Nautilus has been discovered.

Oct. 21—The President moves to transfer all Army space activities to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration headed by T. Keith Glennan. The Army ballistic missile team headed by Wernher von Braun will be placed under the civilian agency.

Oct. 27—General August Schomburg is named to succeed Medaris as head of the Army Ordnance Missile Command.

#### Politics

Oct. 9—New York's Governor Nelson Rockefeller says that non-Communist nations should ask the Russians to agree to preconditions before East-West trade is expanded.

Oct. 14—Twelve of the 13 Democratic Southern governors meeting at their twenty-fifth annual conference agree that a Deep South split at the presidential national convention is unlikely.

Oct. 15—Governor Rockefeller reveals plans for a 3-day speaking tour of California and Oregon in November.

Oct. 17—House Speaker Sam Rayburn begins a "Johnson for President" campaign.

Oct. 25—Rockefeller urges the United States to resume nuclear testing underground.

Oct. 28—Rockefeller confers with President Eisenhower in Washington.

#### Segregation

Oct. 12—Virginia's former Governor John S. Battle quits as a member of the Civil Rights Commission; he has criticized the Commission's first report as "an argument in advocacy of preconceived ideas in race relations."

Oct. 22—Virginia's Pupil Placement Board is told to assign four Negroes to white schools in Norfolk, or face contempt proceedings.

Oct. 27—Miami's recreational facilities are integrated, on order of the City Manager.

Oct. 28—The City Commission of Miami unanimously votes to reverse the order integrating the city's recreational facilities.

#### Supreme Court

Oct. 5—The fall term of the Supreme Court opens; 39 lawyers are admitted to practice at the bar of the Court.

Oct. 12—The Court refuses to review two decisions holding pupil placement laws constitutional.

The Court refuses to hear a Prince Edward County, Virginia, appeal for delay in desegregation.

The Court refuses to review a U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decision that Mississippi cannot constitutionally convict Negroes in counties without Negro voters, because Mississippi jurors are chosen from registered voters' rolls.

Oct. 28—The Court rejects an extraordinary Solicitor General appeal to the Court to end the stay of the steel strike injunction unless the union brings its case in by tomorrow. The Appeals Court has given the Steelworkers Union until November 2 to present its appeal.

Oct. 30—The Court agrees to hear the steel case; the United Steelworkers are challenging the validity of a Taft-Hartley injunction forcing workers back to work in the steel mills.

#### VATICAN, THE

Oct. 8—The Vatican gives all its employees wage increases which average 50 per cent.

Oct. 20—The Sacred Congregation for the Oriental Church announces that plans for a meeting between Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox church officials have been postponed indefinitely.

#### VIETNAM, SOUTH

Oct. 25—A statement by Wolf Ladejinsky, land reform specialist and now adviser on agrarian matters to Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem, is reported in which Ladejinsky praises South Vietnamese progress in agrarian reform.

Oct. 30—A successful army campaign to liquidate terrorist guerrillas in Camau Peninsula in the South is reported.



# Index for July-December, 1959

Volume 37, Numbers 215-220

## SUBJECTS

### AFRICA

- France's Proposals for an Algerian Settlement (doc.), Nov., 303;
- Ghana: Problems and Progress, July, 17;
- Guinea outside the French Community, July, 13;
- Libya: Experiment in Independence, July, 7;
- Map of Libya, 11;
- New States of Africa, entire issue, July, 1959;
- Resolutions of the All-African People's Congress (doc.), July, 41;
- Russia and Afro-Asian Neutralism, Nov., 272;
- Sudan in Transition, The, July, 35;
- Toward Political Maturity in Morocco, July, 23;
- Tunisia and Arab Nationalism, July, 30;
- U.S. Policy for the New Africa, A, July, 1.

### ALGERIA

- France's Proposals for an Algerian Settlement (doc.), Nov., 303.

### ASIA

- Chinese Thrust in Southeast Asia, Dec., 333;
- Russia and Afro-Asian Neutralism, Nov., 272.

### BERLIN

- Berlin and the Balance of Power, Oct., 198;
- Closing Communique of the Geneva Conference (doc.), Oct., 239;
- Eisenhower-Khrushchev Joint Communique (doc.), Nov., 299;
- Map of the Two Germanies, Oct., 199;
- Western Package Plan for a German Settlement (doc.), Oct., 239;
- Western Principles for a German Settlement (doc.), Oct., 243.

### BOOKS REVIEWED

- Abramovitz, Moses, and others, *The Allocation of Economic Resources*, Sept., 172;
- Armstrong, John A., *The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite: A Case Study of the Ukrainian Apparatus*, Aug., 101;
- Bartholomew, Carol, *My Heart Has Seventeen Rooms*, Dec., 364;
- Bascom, William R. and Herskovits, Melville J., eds., *Continuity and Change in African Cultures*, July, 48;
- Benes, Vaclav L., Byrnes, Robt. F. and Spulber, N., eds., *The Second Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute*, Dec., 362;
- Bernal, J. D., *World Without War*, Aug., 103;
- Birdsall, R. D., *Berkshire County: A Cultural History*, Dec., 364;
- Boorstin, Daniel J., *The Americans: The Colonial Experience*, Dec., 364;
- Byrnes, Robt. F., Benes, V. L. and Spulber, Nicholas, eds., *The Second Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute*, Dec., 362;
- Chamberlin, Wm. H., *The Evolution of a Conservative*, Dec., 364;
- Chapin, Miriam, *Contemporary Canada*, July, 51;
- Clough, Shepard B., *The Economic Development of Western Civilization*, July, 51;
- Cohen, Bernard L., *Introduction to the New Economics*, Sept., 172;
- Cottrell, Alvin J., Strausz-Hupé, Robert, Kintner, Wm. R. and Dougherty, James E., *Protracted Conflict*, Nov., 308;
- Cox, Oliver C., *Foundations of Capitalism*, Sept., 172;
- Curti, Merle, and others, *The Making of an American Community*, Sept., 172;
- Dahrendorf, Ralf, *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society*, Sept., 172;
- Diebold, Jr., Wm., *The Schuman Plan*, Dec., 364;

- Dougherty, James E., Strausz-Hupé, Robert, Kintner, Wm. R. and Cottrell, Alvin J., *Protracted Conflict*, Nov., 308;
- Duffy, James, *Portuguese Africa*, July, 48;
- Eppstein, Klaus, *Matthias Erzberger and the Dilemma of German Democracy*, July, 50;
- Fisher, Carol and Kinsky, Fred, *Middle East in Crisis*, July, 49;
- Fitzsimmons, Thomas, ed., *Iraq, Its People, Its Society, Its Culture*, July, 48;
- George, Alexander L., *Propaganda Analysis*, Aug., 104;
- Ginger, Ray, *Altgeld's America*, Sept., 172;
- Graber, D. A., *Crisis Diplomacy*, Oct., 244;
- Halasz, Nicholas, *In the Shadow of Russia*, July, 50;
- Halle, Louis J., *Dream and Reality: Aspects of American Foreign Policy*, Nov., 307;
- Harbison, Frederick and Ibrahim, I. A., *Human Resources for Egyptian Enterprise*, Dec., 363;
- Haring, Albert, *Trading Stamp Practice and Pricing Policy*, Dec., 362;
- Herskovits, Melville J. and Bascom, Wm. R., eds., *Continuity and Change in African Cultures*, July, 48;
- Hitti, Philip, *Syria, A Short History*, July, 48;
- Hussey, W. D. and White, L. D., *Government in Great Britain, The Empire and the Commonwealth*, July, 51;
- Ibrahim, I. A. and Harbison, F., *Human Resources for Egyptian Enterprise*, Dec., 363;
- Kenyon, F. P., *The Stuarts*, Dec., 364;
- Kinsky, Fred and Fisher, Carol, *Middle East in Crisis*, July, 49;
- Kintner, Wm. R., Strausz-Hupé, Robert, Dougherty, James E. and Cottrell, Alvin J., *Protracted Conflict*, Nov., 308;
- Korbonski, Stefan, *Warsaw in Chains*, Nov., 308;
- Laqueur, Walter Z., *The Soviet Union and the Middle East*, Nov., 307;
- Leach, Richard H. and Sugg, Jr., R. S., *The Administration of Interstate Compacts*, Dec., 363;
- Lee, Asher, ed., *The Soviet Air and Rocket Forces*, Dec., 362;
- Leiserson, Wm. H., *American Trade Union Democracy*, Sept., 172;
- Lensen, George A., *The Russian Push toward Japan*, Dec., 362;
- Li, Choh-Ming, *Economic Development of Communist China*, July, 50;
- Little, Tom, *Egypt*, July, 48;
- Logue, John, *The Great Debate on Charter Reform*, July, 49, p.
- Longrigg, Stephen and Stoakes, Frank, *Iraq*, July, 48;
- Luther, Ernest W., *Ethiopia Today*, July, 48;
- Lyons, Gene M. and Masland, John W., *Education and Military Leadership*, Aug., 104;
- McInnis, Edgar, *The Atlantic Triangle and the Cold War*, Oct., 244;
- Magnus, Philip, *Kitchener: Portrait of an Imperialist*, Dec., 364;
- Masland, John W. and Lyons, Gene M., *Education and Military Leadership*, Aug., 104;
- Mayer, Arno J., *Political Origins of the New Diplomacy, 1917-1918*, July, 49;
- Melman, Seymour, ed., *Inspection for Disarmament*, Aug., 103;
- Miksche, F. O., *The Failure of Atomic Strategy*, Dec., 364;
- Miller, J. D. B., *The Commonwealth in the World*, July, 51;
- Millis, Walter, and others, *Arms and the State*, Aug., 104;
- Niebuhr, Reinhold, *The Structure of Nations and Empires*, Dec., 364;
- Nivison, David S. and Wright, Arthur F., *Confucianism in Action*, Dec., 364;
- Page, Stanley W., *Lenin and World Revolution*, Aug., 102;
- Park, Richard L. and Tinker, Irene, eds., *Leadership and Political Institutions in India*, Aug., 101;
- Parton, Margaret, *The Leaf and the Flame*, Dec., 364;
- Qubain, Fahim I., *The Reconstruction of Iraq: 1950-1957*, July, 48;
- Ridgeway, George L., *Merchants of Peace*, Dec., 364;
- Rowse, A. L., *Poems Partly American*, July, 51;
- Russell, Bertrand, *Common Sense and Nuclear Warfare*, Aug., 102;

- Shwadrán, Benjamin, *Jordan, A State of Tension*, July, 49;  
 Snell, John L., *Wartime Origins of the East-West Dilemma over Germany*, Oct., 244;  
 Spulber, Nicholas, Byrnes, Robt. F. and Benes, V. L., eds., *The Second Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute*, Dec., 362;  
 Stoakes, Frank, and Longrigg, Stephen, *Iraq*, July, 48;  
 Strausz-Hupé, Robert, Kintner, Wm. R., Dougherty, James E. and Cottrell, Alvin J., *Protracted Conflict*, Nov., 308;  
 Sugg, Jr., Redding S. and Leach, R. H., *The Administration of Interstate Compacts*, Dec., 363;  
 Thompson, Warren S., *Population and Progress in the Far East*, Dec., 363;  
 Thornton, A. P., *The Imperial Idea and Its Enemies*, July, 51;  
 Tinker, Irene and Park, Richard L., *Leadership and Political Institutions in India*, Aug., 101;  
 Tsuru, Shigeto, *Essays on Japanese Economy*, Dec., 364;  
 Warren, Harris G., *Herbert Hoover and the Great Depression*, Sept., 172;  
 White, L. D. and Hussey, W. D., *Government in Great Britain, The Empire and the Commonwealth*, July, 51;  
 Wright, Arthur F. and Nivison, D. S., *Confucianism in Action*, Dec., 364.

#### CHINA (The People's Republic)

- China Illusion, The, Oct., 222;  
 Chinese-Indian Controversy, Dec., 354;  
 Chinese-Japanese Relations, Dec., 350;  
 Chinese Thrust in Southeast Asia, Dec., 333;  
 Chinese-United States Stalemate, The, Dec., 339;  
 Communes in a Changing China, Dec., 345;  
 Historical View of Chinese Foreign Policy, An, Dec., 321;  
 Khrushchev at Communist China's Anniversary Celebration (doc.), Dec., 365;  
 Moscow-Peking Axis: The First Decade, The, Dec., 326;  
 Soviet Plans for Peking, Nov., 284.

#### CHRONOLOGY (See *The Month in Review*)

#### DISARMAMENT

- American-Russian Arms Competition, Oct., 214;

- Premier Khrushchev's Address to the U.N. (doc.), Nov., 299;  
 Program of General and Complete Disarmament (doc.), Nov., 301.

#### DOCUMENTS

- Closing Communique of the Geneva Conference, Oct., 239;  
 Eisenhower-Khrushchev Joint Communique, Nov., 299;  
 Elliott Bill, Sept., 177;  
 France's Proposals for an Algerian Settlement, Nov., 303;  
 Kennedy Ervin Bill, Sept., 173;  
 Khrushchev at Communist China's Anniversary Celebration, Dec., 365;  
 Landrum-Griffin Bill, Sept., 175;  
 Premier Khrushchev's Address to the U.N., Nov., 299;  
 Program of General and Complete Disarmament, Nov., 301;  
 Resolutions of the All-African People's Congress, July, 41;  
 Supreme Court Upholds Congressional Investigation of Communism in Education: The Barenblatt Case, Aug., 105;  
 Western Package Plan for a German Settlement, Oct., 239;  
 Western Principles for a German Settlement, Oct., 243.

#### EAST EUROPE

- American Policy toward the East European Satellites, Oct., 208;  
 Soviet Policy in East Europe, Nov., 278.

#### FRANCE (See also *Berlin*)

- France's Proposals for an Algerian Settlement (doc.), Nov., 303;  
 Weak Unionism in France, Aug., 74.

#### GERMANY

- Berlin and the Balance of Power, Oct., 198;  
 Closing Communique of the Geneva Conference (doc.), Oct., 239;  
 Eisenhower-Khrushchev Joint Communique (doc.), Nov., 299;  
 Labor and German Prosperity, Aug., 65;  
 Map of the Two Germanies, Oct., 199;  
 Western Package Plan for a German Settlement (doc.), Oct., 239.  
 Western Principles for a German Settlement (doc.), Oct., 243.

**GHANA**

Ghana: Problems and Progress, July, 17.

**GREAT BRITAIN**

British Flexibility and Cold War, Nov., 267;

British Unions and the Government, Aug., 68.

**GUINEA**

Guinea outside the French Community, July, 13.

**INDIA**

Chinese-Indian Controversy, Dec., 354.

**JAPAN**

Chinese-Japanese Relations, Dec., 350;  
Conservative Labor Patterns in Japan, Aug., 85.

**LABOR-GOVERNMENT RELATIONS**

British Unions and the Government, Aug., 68;

Chart of Labor-Government Relations Here and Abroad, Sept., 133;

Collective Bargaining Arena, Sept., 153;  
Conservative Labor Patterns in Japan, Aug., 85;

Elliott Bill (doc.), Sept., 177;

Government and Labor Abroad, entire issue, Aug., 1959;

Government and Labor before the New Deal, Sept., 134;

Government and Labor during World War II, Sept., 146;

Government and Labor in the Eisenhower Administration, Sept., 129;

Government and Labor in the U.S., entire issue, Sept., 1959;

Government and Labor Relations during the New Deal, Sept., 139;

Kennedy Ervin Bill (doc.), Sept., 173;

Labor and German Prosperity, Aug., 65;

Labor Policy in a Democracy, Aug., 96;

Labor Problems in a Developing Economy, Aug., 91;

Labor under the Taft-Hartley Act, Sept., 160;

Landrum-Griffin Bill (doc.), Sept., 175;

Proposals for Change in Labor Legislation, Sept., 165;

Trade Unions in the Soviet State, Aug., 79;

Weak Unionism in France, Aug., 74.

**LIBYA**

Libya: Experiment in Independence, July, 7;

Map of Libya, July, 11.

**MAPS**

Libya, July, 11;

Major Soviet Bloc Aid Agreements, Nov., 273;

Two Germanies, The, Oct., 199;

U.S. Collective Defense Arrangements, Oct., 215.

**MONTH IN REVIEW, THE**

May, 1959, Chronology, July, 52;

June, 1959, Chronology, Aug., 117;

July, 1959, Chronology, Sept., 181;

August, 1959, Chronology, Oct., 245;

Sept., 1959, Chronology, Nov., 309;

October, 1959, Chronology, Dec., 367.

**MOROCCO (See also *Africa*)**

Toward Political Maturity in Morocco, July, 23.

**RECEIVED AT OUR DESK**

July, 48; Aug., 101; Sept., 172; Oct., 244;  
Nov., 307; Dec., 362.

**SUDAN**

Sudan in Transition, The, July, 35.

**TUNISIA**

Tunisia and Arab Nationalism, July, 30.

**U.S.S.R., THE**

American-Russian Arms Competition, Oct., 214;

Berlin and the Balance of Power, Oct., 198;

British Flexibility and the Cold War, Nov., 267;

Closing Communique of the Geneva Conference (doc.), Oct., 239;

Dogma of Communist Victory, The, Nov., 257;

Economic Competition in the Underdeveloped Areas, Oct., 233;

Eisenhower-Khrushchev Joint Communique (doc.), Nov., 299;

Khrushchev at Communist China's Anniversary Celebration (doc.), Dec., 365;

Map of Major Soviet Bloc Aid Agreements, Nov., 273;

Moscow-Peking Axis: The First Decade, Dec., 326;



Premier Khrushchev's Address to the U.N. (doc.), Nov., 299;  
 Program of General and Complete Disarmament (doc.), Nov., 301;  
 Russia and Afro-Asian Neutralism, Nov., 272;  
 Russian Criticism of American Foreign Policy: An Open Letter from *International Affairs*, Moscow, Nov., 295;  
 Russian Foreign Policy and the Western World, entire issue, Nov., 1959;  
 Soviet Industrialization and the Cold War, Nov., 262;  
 Soviet Plans for Peking, Nov., 284;  
 Soviet Policy and World Conquest, Nov., 290;  
 Soviet Policy in East Europe, Nov., 278;  
 Trade Unions in the Soviet State, Aug., 79;  
 U.N. and the Cold War Conflict, The, Oct., 228.

#### UNITED NATIONS

Premier Khrushchev's Address to the U.N. (doc.), Nov., 299;  
 Program of General and Complete Disarmament (doc.), Nov., 301;  
 U.N. and the Cold War Conflict, The, Oct., 228;

#### UNITED STATES (Domestic)

Chart of Labor-Government Relations Here and Abroad, Sept., 133;  
 Collective Bargaining Arena, The, Sept., 153;  
 Elliott Bill (doc.), Sept., 177;  
 Government and Labor before the New Deal, Sept., 134;  
 Government and Labor during World War II, Sept., 146;  
 Government and Labor in the Eisenhower Administration, Sept., 129;  
 Government and Labor in the U.S., entire issue, Sept., 1959;

Government and Labor Relations during the New Deal, Sept., 139;  
 Kennedy Ervin Bill (doc.), Sept., 173;  
 Labor under the Taft-Hartley Act, Sept., 160;  
 Landrum-Griffin Bill (doc.), Sept., 175;  
 Proposals for Change in Labor Legislation, Sept., 165;  
 Supreme Court Upholds Congressional Investigation of Communism in Education: The Barenblatt Case, Aug., 105.

#### UNITED STATES (Foreign)

American Foreign Policy and the Communist World, entire issue, Oct., 1959;  
 American Policy toward the East European Satellites, Oct., 208;  
 American-Russian Arms Competition, Oct., 214;  
 Berlin and the Balance of Power, Oct., 198;  
 China Illusion, The, Oct., 222;  
 Chinese-United States Stalemate, The, Dec., 339;  
 Closing Communique of the Geneva Conference (doc.), Oct., 239;  
 Economic Competition in the Underdeveloped Areas, Oct., 233;  
 Eisenhower-Khrushchev Joint Communique (doc.), Nov., 299;  
 Map of U.S. Collective Defense Arrangements, Oct., 215;  
 Russian Criticism of American Foreign Policy: An Open Letter from *International Affairs*, Moscow, Nov., 295;  
 U.N. and the Cold War Conflict, The, Oct., 228;  
 U.S. Policy for the New Africa, A., July, 1;  
 U.S. Policy in the Cold War, Oct., 193;  
 Western Package Plan for a German Settlement (doc.), Oct., 239;  
 Western Principles for a German Settlement (doc.), Oct., 243.

### AUTHORS

#### BALDWIN, GEORGE B.:

Labor Problems in a Developing Economy, Aug., 91.

#### BERKES, ROSS N.:

United Nations and the Cold War Conflict, The, Oct., 228.

#### CALLIS, HELMUT G.:

Chinese-U.S. Stalemate, The, Dec., 339.

#### CHAO KUO-CHÜN:

Chinese-Indian Controversy, Dec., 354.

#### EDELMAN, MURRAY:

Labor Policy in a Democracy, Aug., 96.

**ERHARD, LUDWIG:**

Labor and German Prosperity, Aug., 65.

**FINE, SIDNEY:**

Government and Labor Relations during the New Deal, Sept., 139.

**FISCHER-GALATI, STEPHEN:**

Soviet Policy in East Europe, Nov., 278.

**FLORINSKY, MICHAEL T.:**

Soviet Industrialization and the Cold War, Nov., 262.

**FREEDMAN, MONROE H.:**

Proposals for Change in Labor Legislation, Sept., 165.

**GRAEBNER, NORMAN A.:**

China Illusion, The, Oct., 222.

**GRANTHAM, JR., DEWEY W.:**

Government and Labor before the New Deal, Sept., 134.

**HUDSON, G. F.:**

British Flexibility and the Cold War, Nov., 267.

**KENWORTHY, LEONARD S.:**

Ghana: Problems and Progress, July, 17.

**KERTESZ, STEPHEN D.:**

Berlin and the Balance of Power, Oct., 198.

**KITCHEN, HELEN A.:**

Sudan in Transition, The, July, 35.

**KOHN, HANS:**

U.S. Policy in the Cold War, Oct., 193.

**LEVI, WERNER:**

Historical View of Chinese Foreign Policy, An, Dec., 321.

**LEVITAN, SAR A.:**

Labor under the Taft-Hartley Act, Sept., 160.

**LINEBARGER, PAUL M. A.:**

Chinese-Japanese Relations, Dec., 350.

**LOGUE, J. GORDON:**

Collective Bargaining Arena, The, Sept., 153.

**McKAY, VERNON:**

U.S. Policy for the New Africa, A, July, 1.

**McLANE, CHARLES B.:**

Moscow-Peking Axis: The First Decade, The, Dec., 326.

**MARES, VACLAV E.:**

American Policy toward the East European Satellites, Oct., 208.

**MARTIN, BENJAMIN:**

Conservative Labor Patterns in Japan, Aug., 85.

**MICAUD, CHARLES A.:**

Weak Unionism in France, Aug., 74.

**MITCHELL, JAMES:**

Government and Labor in the Eisenhower Administration, Sept., 129.

**MORGENTHAU, HANS J.:**

Soviet Policy and World Conquest, Nov., 290.

**MURRAY, ROBERT K.:**

Government and Labor during World War II, Sept., 146.

**NANES, ALLAN S.:**

American-Russian Arms Competition, Oct., 214.

**RIVLIN, BENJAMIN:**

Toward Political Maturity in Morocco, July, 23.

**RUBINSTEIN, ALVIN Z.:**

Book reviews, July, 49-51; Aug., 101-102; Oct., 244; Nov., 307-308; Dec., 362-363.

Economic Competition in the Underdeveloped Areas, Oct., 233.

**RUDIN, HARRY R.:**

Guinea outside the French Community, July, 13.

**SCHWARZ, SOLOMON, M.:**

Trade Unions in the Soviet State, Aug., 79.

**SHEPHERD, GEORGE W.:**

Tunisia and Arab Nationalism, July, 30.

**SPECTOR, IVAR:**

Russia and Afro-Asian Neutralism, Nov., 272.

**TANG, PETER S. H.:**

Soviet Plans for Peking, Nov., 284.

**TOWSTER, JULIAN:**

Dogma of Communist Victory, The, Nov., 257.

**VANDENBOSCH, AMRY:**

Chinese Thrust in Southeast Asia, Dec., 333.

**VILLARD, HENRY S.:**

Libya: Experiment in Independence, July., 7.

**WIGHAM, ERIC:**

British Unions and the Government, Aug., 68.

**WU, YUAN-LI:**

Communes in a Changing China, The, Dec., 345.

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